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RE-READING WEBER IN LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: 
A CRITICAL INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF “GOOD GOVERNANCE” REFORM 
 
Chantal Thomas* 
 
*   *   * 
 
The "Weberianism" of the modern age derives from the influence of three 
theoretical concepts in Weber's work. First, Weber described the development 
of "logically formal rationality" in governance as central to the rise of Western 
capitalist democracy. Second, Weber posited that Protestant religious ethics 
had helped to promote certain economic behaviors associated with 
contemporary capitalism. Third, Weber identified the rise of bureaucratic 
governance, as the primary means of realizing logically formal rationality, as 
distinctly modern.  
 
This essay examines the influence of these basic insights on discourse on legal 
reform in developing countries. The prioritization of legal and institutional 
reforms to achieve "good governance" seems to be part of a larger intellectual 
shift to the problems and challenges of "governance" in a globalizing world.  
 
Transmitters of Weberian analysis in this milieu, however, have at times elided 
important nuances in Weber's own thought -- nuances that, if incorporated, 
might have significant implications within development discourse.  
 
The paper's objectives are: first, to conduct an intellectual history that shows 
how one of the greatest sociologists influenced an increasingly important area 
of law reform in the age of globalization; second, to surface critiques arising 
within that field of law reform; and third, to suggest that there may be some 
connection between the two. In that sense, the paper seeks to make a 
contribution to two discourses: to enrich the study of the history of legal thought 
the reception of an important thinker has shaped contemporary law and policy 
in a relatively understudied field in the academy; and at the same time to 
underscore and contextualize policy critiques that have arisen in an 
increasingly important field of practice. 
                                                          
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, ct343@cornell.edu.  Parts I, II.A. and 
II.B. were published as Max Weber, Talcott Parsons and the Sociology of Legal 
Reform: A Reassessment with Implications for Law and Development, 15 MINN. 
J. INT'L L. 383 (2006).  My thanks to Brian Bix, Jim Chen, Daria Roithmayr, 
Duncan Kennedy and Hani Sayed for their helpful comments, suggestions and 
encouragements.  Errors are of course mine alone. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1313718
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The present age and its presentation of itself is 
dominantly ‘Weberian.’1 
 
Weber’s renowned comparative studies from his 
Protestant Ethic [The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism] to his Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft [Economy 
and Society] have yet to be understood in their true light.  
They are much more than they seem or are generally 
understood to be, comparative sociological 
investigations against a background of the history of 
Western civilization and culture.  In a sense which many 
overlook, they are prophecies and warnings – 
prophecies about the menacing shape of things to come, 
warnings against the further expansion of the domain of 
conscienceless reason, even in the name of the most 
noble ideals… The noblest impulses only too often gave 
rise to the most baleful consequences.2 
 
The “Weberianism” of the modern age derives from the 
influence of three theoretical concepts in Weber’s work.  
First, Weber described the development of “logically formal 
rationality” in governance as central to the rise of Western 
capitalist democracy.  Second, Weber posited that Protestant 
religious ethics had helped to promote certain economic 
behaviors associated with contemporary capitalism.  Third, 
Weber identified the rise of bureaucratic governance, as the 
primary means of realizing logically formal rationality, as 
distinctly modern.   
This essay examines the influence of these basic 
insights on discourse on legal reform in developing 
countries. Involvement in the politics of his native Germany 
aside, Weber himself wrote mostly from the perspective of 
                                                          
1  ALASDAIR MCINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE.  McIntyre’s comment situates Weber 
within a debate between naturalist and positivist philosophy, which this paper 
briefly discusses in section A.3. infra.   
2 Benjamin Nelson, Discussion on Industrialization and Capitalism, in STAMMER ED., 
MAX WEBER AND SOCIOLOGY, pp.17-18 (cited in Alan Sica, Rationalization and 
culture, CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO WEBER 54, 54 (2000)). 
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an historian, seeking to explain the difference between 
countries rather than to propose reforms for change within 
them.  Though descriptive rather than prescriptive, Weber’s 
analyses have exerted wide-ranging influence on American 
scholars and administrators who concern themselves with 
causing developing countries to acquire the affluence of the 
modern West.   
This work originated in the social sciences, and is 
characterized in particular by the work of Talcott Parsons 
(with “Structural-Functionalist” sociology) and W.W. 
Rostow (with “Modernization Theory”), both writing in the 
mid-twentieth century.  Structural-Functionalism and 
Modernization Theory helped generate a particular set of 
views, collected under the rubric of “Law and Development 
Theory” about the kinds of legal reforms necessary to 
facilitate development, formulated in the 1950s and 1960s.  
The tenets of Law and Development Theory have in turn 
helped to shape the basis in the last two decades for a 
renewed attention within influential development 
institutions to the importance legal reform referred to as 
“Good Governance Policy.”  The prioritization of legal and 
institutional reforms to achieve “good governance” seems to 
be part of a larger intellectual shift to the problems and 
challenges of “governance” in a globalizing world. 
Transmitters of Weberian analysis in this milieu, 
however, have elided important nuances in Weber’s own 
thought -- nuances that, if incorporated, might have 
significant implications within development discourse.  
These elisions, which I term the “Three Theoretical Shortcuts,” 
may have contributed to a set of conceptual tendencies that 
have led to flawed theory and policy on legal reform in 
developing countries.  These tendencies or Theoretical 
Shortcuts are: an attraction to universalistic, “one-size-fits-
all” reform objectives; an emphasis on “values” as a 
determinant of economic growth and a target of reform 
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efforts; and a failure to appreciate the irrationalities that 
arise endemically out of the bureaucratization of 
government, as well as the tenuousness of democratic 
processes therein. 
 Over the past few decades in the social sciences, a 
new wave of Weberian scholarship (the “New Weberians”) 
has arisen that seeks to repair some of the distortions in the 
earlier reception of Weber.3  An early and prominent 
example of this alternative Weberianism arose from the 
work of three sociologists, Jere Cohen, Lawrence Hazelrigg, 
and Whitney Pope (hereinafter “Cohen et al.”), in a strident 
1975 critique of the “Parsonized” understanding of Weber.  
In “Deparsonizing Weber,” Cohen et al. took Parsons to task 
for downplaying Weber’s understanding of power relations 
in society, as well as Weber’s acknowledgment of the 
importance of material dynamics, in favor of a reading that 
coincided with classical liberalism’s relative neutrality with 
respect to the role of government, and in favor of an 
overweening emphasis on “ideals” as a determinant of 
economic growth.  A later strain of alternative Weberian 
analysis, unlike Cohen et al., accepts the methodological 
focus on ideals, but seeks to situate the idealist analysis 
within an appreciation of power relations.  This second 
strain of analysis, reflected for example in the work of 
Kieran Allen, Sven Eliasson, Nicholas Gane and Peter 
Lansmann, inherits a sensibility from the line of critical 
theorists beginning with the Frankfurt school.   
At the same time, in the field of development policy, 
“good governance” policies have come under increasing 
                                                          
3 See, e.g., Peter Lansmann, Power, Politics and Legitimation, in CAMBRIDGE 
COMPANION TO WEBER 83, 86 (2000): “One obstacle to understanding is the 
peculiar reception history of Weber’s work.  Much of post-Second WorldWar 
social science has worked with a rather simplified and misleading account of 
Weber’s intentions, and often, until very recently, as a result of the incomplete 
character of translation, with a fragmentary knowledge of his work.  
Consequently, Weber’s central concepts have frequently been assimilated to the 
language of the modern social sciences in an uncritical manner.” 
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scrutiny and criticism by scholars (the “Good Governance 
Scholars”).  In recent years, good governance policy has come 
under scrutiny from a variety of commentators, whom I dub 
the Good Governance Scholars: I use this term to include 
groundbreaking critical thinkers such as James Gathii, Kerry 
Rittich, and Alvaro Santos, as well as the sophisticated 
empirical and economic analysis of  scholars such as Kevin 
Davis, Katarina Pistor, and Michael Trebilcock.  These Good 
Governance Scholars have raised a variety of concerns about 
the efficacy of the prevailing agenda of international “best 
practices” in legal reform for developing countries.   
Though the New Weberians and the Good 
Governance Scholars appear to be largely mutually 
unknown, in fact their conclusions often appear to mirror 
each other.  Many of the current policy flaws in good 
governance reforms as described by the Good Governance 
Scholars seem to reflect the flaws in the mid-twentieth 
century reception of Weberian social science as revealed by 
the New Weberians.  
The objective is to define an interface between two 
bodies of critical reappraisal: that concerning Weber (but not 
addressing law and development), and that concerning law 
and development (but not addressing Weber).  The 
sociologists, political scientists and philosophers who have 
called for a new understanding of Weber have not have 
considered the impact of their critiques on the field of law 
and development.  At the same time, critics of law and 
development and governance reforms have perceived 
shortcomings that track and reflect some of the kinds of 
conclusions reached by the re-readers of Weber. 
This “mirror image” between the respective critiques 
of the New Weberians and the Good Governance Scholars 
suggests that there may be a relationship between the flawed 
transmission of Weberian theory, on the one hand, and some 
of the programmatic limitations of good governance legal 
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reform directives, on the other.   
In defining this interface between Good Governance 
Scholars and New Weberians, this article follows and seeks 
to merge two trails established by two prior works of legal 
scholarship: David Trubek’s “Max Weber on Law and 
Capitalism,” and Duncan Kennedy’s “The Disenchantment 
of Logically Formal Rationality, or Max Weber’s Sociology in 
the Genealogy of the Contemporary Mode of Western Legal 
Thought.” Trubek’s article, written in 1972, explains Weber 
as an intellectual precursor of contemporary law and 
development theory; written ahead of the bulk of New 
Weberian scholarship, it anticipates and briefly engages a 
critical re-reading of Weber.4  Kennedy’s article, written in 
2004, delves more squarely into the New Weberian project in 
the humanities and social sciences of critically reassessing 
the reception of Weberian theory; written as a general 
exposition of Weber’s role in contemporary legal thought, 
however, it does not apply itself to the problematique of law 
and development.  Inspired by both works, the objective of 
this paper is to understand how a critical re-reading of 
Weber might impact on the particular field of law and 
development.   
 The point of the paper is not to argue that 
contemporary law and development policy should seek 
fidelity to Weberian thought.  Rather, the paper’s objectives 
are: first, to conduct an intellectual history that shows how 
one of the greatest sociologists influenced an increasingly 
important area of law reform in the age of globalization; 
second, to surface critiques arising within that field of law 
                                                          
4 See David Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 WISCONSIN 
L. REV. 720, 737 n.31, also discussed below.  In Trubek’s other canonical law and 
development essay, David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 
1974 WISCONSIN L. REV. 1062,  Trubek and his co-author Galanter articulate many 
of the criticisms whose intellectual history it is the objective of this paper to 
delineate. See infra, Part II.D., for an explication of the relationship between the 
criticisms of Trubek & Galanter and the Theoretical Shortcuts posited by this 
essay. 
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reform; and third, to suggest that there may be some 
connection between the two.  In that sense, the paper seeks 
to make a contribution to two discourses: to enrich the study 
of the history of legal thought the reception of an important 
thinker has shaped contemporary law and policy in a 
relatively understudied field in the academy; and at the 
same time to underscore and contextualize policy critiques 
that have arisen in an increasingly important field of 
practice. 
 
*  *  * 
 
Part I of the paper provides an Introduction of 
Weber’s best-known analyses – the ideal typology of systems 
of governance; the association of Calvinist religious values 
with capitalistic economic growth; and the centrality of 
bureaucracy.  Following the Introduction, this paper will 
pursue in Part II its project of re-reading Weber against law 
and development discourse. Part II will describe the 
trajectory of Weberian analysis from mid-century U.S. social 
science scholarship to U.S. foreign policies of the same era.  
In United States scholarship of the twentieth century, Talcott 
Parsons was arguably the most significant of Weber’s 
interlocutors.  Parsons’s analysis emerged in a particular 
moment in mid-century social science in the United States.   
Though Parsons embedded his theory in an elaborate 
methodological framework in an extensive body of 
scholarship, he also consciously fashioned a theory that 
sought to influence not only scholarly debates but also the 
policy and practice of an ascendant foreign-affairs focus in 
the newly potent United States government.  Parsons’ theory 
featured core analytical points which channeled Weber’s 
analysis into a discourse and debate that was distinctly Cold 
War.  Parsons’ analysis influenced subsequent writers such 
as W.W. Rostow, whose own application of the Weber-
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Parsons approach further simplified it for deployment in the 
foreign-affairs goal of the U.S. to limit the influence of 
socialist and nationalist politics in developing states.  
Rostow’s analysis in turn shaped the later generation of 
“good governance” policy, much more separated from 
scholarship and again much more streamlined in its 
ideological and practical sources and intended effects.  Part 
II will consider this particular strain of Weberian discourse 
in the light of other, competing accounts of Weber’s work 
within U.S. social science scholarship.   
 Finally, Part II will reflect on the significance of the 
second set of Weberian accounts on the first.  In particular, 
the paper will try to extend these alternative accounts that 
have arisen within the academy to the law and policy 
framework of good governance that is the successor of the 
Parsonized account.  In this section, the paper will observe 
that, for a variety of reasons, this alternative strain of 
scholarship disconnected from U.S. foreign policy, leaving 
the field open for the Parsons-Rostow account that 
ultimately helped to generate, or at least legitimate, 
contemporary good governance policy.  Good governance is 
highly influential in contemporary law and policy in the 
international economic order, particularly in the 
development context.  As such, a critical engagement with 
the intellectual antecedents of the framework takes on not 
only scholarly significance but also practical and 
programmatic significance.  In Part III, the paper briefly 
offers some conclusions and suggestions for reform.   
 
 Although it begins by recounting the influence of 
Weberian thought in good governance analysis, this paper’s 
ambitions extend beyond intellectual history.  Rather, the 
paper aims to mount a “legitimation critique” from the 
platform of this revisionist account.  The argument is that 
good governance analysis, and the law and policy reforms 
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that result from it, gain an important source of legitimation 
in this most influential of modern social theorists.  In this 
sense, critical engagement with the intellectual origins of 
contemporary good governance analysis generates 
important implications not only for the concrete 
programmatic dimensions of good governance law reforms 
and for the possibility of alternative kinds of approaches to 
reform, but for their analytical legitimacy. 
 
PART I.  Introduction: Weber’s Central Insights 
 
 Weber’s most influential analyses relating to the role 
of governance and growth are: (1) the analysis, in Part I of 
his Economy and Society, of three “ideal types” of rule – 
traditional, charismatic, and “rationalen,” with “rationalen” 
being the type of rule characteristic of modern Western 
society; (2) the analysis, in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism, of the way in which religious values supported 
the development of capitalistic practices in Western Europe, 
through the association of religious virtue with capitalistic 
practices such as saving, investment and profit, and having 
been missing in certain other societies, such as China and 
India, that attained significant levels of technology but did 
not undergo industrialization; and (3) the rise of 
bureaucracy as the expression of both the “disenchantment” 
modern society inherent in its drive towards rationalization, 
and its “reenchantment” through the establishment and 
inculcation of relationships between groups vying for 
power. 
  
Theoretical Insight #1: “Ideal Types” of Governance 
 
 Weber in fact was trained as an economist, and so his 
work which was ultimately deemed a cornerstone of 
sociology often investigated the social dimensions of 
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economic activity.5   
 Weber employed a methodology of “ideal types” in 
his sociological history, seeking to identify and categorize 
societies on the basis of an heuristic framework.  Though 
elements of each category were present in every society, 
Weber believed that such a framework would aid in 
understanding the distinctive qualities of particular societies 
as well as their relationship to each other.  Particularly 
influential was Weber’s framework of systems of 
governance6 – what Weber called Herrschaft.  
 In his historical and comparative sociology, Weber 
sought to explain why “the modern system of industrial (or 
‘bourgeois’) capitalism emerged in Europe, but not other 
parts of the world... European law had unique features 
which made it more conductive to capitalism than were the 
legal systems of other civilizations.”7 
                                                          
5  Richard Swedberg, Max Weber as an Economist and as a Sociologist: Towards a 
Fuller Understanding of Weber's View of Economics, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY (1999). 
6  In employing the term “governance” here, the objective is to use a term that in 
contemporary English that can describe modes of socially authoritative decision-
making without necessarily interjecting an explicitly normative sense of whether 
they are politically valid or desirable.  Thus the emerging literature on 
governance approaches the topic from a range of perspectives: the attempt to 
categorize and describe neutrally existing systems of governance; the critique of 
current systems; and the proposal of new systems of governance or 
improvements in current systems.  Weber’s own sense of Herrschaft has changed 
over time, and is one of the foci of recent re-readers, as the section infra 
indicates.) . 
7 David Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 WISCONSIN L. 
REV. 720, 722.  Trubek’s discussion of Weber remains the authoritative treatment 
in the American legal academy of the Weberian understanding of the role of law 
in development.  I discovered Trubek’s work as a law student, and am indebted 
to him for showing me that such topics had been and could be successfully 
incorporated into one’s career as a lawyer and legal scholar.  Most of the 
citations that follow in this section refer to Trubek’s essay, but Trubek in turn 
relied primarily on three sources: Max Rheinstein, Introduction, MAX WEBER ON 
LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (M. Rheinstein ed. 1954); REINHARD BENDIX, MAX 
WEBER, AN INTELLECTUAL PORTRAIT 385-457 (1962); and Weber’s essay, “Sociology 
of Law,” which appears in MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (G. Roth & R. 
Wittich ed. 1968).  The advantage of Trubek’s treatment is not only that it 
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 The starting point for this typology was the sense that 
modern Western governance was characterized by a 
commitment within its legal systems to the goal of “logically 
formal rationality.”8  Per David Trubek’s fine summary: 
“Legal thought is rational to the extent that it relies on some 
justification that transcends the particular case, and is based 
on existing, unambiguous rules; formal to the extent that the 
criteria of decision are intrinsic to the legal system; and 
logical to the extent that rules or principles are consciously 
constructed by specialized modes of legal thought which rely 
on … systematization, and to the extent that decisions of 
specific cases are reached by processes of specialized 
deductive logic proceeding from previously established 
rules or principles.”9  
 Logically formal rationality in the law aided the 
tendencies in European society towards capitalistic 
economic growth in two primary ways.  First, it weakened 
the hold traditional ruling classes on the levers of power, 
and as such allowed relatively autonomous groups – 
critically, capitalists and workers – to emerge.10  Second, it 
channeled the exercise of legal power into predictable 
processes and results, thus enabling market actors to rely on 
contract and property rights to structure their interactions 
and to achieve greater efficiency therein.11 
 These concepts in Weber’s account, written in the 
early twentieth century, of logically formal rationality and 
                                                                                                                                  
synthesizes these disparate sources on Weber’s sociology of law, but also that it 
re-orients them in a way readily accessible to a legal, as opposed to a 
sociological, disciplinary perspective. 
8  
9 David Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 WISCONSIN L. 
REV. 720, 730.  As Trubek pointed out in that essay, the English common law 
system constituted an important counterfactual example for Weber’s hypothesis. 
See id. 
10 David Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 WISCONSIN L. 
REV. 720, 744. 
11 David Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 WISCONSIN L. 
REV. 720, 742-743. 
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the rise of capitalism will seem eminently familiar to legal 
scholars today: they have become touchstones in the field of 
law and economics.  Freedom from interference in legal 
outcomes by “irrational” sources, whether they be such 
status-based pressure (what some might describe as a 
variant of “corruption”), or equitable considerations, has 
been argued to be central to the ability of market actors to 
operate efficiently.  Predictability, flowing in part from this 
freedom from interference but also from the commitment to 
formal rationality, has also been argued to be crucial to 
efficient market activity.   
 Thus, according to Weber, “[T]he rationalization and 
systematization of the law in general and … the increasing 
calculability of the functioning of the legal process in 
particular, constituted one of the most important conditions 
for the existence of … capitalistic enterprise, which cannot 
do without legal security.”12  
 Logically formal rationality, as a central characteristic 
of modern Western governance, could be contrasted against 
modes of governance visible in other societies.  The 
“traditional” mode based its authority on claims to 
customary or familial status: an “established belief in the 
sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those 
exercising authority under them.”13  The “charismatic” 
mode, which based its authority on the claims of a particular 
ruler to a special authority based on that ruler’s 
extraordinary qualities,14 bears a family resemblance to the 
                                                          
12 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 883 (G. Roth & R. Wittich ed. 1968).  For a 
more detailed working out of the relationship see David Trubek, Towards a Social 
Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and Politics in Economic Development, 
YALE L.J.]  
13 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 215 (G. Roth & C. Wittich eds. 1968). 
14 Weber defined charisma as “the quality of a personality, held to be out of the 
ordinary (and originally thought to have magical sources, both in the case of the 
prophets and men who are wise in healing or in law, the leaders of the hunt or 
heroes in war), on account of which the person is evaluated as being gifted with 
supernatural or superhuman or at least specifically out of the ordinary powers 
 
 
RE-READING WEBER IN LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
 
 
 14
“cult of personality.”  While every society had elements of 
all three of these, one could nevertheless categorize societies 
according to the primacy of one of these modes of 
governance. 
 
Theoretical Insight #2: Protestant Values and the Rise 
of Capitalism 
 
Weber’s essay The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism undoubtedly constitutes his most widely 
influential concept, reaching beyond the academy to 
everyday conventional wisdom.  Written 
contemporaneously with a voyage to the United States,15 
Weber sought to explain why, notwithstanding the general 
characteristic of “rationalism” in the law amongst European 
societies, capitalistic behavior had taken root more strongly 
in some as opposed to others within this group.  In 
particular, Weber sought to explain the reasons why those 
“districts of highest economic development” were at the 
same time most amenable to Protestantism and “revolution 
in the Church.”16 
Weber rejected the explanation that “the greater 
participation of Protestants in the positions of ownership 
and management in modern economic life may… be 
understood … simply as a result of the greater material 
wealth they have inherited.”17  He also rejected as simplistic 
                                                                                                                                  
not accessible to everybody, and hence as a ‘leader.’”  MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND 
SOCIETY 241 (G. Roth & C. Wittich eds. 1968). 
15 Part One, setting out “The Problem” of greater economic development in 
Protestant societies and Luther’s idea of the calling, was published in 1904 just 
before Weber’s trip to the United States.  Part Two, elaborating on the “Practical 
Ethics of the Ascetic Branches of Protestantism,” was published shortly after his 
return.  See JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, MAX WEBER: POLITICS AND THE SPIRIT OF 
TRAGEDY 93 (1996); and Diggins more generally for an examination of Weber’s 
views on America. 
16 MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 36 (Talcott 
Parsons trans., 1930) [hereinafter WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC]. 
17 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at p.37. 
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the notion that success in capitalism flowed from a 
“secularization of all ideals through Protestantism.”18   
Rather, Weber argued that the particular intensity of 
capitalistic behavior among some – especially Calvinist – 
denominations arose from an alliance of religious virtue, on 
the one hand, with economic gain, on the other.  Within this 
worldview, economic gain was expressive of religious 
virtue.  As such, the pious individual was obligated by his 
religious calling to maximize his material gain. 
This conceptual shift constituted what Weber called a 
“reversal” of the “natural relationship”:19 “A man does not 
‘by nature’ wish to earn more and more money, but simply 
to live as he is accustomed to live and to earn as much as is 
necessary for that purpose.”20  The Protestant ethic of which 
Weber wrote, however, contradicted this “traditional 
manner of life” and “traditional rate of profit.”21 In holding 
that “[e]conomic acquisition is no longer subordinated to 
man as the means for the satisfaction of his material 
needs,”22 this shift laid the foundation for  instead a “new 
spirit, the spirit of modern capitalism.”23   
The Protestant ethic arose from a foundation of 
“rationalism” which characterized more generally the trend 
within European societies.24  This rationalism was filtered 
through Martin Luther’s conception of the calling, in which 
“the valuation of the fulfillment of duty in worldly affairs 
[w]as the highest form which the moral activity of the 
individual could assume:”25  that is, one’s religiousity 
manifested itself in engagement with, rather than 
“monastic” disassociation from, worldly activity.   
                                                          
18 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at p.40. 
19 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at p.53. 
20 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at p.60. 
21 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at p.59. 
22 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at p.53. 
23 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at p.60. 
24 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at p.79. 
25 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at p.80. 
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According to Weber, Luther’s conception of the calling 
remained “traditionalistic”26: “The individual should remain 
… in the station … in which God had placed him, and 
should restrain his worldly activity within the limits 
imposed by his established station in life.”27  The later 
Calvinist, Baptist and Methodist denominations within 
Protestantism would, however, press into new service the 
notion of worldly activity as indicative of grace: worldly 
activity now not only manifested one’ salvation, but actually 
proved one’s worthiness of being saved.28   These 
perspectives required the individual “methodically to 
supervise his own state of grace in his own conduct, and 
thus to penetrate it with asceticism.”29  The notion of 
asceticism as a prerequisite to salvation required an intense 
unification and “rationalization of conduct within this 
                                                          
26 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at p.85. 
27 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at p.85. 
28 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at p.121, discussing the contribution by Calvinism 
of the “idea of the necessity of proving one’s faith in worldly activity.”  Primary 
in the development of this approach, according to Weber, was the Calvinist idea 
of predestination: although at first blush the idea that “some men and angels are 
predestinated unto everlasting life, and others foreordained to everlasting 
death,” WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at 100 (quoting the Westminster Confession of 
1647), would appear to render moot any possible contributions through one’s 
conduct to salvation or damnation, in fact the doctrine developed into two tenets 
which would place worldly conduct at the center of salvation: “On the one hand, 
it is held to be an absolute duty to consider oneself chosen, and to combat all 
doubts as temptations of the devil, since lack of self-confidence is the result of 
insufficient faith, hence of imperfect grace… On the other hand, in order to attain 
that self-confidence intense worldly activity is recommended as the most 
suitable means.”  WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at 111-112.  Although Baptism and 
Methodism rejected the doctrine of predestination, Weber argued that they 
reached the same endpoint by alternative means: in the case of Methodism, the 
“aspiration to the higher life… served [] as a sort of makeshift for the doctrine of 
predestination” WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at 142-143; in the case of Baptist 
doctrine, the “immense importance … attributed by the … doctrine of salvation 
to the role of the conscience as the revelation of God to the individual gave… 
conduct in worldly callings … the greatest significance for the development of 
the spirit of capitalism.” WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, pp.150-151. 
29 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at 153. 
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world… for the sake of the world beyond.”30   
This drive to rationalize and unify one’s conduct 
according to ascetic principles lent itself to, and meshed 
with, the rationalistic emphases of capitalism on the 
measurement of production for the maximization of gain.  
Thus, “[t]hat powerful tendency toward uniformity of life, 
which to-day so immensely aids the 31capitalistic interest of 
the standardization of production, had its ideal foundations 
in the repudiation of all idolatry of the flesh.”32 
The “accumulation of capital” was aided not only by this 
emphasis on uniform and disciplined conduct, but also at 
least as importantly by the “ascetic compulsion to save” as a 
form of abnegation of worldly enjoyment and therefore an 
indication of grace.33  “Waste” was the “deadliest of sins.”  
By contrast, “wealth” was harmful “only … as a temptation 
to idleness and sinful enjoyment of life”: hence saving and 
investment indicated both that virtuous industriousness had 
generated profit, and that virtuous piety had led to the 
refusal to enjoy that profit in the form of personal 
consumption.  Saving and investment became principal 
indicatives of virtue, at the same time that they furthered 
capitalistic ends. 
Finally, “Protestant Asceticism” gave a particular 
moralized underpinning to the emergence of waged 
workforces employed capitalist entrepreneurs.  To begin 
with, according to Weber ascetic literature generally 
condoned the “idea that faithful labour, even at low wages, 
on the part of those whom life offers no other opportunities, 
is highly pleasing to God” and ultimately “the only means of 
                                                          
30 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at 155. 
31 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at 157. 
32 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at 169. 
33 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at p.172 (“The restraints which were imposed upon 
the consumption of wealth naturally served to increase it by making possible the 
productive investment of capital.”) 
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attaining certainty of grace.”34  In addition, Protestantism 
“legalized the exploitation of this specific willingness to 
work, in that it also interpreted the employer’s business 
activity as a calling.”35  The pressure imposed by employers 
upon workers to achieve increasing profits not only failed to 
offend, but actually furthered, this particular conception of 
virtue. 
Thus, both with respect to the capitalistic labor force and 
with respect to the capitalistic employer, Protestant 
Asceticism provided a special motivation: “The emphasis on 
the ascetic importance of a fixed calling provided an ethical 
justification of the modern specialized division of labour.  In 
a similar way the providential interpretation of profit-
making justified the activities of the business man.”36 
Surrounding the content of this analysis, Weber 
established several caveats.  First, the integration of 
Protestant Ascetism into capitalistic life was not anything 
intended by its authors: “the cultural consequences of the 
Reformation were to a great extent … unforeseen and even 
unwished for results of the labours of the reformers.  They 
were often far removed from or even in contradiction to all 
that they themselves thought to attain.”37   
In a second caveat, Weber specifically discouraged an 
interpretation of his work that privileged religious or 
cultural values above other causal dynamics of societal 
change: on the contrary, in view of the “interdependent 
influences” of “material  basis,” “forms of social and political 
organization,” and “ideas,” it would be “foolish and 
doctrinaire” to assert that “capitalism… could only have 
arisen as a result of certain effects of the [Protestant] 
Reformation.”38  Weber emphasized that is was “not [his] 
                                                          
34 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC, at 178. 
35 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC at p.178. 
36 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC at p.163. 
37 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC at p.90. 
38 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC at p.91. 
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aim” to substitute for a one-sided materialistic an equally 
one-sided spiritualistic causal interpretation of… history.”39  
The goal of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism 
was, rather, much more modestly to “as far as possible” 
clarify “what concrete aspects of our capitalistic culture can 
be traced to” religious movements, keeping in mind the 
interdependence of material, social, political and ideational 
“relationships.”40 
As a final caveat, Weber argued that, although religious 
asceticism had helped to give rise to the “spirit of modern 
capitalism” through its emphasis on “rational conduct on the 
basis of the calling,”41 the capitalistic system “no longer 
need[ed] the support of any religious forces.”42  To the 
contrary, “[s]ince ascetism undertook to remodel the world 
and work out its ideals in the world, material goods have 
gained an increasing and finally an inexorable power over 
the lives of men as at no previous period in history.”43  
Weber’s view of societal end-point of this trajectory was 
indeed somewhat gloomy: religious asceticism ultimately 
gave rise to a dynamic that undermined its own importance 
in the production of wealth, so that all that remained was the 
latter.  It was in the United States, which had inspired Weber 
to write The Protestant Ethic, that he saw this dynamic most 
clearly: “In the field of its highest development, in the 
United States, the pursuit of wealth, stripped of its religious 
and ethical meaning, tends to become associated with purely 
mundane passions, which often actually give it the character 
of sport.”44 
This last point is perhaps most surprising from the point 
of view of the popular reception of Weberian thought.  The 
                                                          
39 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC at p.183. 
40 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC at p.91. 
41 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC at p.181. 
42 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC at p.72. 
43 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC at p.181. 
44 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC at p.182. 
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Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism did not set out to 
celebrate either modernism or capitalism.  Indeed, Weber 
ended his study on a decisively somber note: 
 
No one knows … whether at the end of this tremendous 
development… there will be a great rebirth of old ideas 
and ideals, or… mechanized petrification embellished 
with a sort of convulsive self-importance.  For of the last 
stage of this cultural development, it might well be truly 
said: ‘Specialists without spirit, sensualists without 
heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of 
civilization never before achieved.’45 
 
 
Theoretical Insight #3: The “Iron Cage” of Bureaucracy 
 
The “tragic vision of history”46 suggested by Weber’s 
gloomy assessment of modern capitalism at the end of The 
Protestant Ethic is perhaps most expressly elaborated in 
Weber’s writings on the bureaucratization of modern 
government.  Perhaps because Weber’s writings on 
bureaucracy remain somewhat less familiar than his “ideal 
types” and “protestant ethic” insights, they appear to form 
his most intricate  of observations (this set of insights also 
seems to prefigure many of the arguments of critical 
theorists writing later in the twentieth century).47  This 
                                                          
45 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC at p.182. 
46 JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, MAX WEBER: POLITICS AND THE SPIRIT OF TRAGEDY 10 
(1996) (attributing to Weber a “vision of history, religion, society and politics” 
that “contains several dimensions of tragedy.”)  Diggins links this tragic 
sensibility with Weber’s appreciation for the writings of Nietzsche and Simmel, 
within German philosophy, and also in Weber’s knowledge of the “themes of 
Attic tragedy.”  See JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, MAX WEBER: POLITICS AND THE SPIRIT 
OF TRAGEDY 10 (1996).  Weber’s description also resembles in some ways 
Durkheim’s rendition of anomie in modern life.  See Durkheim. 
47 See, e.g., NILS GILMAN, MANDARINS OF THE FUTURE 55 (2004) (alluding to how 
the Frankfurt School employed “Weber’s (and Freud’s and Nietzsche’s) cultural 
pessimism about an administered world to criticize American mass culture.”); 
NICHOLAS GANE, MAX WEBER AND POSTMODERN THEORY: RATIONALIZATION VERSUS 
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theoretical intricacy and relative unfamiliarity means that 
somewhat more attention will be given here to describing 
this particular theoretical insight.     
 
 
Bureaucracy, Rationalization and Disenchantment 
 
In Economy and Society, Weber identified bureaucratic 
government – “general rules, hierarchy, full-time training, 
and so on”48 – as a central feature of the process of societal 
rationalization:49    
From a purely technical point of view, a bureaucracy is 
capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency, and 
is in this sense formally the most rational known means 
of exercising authority over human beings.  It is superior 
to any other form in precision, in stability, in the 
stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability.  It thus 
makes possible a particularly high degree of 
calculability of results for the heads of the organization 
and for those acting in relation to it.  It is finally superior 
both in intensive efficiency and in the scope of its 
                                                                                                                                  
RE-ENCHANTMENT 81-150 (2002) (demonstrating, inter alia, analytical similarities 
between Weber’s writings on rationalization and re-enchantment, and those of 
Foucault, Baudrillard and Lyotard); Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantement of 
Logically Formal Rationality, or Max Weber’s Sociology of Law in the Geneaology of the 
Contemporary Mode of Western Legal Thought, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1076 (2004) 
(“To a degree that has continually surprised me, … Weber’s sociology of law, in 
conjunction with his general sociology of disenchantment, seems to lead to the 
conclusion that much critical legal studies work, in the skeptical vein, has been 
reinvention, or adaptation to view non-Weberian purposes, of Weberian 
wheels.”). 
48 Jon Elster, Rationality, Economy and Society, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO WEBER 
21, 22 (2000). 
49 "This whole process of rationalization in the factory and elsewhere, and 
especially in the bureaucratic state machine, parallels the centralization of the 
material implements of organization in the hands of the master.  Thus, discipline 
inexorably takes over ever larger areas as the satisfaction of political and 
economic needs is increasingly rationalized."  Max Rheinstein ed., MAX WEBER 
ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 156 (1968) (Edward Shils & Max Rheinstein 
trans., 1968). 
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operations and is formally capable of application to all 
kinds of administrative tasks.50  
Bureaucratization not only grew out of the rationalization 
process, but constituted the only realistic way of 
administering the complex societal forms that accompany 
it.51  Because “logically formal rationality” in society also 
accompanies the emergence of capitalism, it follows that 
bureaucratic administration is ultimately necessary for the 
preservation of the formally-rational legal system that allows 
capitalism to thrive.52  Indeed, bureaucratization in 
governance was none other than an application of the same 
principles of rationality and technological progress that 
produced industrialization.53  Bureaucratic rationality also 
represents the triumph of “instrumental rationality” 54 over 
                                                          
50 Max Rheinstein ed., MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 223 (1968) 
(Edward Shils & Max Rheinstein trans., 1968).  
51 "The needs of mass administration make it today completely indispensable.  
The choice is only between bureaucracy and dilettantism in the field of 
administration." Max Rheinstein ed., MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND 
SOCIETY 224 (1968) (Edward Shils & Max Rheinstein trans., 1968). 
52 Cf. "To this extent increasing bureaucratization is a function of the increasing 
possession of goods used for consumption, and of an increasingly sophisticated 
technique for fashioning external life--a technique which corresponds to the 
opportunities provided by such wealth" p.212, Weber, Max. 1946/1958. From 
Max Weber.  Translated and edited by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. 
53 "The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has always 
been its purely technical superiortiy over any other kind of organization.  The 
fully developed bureaucratic mechanism compares with other organizations 
exactly as does the machine with the nonmechanical modes of organization" 
p.214, Weber, Max. 1946/1958. From Max Weber.  Translated and edited by H. H. 
Gerth and C. Wright Mills.  
54 Jon Elster, Rationality, Economy and Society, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO 
WEBER, at 21, 23 (2000) (“the substantive rationality of legal and bureaucratic 
institutions [in Weber’s thought’ is a form of instrumental adaptation. Whereas 
individual value-rational action is oriented towards a specific behavior without 
regard for its consequences…, substantively rational action is guided by its 
consequences.”) 
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“value rationality,” the latter being Weber’s term for 
““conscious belief as a value for its own sake.”55 
 Bureaucratic governance, “guided by instrumental 
reason,” therefore “lies in stark contrast to non-modern 
forms” of governance – traditional and charismatic – which 
confer validity on value-rational grounds.56  As a triumph of 
instrumental rationality, bureaucratization represented 
modern capitalism’s vanquishing of the Protestant Ethic.  
Whereas Protestant Asceticism at one time provided a 
justification of certain kinds of rationalistic, maximizing 
behaviors as ends in themselves, modern capitalism 
supplanted these justifications with those that valued such 
behaviors for the maximizations they produced.57   
                                                          
55 Max Rheinstein ed., MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 24-25 (1968) 
(Edward Shils & Max Rheinstein trans., 1968).  As Weber explained in Economy 
and Society, social behavior could be explained in four possible ways: (1) 
“instrumentally rational,” or consequentialist, grounds; (2) “value-rational” 
grounds; (3) “effectual” grounds, or “specific affects and feeling states”; or (4) 
“traditional” grounds, that is, “ingrained habituation.”  Id. 
56 NICHOLAS GANE, MAX WEBER AND POSTMODERN THEORY 25 (2002) (discussing 
“rationalization and disenchantment” in Weberian theory). “Both of these types 
of domination are personal rather than impersonal forms of rule, and neither is 
grounded upon a system of rational law.  On the one hand, traditional 
authority… proceeds ‘by virtue of age-old rules and powers’ …. On the other, 
charismatic authority, while based on personal devotion to the leader or hero 
(prophet), is foreign to rules and proceeds through the repudiation of past 
authority…. [Both] traditional and charismatic authority .. are orders of authority 
which demand unlimited personal obligation… [With rationalization] both tend 
to be replaced by the impersonal rule of the modern (capitalist) bureaucratic 
state.”  Gane, at pp.25-26.   See also "The appartus (bureaucracy), with its 
peculiar impersonal character. . . is easily made to work for anybody who knows 
how to gain control over it.  A rationally ordered system of officials continues to 
function smoothly after the enemy has occupied the area: he merely needs to 
change the top officials" p.229, Weber, Max. 1946/1958. From Max Weber.  
Translated and edited by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills.  New York: Galaxy.  
57 See, e.g., JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, MAX WEBER: POLITICS AND THE SPIRIT OF 
TRAGEDY 26 (1996) (describing Weber’s theory of capitalism as a “sociological 
phenomenon springing up originally from religious convictions, which would 
eventually give way to secularization as the entrepreneur continued to 
demonstrate his qualifications as a Christian by his business integrity.”).   
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This was one of the paradoxes that Weber 
underscored: the way in which the very religious values that 
helped to propel modern activity in the form of industry in 
the economic sphere, scientific inquiry, and even the rule of 
law ultimately created institutions that would destabilize the 
values that birthed them.  In “depicting this movement from 
God … to the disenchantment of religious forms,” Weber 
“adheres to a Nietzschean thesis: the highest values devalue 
themselves.”58 
  This devaluation of values was what Weber called 
the “disenchantment” of modern society.  In his discussion 
of “Modernization as Societal Rationalization,” Jurgen 
Habermas quotes a passage of Weber’s from a little-
translated essay entitled “Zwischenbetrachtung” or 
“Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions”:  
The rational knowledge to which ethical religiosity had 
itself appealed followed its own autonomous and 
innerworldly norms.  It fashioned a cosmos of truths 
which no longer had anything to do with the systematic 
postulates of a rational religious ethic… On the contrary, 
rational knowledge had to reject this claim in 
principle…although the science that created this cosmos 
seemed unable to answer with certainty the question of 
its own ultimate presuppositions.59 
Much as with his analysis of the Protestant Ethic, 
Weber’s theorizing of bureaucracy hardly celebrated 
                                                          
58 NICHOLAS GANE, MAX WEBER AND POSTMODERN THEORY: RATIONALIZATION 
VERSUS RE-ENCHANTMENT 21 (2002) (quoting p.9, Nietzsche, The Will to Power, W. 
Kaufman trans. (1978)). 
59 P.229, Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol.1: Reason and the 
Rationalization of Society (1984) (Thomas MacCarthy trans.)  Thus, Weber 
showed how disenchantment was hydraulically related to modern processes of 
analysis with  more dynamic methodology than  Durkheim’s anomie, which 
identified a similar malaise in modernity, but attributed it to the preeminence of 
individualism over group identity, rather than to the very means of reasoning 
within modernity. 
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modernity.  Rather, Weber literally despaired the rise 
of bureaucratization.  In his remarks to a 1901 
academic conference in Vienna, Weber exclaimed, 
“The passion for bureaucracy…is enough to drive one 
to despair.… but what can we oppose to this 
machinery in order to keep a portion of mankind free 
from this parceling-out of the soul, from this supreme 
mastery of the bureaucratic way of life… I only wish 
to challenge the unquestioning idolization of 
bureaucracy.”60  Disenchantment resulting from 
bureaucratization thus constituted one of the “baleful 
consequences” arising from the “noblest impulses” of 
modernity.61 
 
 
Bureaucracy, Irrationality and “Anti-Formalism” 
 The “baleful consequences” of rationalization and 
bureaucratization extended beyond the disenchantment of 
modern life.  Indeed, in a turn of analysis reflected by later 
critical theory, Weber showed how the terrain of a 
rationalized governance ultimately became susceptible to a 
peculiarly modern form of irrationality. 
 This irrationality flows from the very dynamic that 
generated rationalization, namely the “devaluation of 
ultimate values.”62  In addition to producing the rationalized 
world of “stable calculations,” rationalization allows for the 
“emergence of a polytheistic and disordered world of 
competing values and ideals.  For with the rise of modern 
                                                          
60 Remarks, Vienna 1901, Verein für Sozialpolitik, cited in Alan Sica, 
Rationalization and Culture, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO WEBER 42, 53 (2000). 
61 Benjamin Nelson, Discussion on Industrialization and Capitalism, in Stammer 
ed., Max Weber and Sociology, pp.17-168; cited in Alan Sica, Rationalization and 
Culture, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO WEBER 42, 54 (quoted above note 2). 
62 NICHOLAS GANE, MAX WEBER AND POSTMODERN THEORY: RATIONALIZATION 
VERSUS RE-ENCHANTMENT 29 (2002). 
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scientific (or ‘rational’) knowledge, religion is, for the first 
time, challenged by the disparate claims of other life-orders 
(Lebensordnungen), the economic, political, aesthetic, erotic 
and intellectual, which, with the onset of modernity, 
separate out into relatively autonomous realms.”63  Scientific 
rationality has both displaced prior ultimate means of 
assessing values, and failed by its own terms to provide a 
replacement: the result is that competing non-scientific value 
systems persist at the same time that they are unable to 
establish supremacy according to the overarching scientific 
logic.  “The transition to modernity is thus a paradoxical 
one, for it brings new ‘rational’ means for controlling and 
systematizing life while at the same time inaugurating an 
endless struggle between (and within) opposing value-
spheres.”64 
 This paradoxical tendency towards irrationality 
surfaces even within the modern legal system, premised on 
“logically formal rationality.”  Within the legal system, the 
proliferation of values resurfaces as the “rise of policy 
analysis.”65  The devaluation of values destroys the 
“immanent” quality of law – that is, natural law becomes 
replaced by positive law.66  Habermas summarizes the turn 
to policy: “From the perspective of a formal ethic based on 
                                                          
63 NICHOLAS GANE, MAX WEBER AND POSTMODERN THEORY: RATIONALIZATION 
VERSUS RE-ENCHANTMENT 29 (2002). 
64 NICHOLAS GANE, MAX WEBER AND POSTMODERN THEORY: RATIONALIZATION 
VERSUS RE-ENCHANTMENT 35 (2002). 
65 Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantement of Logically Formal Rationality, or Max 
Weber’s Sociology of Law in the Geneaology of the Contemporary Mode of Western Legal 
Thought, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1071 (2004). 
66 “The disappearance of the old natural law conceptions has destroyed all 
possibility of providing the law with a metaphysical dignity by virtue of its 
immanent qualities.”  MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 874-875 (G. Roth & R. 
Wittich ed. 1968); see also Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantement of Logically 
Formal Rationality, or Max Weber’s Sociology of Law in the Geneaology of the 
Contemporary Mode of Western Legal Thought, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1066 (2004) 
(“Positivism becomes the theory of lawmaking because natural law is 
implausible in theory.”) 
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general principles, legal norms … now count as mere 
conventions that can be considered hypothetically and 
enacted positively.”67   
 On the one hand, the demise of “immanent” 
constraints on lawmaking increased the authority of 
lawmakers to act as arbiters between “mere” norms.  On the 
other, the modern system expressly turned to lawmakers as 
the positivist authority for resolving such conflicts.  Hence 
lawmakers, in Weber’s understanding of “politics as a 
vocation,” are torn between the “ethics of conviction,” in 
which action was justified on “value-rational” grounds or 
“immanent norms,” and the “ethics of responsibility,” in 
which lawmakers consider the outcomes of their decisions 
on an instrumentally rational basis that must take into 
account political “responsibility for the predictable 
consequences of the action….”68  This tension is exacerbated, 
Kennedy writes, by the “dynamism of the capitalist 
economy [which] generate[s], constantly, increasingly, legal 
gaps or conflicts involving large economic and political 
stakes.”69  
 The result is that the peculiar tendency of irrationality 
in modern society is reflected in the “anti-formal tendencies 
of modern law.”70  Of modern law, Weber concludes: “In the 
great majority of its most important provisions, it has been 
                                                          
67 pp.162-163, Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action vol.1 (1984). 
68 P.16, Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, ed. & trans. E.A. 
Shils & H.A. Finch (1949); see also NICHOLAS GANE, MAX WEBER AND POSTMODERN 
THEORY: RATIONALIZATION VERSUS RE-ENCHANTMENT 64-69 (2002). 
69 Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantement of Logically Formal Rationality, or Max 
Weber’s Sociology of Law in the Geneaology of the Contemporary Mode of Western Legal 
Thought, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1067 (2004). 
70 Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantement of Logically Formal Rationality, or Max 
Weber’s Sociology of Law in the Geneaology of the Contemporary Mode of Western Legal 
Thought, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1064 (2004). 
 
 
RE-READING WEBER IN LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
 
 
 28
unmasked all too visibly, as the product of the technical 
means of a compromise between conflicting interests.” 71 
 
Bureaucracy, Democracy and Power 
Weber’s conceptualization of conflicting interests in 
modern life understood politics as a struggle for power.72  In 
opposition to the Marxian view of modern power politics as 
essentially class-based, Weber argued that power could be 
measured and distributed according to class, status or 
party.73  Although such struggle could take multiple shapes, 
Weber nevertheless insisted on an analytical lens that 
acknowledged the “violence of this struggle and the violence 
of political power.”74  Indeed, Weber defined the state as 
“that human community which (successfully) lays claim to 
the monopoly of legitimate physical violence.”75 
 This perspective demonstrates the influence on 
Weber’s theory of Nietzsche’s writings, not only in the 
analysis of disenchantment as the “devaluation of values”76 
                                                          
71 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 875 (G. Roth & R. Wittich ed. 1968); see 
also Gane at pp.40-41; Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantement of Logically Formal 
Rationality, or Max Weber’s Sociology of Law in the Geneaology of the Contemporary 
Mode of Western Legal Thought, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1066 (2004). 
72 “The essence of politics is struggle.” MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 1415, 
1450 (G. Roth & R. Wittich ed. 1968). 
73 From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans. & ed. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright 
Mills. 
74 NICHOLAS GANE, MAX WEBER AND POSTMODERN THEORY: RATIONALIZATION 
VERSUS RE-ENCHANTMENT 74 (2002). 
75 Peter Lansmann, Power, Politics and Legitimation, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO 
WEBER 83, 90 (2000).   
76 p.101, Lawrence A. Scaff, Weber on the cultural situation of the modern age, 
p.99: The coda in Weber on ‘specialists without spirit’is Weber’s version of those 
‘last men who invented happiness’ pilloried in Nietzsche’s prologue to 
Zarathustra.  See Nietzche, at p.10: (“I will speak of the mot contemptible thing; 
that… is the last man!... ‘What is love? What is creation? What is a star?’ So asketh 
the last man and blinketh. The earth hath then become small, and on it there 
hoppeth the last man who maketh everything small…`We have discovered 
happiness,’ say the last men and blink….” Thus Spake Zarathustra, Friedrich 
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but also in the analysis of governance as power struggle.77  
Thus, Weber stated in Economy and Society that “without 
exception every sphere of social action is profoundly 
influenced by structures of dominancy.” 78 
Weber declared: “there can … be no real work in 
political economy on the basis of optimistic dreams of 
happiness.  Abandon all hope ye who enter here: these 
words are inscribed above the portals of the unknown future 
history of mankind.”79 
 The political struggle that Weber analyzed in modern 
society was subject to two competing dynamics: 
bureaucratization, on the one hand, and democratization, on 
the other.   
 Bureaucratization reproduced a form of social 
oligarchy. Due to the large scale of organizational 
complexity required to govern in modern bureaucracies, 
power tended to consolidate in hierarchical form favoring 
technocratic elites.80  At the same time, the “leveling of 
distinctions” based on traditional status in modern society 
produced a dynamic of democratization.81 
 These two dynamics could produce tendencies in two 
possible directions: “either ‘administering’ the mass of 
                                                                                                                                  
Nietzsche, trans. Thomas Common, 1997.  
77 KIERAN ALLEN, MAX WEBER 7-8 (1998). 
78 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 941 (G. Roth & R. Wittich ed. 1968). 
79 Weber, “The National State and Economic Policy” (Inaugural Lecture, 
Freiburg, May 1895), trans. B. Fowkes, in Reading Weber, ed. K. Tribe (1989) 
(quoted in NICHOLAS GANE, MAX WEBER AND POSTMODERN THEORY: 
RATIONALIZATION VERSUS RE-ENCHANTMENT 166 n.13 (2002)). 
80 This observation of Weber’s was subsequently developed by his fellow 
sociologist Robert Michels as an “iron law of oligarchy” in modern societies.  
Michels, Robert.  1915.  Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical 
Tendencies of Modern Democracy.  Translated by Eden Paul and Cedar Paul.    
81 Lawrence A. Scaff, Weber on the Cultural Situation of the Modern Age, in 
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO WEBER 101, 106 (2000). 
 
 
RE-READING WEBER IN LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
 
 
 30
citizens deprived of rights and freedoms like a herd of cattle 
in a bureaucratic `authoritarian state’ with pseudo-
parliamentarianim, or else including the citizens as 
participants in the state.”82   
 Both types of governance – “pseudo-democracy” and 
“participatory democracy” – were entirely possible 
outcomes of the modern rationalization process.  Indeed, 
between the two, Weber appeared to believe the former to be 
the more likely outcome.  The threat to democratic 
governance from modern rationalization stemmed not only 
from its tendency towards bureaucratic hierarchy, but also 
from the cultural acclimation of citizens to their role as “little 
cogs, little men clinging to little jobs and striving toward 
bigger ones” within the “machinery” of modern 
bureaucratic capitalism:83 
That the world should know no men but these: it is in 
such an evolution that we are already caught up, and 
the great question is, therefore, not how we can promote 
and hasten it, but what can we oppose to this machinery 
in order to keep a portion of mankind free from this 
parceling-out of the soul, from this supreme mastery of 
the bureaucratic way of life.84  
In other words, concerted effort was required to maintain 
even the viability of democratic government in the modern 
state.  Weber clearly viewed modern bureaucratization as 
both inevitable and in many ways distasteful.  Weber also 
saw democracy as under threat from the modernity’s more 
central feature, bureaucratic rationalization in government.  
                                                          
82 Lawrence A. Scaff, Weber on the Cultural Situation of the Modern Age, in 
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO WEBER 101, 106 (2000). [quoting Weber’s Zur Politik 
im Weltkrieg: Schriften und Redden 1914-1918, or “On Policy during the World 
War: Writings and Speeches 1914-1918] 
83 Weber quoted  by J.P. Mayer in  Max Weber and German Politics, 2nd. edition. 
London, Faber and Faber, 1956, pp. 126-127. 
84 Weber quoted  by J.P. Mayer in  Max Weber and German Politics, 2nd. edition. 
London, Faber and Faber, 1956, pp. 126-127. 
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Weber saw this dynamic most clearly in his own country, 
where the post-Bismarckian state appeared to have choked 
off real democratic participation.85   
 From the foregoing characterizations, one might infer 
Weber’s allegiance to a contractarian set of ideals regarding 
the normative foundation for democratic governance and 
the rule of law, and a commitment to the normative 
egalitarianism found in social contract theorists of the 
modern state such as John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.  
Such an inference would be mistaken, however.  Weber does 
not appear to have shared the focus of these Enlightenment 
theorists on the normative necessity of universal political 
liberalism.  Sven Eliasson has written that  
 
[Weber] was a liberal in the sense of being deeply concerned 
about the individual as an autonomous cultural being ….  But he 
did not defend this as an ordinary principle… [and] [i]ndeed he 
did not think that this was feasible for ordinary people, 
governed by the necessity of making a living… This was an 
aristocratic notion of autonomy rather than a principled 
universalistic one.86 
 
This indifference of Weber’s to Enlightenment ideals,87 and 
their foundations in the political philosophies of classical 
                                                          
85 Sven Eliaeson, Constitutional Ceasarism: Weber’s Politics in their German Context, 
in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO WEBER 131, 136 (2000): Weber very much was 
responding to the political context of German: the danger of domination by the 
feudalistic Junker class, who were “anti-modernist and backward-looking” and 
dependent on economic protectionism by the state; the weakness of the 
bourgeoisie, coupled with their “antipolitical” tendencies (“in part to a long 
tradition of Romantic skepticism about the Enlightenment, and in part to a sense 
of impotence resulting from the failure of the liberals to unify Germany in 1848”) 
so that Weber expressed worry about whether “the German bourgeoisie has the 
maturity … to be the leading political class”; and dislike of the working class and 
its journalist leaders who were “poseurs.” 
86 Eliasson, supra, at 137. 
87 Peter Lansmann, Power, Politics and Legitimation, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO 
WEBER 83, 88 (2000) (describing the lack of influence of Locke and Rousseau on 
Weber). 
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antiquity,88 manifested itself, secondly, in a sharply 
circumscribed understanding even of “real,” participatory 
democracy.   
 Weber asserted that “[t]rue democracy means... 
submission to a leader whom the people have elected 
themselves.”89  Thus, the choice between “participatory 
democracy” and “pseudo-parliamentary democracy” 
appeared to boil down to the difference between “a 
leadership democracy with a ‘machine’” and “a democracy 
without a leader, which means rule by the ‘professional 
politicians.’”90  Thus, Weber played an important role in 
ensuring that the Weimar constitution allowed the president 
to be elected directly by the people rather than parliament,91 
but at the same time held a very limited view of the people’s 
ability to hold the president accountable at any but the most 
general level.92 
                                                          
88 Lansmann, supra, at 91 (describing Weber’s rejection of Aristotelian 
classifications of government in favor of his own “command”-based typology). 
89 KIERAN ALLEN, MAX WEBER 171 (1998) (quoting Beetham, Max Weber and the 
Theory of Modern Politics, p.236).   
90 P.142:, citing Landesmann & Ronald Spiers ed., Political Writings (1994), at 
351.  This quote resembles that from Eliasson p.106 cited above. 
91 Article 41 of the Weimar Constitution. 
92 Hence the following recorded exchange between the reactionary General 
Ludendorff and Weber: “Ludendorff: What is your idea of a democracy, then?  
Weber: In a democracy the people choose a leader whom they trust.  Then the 
chosen man says, “Now shut your mouths and obey me.  The people and the 
parties are no longer free to interfere in the leader’s business.”  The exchange 
between Weber and Lufendorff, according to Eliasson, came at the end of the 
World War I when Weber was trying to convince Lufendorff to “give himself up 
to the Allies.”  Id. At 146.  After the quoted passage above, “Weber added that 
thereafter the people can rule and say ‘to the gallows with the leader.’” Id. At 
147.  Nevertheless, Weber’s endorsement of “leadership democracy” generated 
strong criticism after World War II, particularly in Wolfgang Mommsen’s charge 
that Weber’s theory served “to make the German people inwardly willing to 
acclaim Adolf Hitler’s leadership position.” Id. At 144 (quoting Mommsen, Max 
Weber and German Politics (1959) at 410).  Although Weber died in 1920, his 
express opposition during his lifetime to anti-Semitism and to racism, as well as 
his defense of academic freedom, suggests that he would have opposed Nazism.  
See JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, MAX WEBER: POLITICS AND THE SPIRIT OF TRAGEDY 271 
(1996).  Nevertheless, Weber undoubtedly left some ambiguity as to the 
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 Thus, Weber’s understanding of democracy stemmed 
from a pragmatic, rather than a normative, orientation.  
Weber saw democracy – at the aforementioned 
“plebiscitary” level as necessary to break the chokehold of 
the landholding interests who were stalling Germany’s 
capitalist economic growth.  Democracy, Weber, believed, 
could help to mobilize Germany’s relatively weak 
bourgeoisie.93  In this sense, democracy in Germany’s 
particular context could help to propel capitalism.  The 
converse relationship – that capitalism would automatically 
give rise to democracy – was not a Weberian hypothesis.  
Moreover, the relationship between democracy and 
economic growth that Weber desired would not naturally 
arise but rather had to be pursued through concerted reform. 
                                                                                                                                  
relationship between popular accountability and “leadership democracy.”   
For example, in addition to Article 41 enabling direct presidential 
elections, Weber also supported Article 48 of the Weimar constitution, which 
“granted the president extraordinary powers in times of crisis,” although 
Weber’s role in relation to Article 48 is a matter of dispute while his role in 
promoting Article 41 is accepted knowledge.”  Sven Eliasson, Constitutional 
Caesarism, at p.142.  Though Weber himself did not expressly resolve the 
ambiguous relationship between popular election and extraordinary presidential 
power, one “author who devoted much of his thought to resolving the 
constitutional ambiguities that Weber bequeathed to German posterity was Carl 
Schmitt.”  Id. At. 147.  Schmitt foresaw that “Weimar parliamentarianism could 
not withstand” the a “totalizing party” such as the National Socialists.  “The 
presidential leader, Hindenburg, came to a parallel conclusion, and used Article 
48 to install Hitler in power.  Schmitt, in short, filled the lacunae in Weber’s 
constitutional thinking.  How Weber himself might have filled it will,” according 
to Eliasson, “forever remain unclear.” Id. At 147.  For a thorough exposition and 
critique of Schmitt’s constitutional thought, see Oren Gross, The Normless and 
Exceptionless Exception: Carl Schmitt’s Theory of Emergency Powers and the “Norm-
Exception” Dichotomy, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1824 (1999-2000).   
One final clue perhaps lies in Weber’s somewhat surprising support for 
a “strong parliament” as a corrective “to balance the power of the bureaucracy.”  
Id. At p.142.  Weber appears, therefore and contrary to his own dichotomous 
phrasing, to have supported both “parliamentarian democracy and plebiscitary 
rule.”  Id. At 143.  The best explanation for this, according to Eliasson, is that 
Weber “envisioned balance, much like in a monarchical system.” Id. At 143. 
93 See Chapter 2 in KIERAN ALLEN, MAX WEBER (1998). 
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PART II. A Geneaology of Theory, Policy and Praxis: 
Weber and Development Theorists  
 
 There are three key moves that get made in the 
transition from Weber’s own insights to the truths of 
development policy.  The first two, relatively explicit, moves 
are: (1) the move from an inductively based set of ideal types 
of society to an a priori belief in a single evolutionary path for 
all societies, ending in Western-style capitalist democracy; 
(2) the move from identifying the importance of the 
normative dimension of economic practices to a belief in the 
primacy of “values” in economic practices. 
 The third move is more subtle, and indeed consists 
mostly of analytical evasion rather than assertion.  This is the 
idea that democratic governance goes hand-in-hand with 
capitalistic economic growth – more simplistically put, the 
notion that markets and democracies are mutually 
reinforcing components of the same evolutionary process. 
 In fact, all three of these moves were reflected in 
significant elisions by Parsons of Weber’s own theoretical 
premises.  These elisions (which I will call “the Three 
Theoretical Shortcuts”) can be summarized as follows: (1) 
First, Weber himself repeatedly sought to resist the 
temptation to induce a rigid, universalistic framework, 
preferring to understand his typology as primarily heuristic; 
however, Parsons employed Weberian theory to establish a 
universal model of societal evolution (the “One-Size-Fits-
All” Theoretical Shortcut). (2) Second, far from rejecting the 
“materialist” analysis of Marx and others, Weber insisted on 
the additionally important role of ideational frameworks 
and saw the interaction between these two as explanatorily 
essential; however, Parsons saw values as essentially 
dispositive of social identity and social change (the 
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“Determinism of Values” Theoretical Shortcut).  (3) Weber’s 
own his understanding was that democratic governance was 
both necessary and significantly limited in its emancipatory 
potential by the power dynamics inherent in 
bureaucratization; Parsons, however, assumed an 
unproblematic correlaton beween institutional 
rationalization in modernity, on the one, and democracy, on 
the other (the “Correlation of Modernity with Democracy” 
Theoretical Shortcut). 
 This geneaology follows the role of Weber in 
Parsonian theory, with its accompanying Theoretical 
Shortcuts, through to policy on law and development in 
particular.  At key moments, a symbiotic relationship arose 
between leading scholars of modernization and 
policymakers within the foreign affairs related branches of 
the U.S. government.  At those moments, ideas developed 
within the academy took root and helped provide a basis for 
U.S. policy.  It is those moments within the academy, and 
their transmittal to U.S. policy, that this section focuses on. 
Through some interaction of these dynamics, all of 
these thinkers display the same tendencies in reading Weber: 
an attraction to a universal model of growth and 
development, an emphasis on normative rather than non-
normative interests and an alliance of the normative with the 
“expanding capitalist nucleus” idea, and a glossing-over of 
the role of democracy. 
This section will trace this geneaology.  The first part 
of this section will trace the three “elisions” of Weberian 
theory -- the emphasis on normative over non-normative 
factors, the emphasis on universals, and the superficial 
association of market growth with democratic governance – 
from Parsons into modernization theory.  The section will 
also highlight the intersections between economic and 
sociological theory on the one hand, and development policy 
discourse in the context of U.S. governmental practice on the 
 
 
RE-READING WEBER IN LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
 
 
 36
other. 
 
 
A. Talcott Parsons: “Structural Functionalism” as a 
Precursor to Modernization Theory 
 
Talcott Parsons is widely understood to have been the 
most influential United States sociologist of the twentieth 
century.94 Parsons was also an influential advocate for 
Weberian theory in the U.S. scene,  translating both The 
Protestant Ethic and Economy and Society into English.95  
Parsons’s advocacy included his inspirations by Weber in 
formulating his distinctive brand of sociological theory, 
which ultimately became known as “structural-
functionalist” theory.96  Finally, Parsons also sought to 
connect some of his theoretical conclusions to U.S. foreign 
policy, playing an active advisory role from the 1930s to the 
1950s as the U.S. developed its approach towards newly 
decolonizing states.   
The result of these combining factors was Parsonian 
influence in the ensuring the importance of Weberian 
thought in development theory, policy and praxis in the 
mid-to-late twentieth-century United States – and also in 
ensuring the reception of Weberian thought in a particular 
form.  The next sections will seek to demonstrate how the 
three theoretical influences described above arose in 
Parsons’ own theory, and how they replicated themselves 
throughout the development discourse of this era. 
 
                                                          
94 PETER HAMILTON, TALCOTT PARSONS 13 (1983).  “Looking at the development of 
American sociology over the past fifty years, one is immediately struck by the 
scale of the contribution Talcott Parsons made… Parsons reformulated the 
nature of sociological inquiry… and … gave it … a theoretical programme, which 
it lacked before.” 
95  
96 Though structural-functionalism had fallen from grace by the 1970s, at its peak 
the approach enjoyed status  widespread influence within sociological theory. 
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A.1. Parsons and Theoretical Shortcut #1 (“One-Size-Fits-
All”): From “Ideal Types” to “Evolutionary Universals” 
  
 Parsons is often credited as being concerned above all 
with building a “general” theory of social action as a 
foundation for sociological analysis.  Parsons’ first step 
towards this end occurred in his work The Structure of Social 
Action.  The first step in Parsons’ own universalist analysis, 
however, was an extrapolation of “generalized”97 and 
“systematic” theoretical precepts from Weber’s analysis of 
“ideal types.”  Parsons was careful to establish that Weber 
himself shied away from  “systematic” analysis, ensuring 
that the systematization of Weber’s analysis was identifiable 
as Parsons’ unique improvement. 
Before setting forth a systematic theory, Parsons 
devoted some time to delineating the lack of systematic 
analysis in Weber,98 much of which was intentional on 
Weber’s part.  Parsons observed Weber’s opposition to the 
idealistic or intuitionist strain of German theory.99  By 
contrast, Weber sought to embrace an inductive, and 
ultimately empirical, approach.100  Parsons gives a careful 
account of Weber’s balancing of the commitment to 
identifying general principles with the awareness of the 
limitations of those principles: 
 
A general ideal type is such a construction of a 
hypothetical course of events with two other 
characteristics: (1) abstract generality and (2) the ideal-
typical exaggeration of empirical reality.  Without the 
first of these last two elements, the concept might be 
                                                          
97  Parsons, Structure of Social Action, at p.601; id. At p.640. 
98  See Parsons, Structure of Social action, at pp.601-641. 
99  Parsons, Structure of Social Action, at p.602. 
100  Parsons, Structure of Social Action, at p.602 (“Weber throughout emphasized 
that scientific concepts do not exhaust concrete reality but involve selection and 
are hence in this sense unreal.”). 
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applicable only to a single historical situation; without 
the second it might be merely a common trait or a 
statistical average.101 
 
Although Weber’s analysis of ideal types seemed to embody 
universalizable implications, Weber himself stopped short of 
making those explicit.  It was left to Parsons to clarify the 
relationship of the “universal to the particular” in Weber’s 
analysis.102  In doing so, Parsons declared it “necessary, in 
order to clarify the implications of his position, to go beyond 
Weber’s own analysis.”103 
In The Structure of Social Action, Parsons sought to 
build a more “systematic classification of ideal types.”104  In 
doing so, Parsons introduced his own “generalized 
theoretical account” of society under a “structural” analysis 
of “systems of action” and “systems of elements.”105 Indeed, 
Parsons’ desire to construct a “total, general theoretical 
system”106 would irritate many of his contemporaries.107  The 
irritation may have become further inflamed by Parsons’ 
own rather abstruse language,108 requiring several iterations 
                                                          
101  Parsons, Structure of Social Action, at p.605-606. 
102  Parsons, Structure of Social Action, at p.614. 
103  Parsons, Structure of Social Action, at p.614. 
104  Parsons, Structure of Social Action, at p.640. 
105  Parsons, Structure of Social Action, at p.640. 
106 “Parsons has stood virtually alone in his concern with the construction of a 
total, general theoretical system.” Edward C. Devereux, Jr., Parsons’ Sociological 
Theory, in THE SOCIAL THEORIES OF TALCOTT PARSONS: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION 1, 
1 (1961). 
107 “In his Dedication of The Social System, Talcott Parsons describes himself as an 
incurable theorist.  On this point even his severest critics would hasten to agree.  
Certainly he has done a great deal more theorizing than any other contemporary 
American sociologist; and it is probably also true that he has done rather less of 
anything else.” See Devereux, supra, at 1.  The philosopher Max Black derided 
Parsons’ theories as tending towards  “aphorisms” such as “Whenever you do 
anything, you’re trying to get something done.” See Devereux, supra, at 279 
(quoting Max Black, Some Questions About Parsons’ Theories, p.268.). 
108 “Parsons has been explaining his own theories in his own words these many 
years, but the evidence is rather impressive that he has not always succeeded in 
making himself understood.”  See Devereux, supra, at 1-2. 
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both by the author himself109 and by commentators to gel 
into the influential “structural-functional” sociological 
theory of social action. 
 Methodologically, Parsons’ “structural-functionalist” 
theory straddled German and Anglo-Saxon theory,110 
seeking to blend the sought to blend the “analytical 
elegance” and dynamism of economics, with both the 
concreteness of positivists and the sensitivity to culture of 
idealists.111  Thus, Parsons sought a transhistorical, general 
“analytical theory”112 of society that was both dynamic and 
                                                          
109 See Chandler Morse, The Functional Imperatives, THE SOCIAL THEORIES OF 
TALCOTT PARSONS: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION 100, 113 (1961). “The relation of 
structure to process was far from clear in early versions of the Parsonian model.  
But as the model evolved, the relationship acquired an increasingly definite 
form.” Id. 
110 See Devereux, supra, at 2,4,5. 
111 Parsons goal was to combine: Combine the “analytical elegance” and the 
“action frame of reference” of economists (while rejecting their focus on 
rationality), the focus on “physiological parameters of personality and human 
behavior” of the positivists, while rejecting its elements of “mechanistic 
determination,” and from the idealists the “analysis of cultural configurations 
and of the role of ideas, values, and norms” without the “cultural relativism 
which… blocked general theory.” See Devereux, supra, at 19. 
112 Feraro explains the Parsonian understanding of the term: “The structural type 
of [conceptual] scheme specifies concepts that refer to the types of units or parts 
and the relations among them that constitute the generic structure of a category 
of empirical system within the scope of a theoretical framework. The 
corresponding general propositions are statements of uniformities in the 
behavior of concrete parts and relations, as these are conceptualized. Parsons 
calls such general propositions empirical generalizations. The analytical type of 
[conceptual] scheme specifies analytical elements or variables, the values of 
which characterize concrete components of the empirical system. The 
corresponding general propositions are statements of uniformities in the 
analytical relationships among such elements. Parsons calls them analytical laws. 
An analytical theory, finally, is a system of analytical laws. One important 
implication of these distinctions is that the formulation of an analytical theory 
must be based upon an accompanying structural type of conceptual scheme as 
well as an analytical type. The reason for this 
is that an analytical law presupposes elements that characterize the various 
components or concrete entities comprising an empirical system and these 
components have to be conceptualized in structural terms (i. e., in terms of ideas 
about the types of concrete units and their relations). It is because of this 
methodological implication that Parsons exerts so much effort in his early work 
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responsive to culture. 
 Within this structural account, Parsons emphasized 
the importance of methodological dynamism, as expressed 
on two different levels: first, the fundamental unit of 
analysis was the “unit act,”113 and the sociological theory 
itself was a theory of social action.114  Second, Parsons 
embraced a “voluntaristic theory of action,” which assumed 
a critical role of agency in determining how individuals 
committed “unit acts” against the complex backdrop of his 
structural-functional analytical framework.115 
 Parsons posited that social action occurred against a 
backdrop of structural, universal features of the social 
system.116  The three fundamental structural sub-systems 
were:  “the personality systems of … individualized 
actors”;117  the differentiation and organization of social 
                                                                                                                                  
to provide a general conception of the structure of empirical social action 
systems that can become the basis for a later analytical sociological theory of 
these systems.”  THOMAS J. FARARO, SOCIAL ACTION SYSTEMS : FOUNDATION AND 
SYNTHESIS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 82 (2001). 
113 THOMAS J. FARARO, SOCIAL ACTION SYSTEMS : FOUNDATION AND SYNTHESIS IN 
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 88-93 (2001).  The “unit act” was defined to include the 
following elements: an actor; an “end” (that is, “a future state of affairs toward 
which the process ofaction is oriented,”; a “situation,” “differing from that to 
which action is oriented (the end) and including two elements, those which 
cannot be altered by the actor – conditions – and those which he can control – 
means); and a “specific mode of relationship between the elements of the unit 
act, so that ‘in the choice of alterative means to the end insofar as the situation 
allows alternatives, here is a ‘normative orientation’ of action.’”  PETER 
HAMILTON, TALCOTT PARSONS 70 (1983) (quoting Talcott Parsons, Structure of 
Social Action at p.44). 
114 E.g., Parsons’ landmark work, The Structure of Social Action (1937); Parsons, 
Working Papers in the Theory of Action (1953). 
115 See Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (1937); Parsons, The Social System 
(1951). 
THOMAS J. FARARO, SOCIAL ACTION SYSTEMS : FOUNDATION AND SYNTHESIS IN 
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 87 (2001). 
116 “Structure, as Parsons sees it, represents at best a convenient way of codifying 
and talking about certain apparent consistencies in social phenomena… [but in 
order to avoid reification we must employ the] conception of dynamic 
equilibrium.” See Devereux, supra, at 53. 
117 “the personality systems of … individualized actors, consisting of internalized 
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role;118 and “the culture system.”119 Of these three 
interdependent sub-systems, Parsons saw culture as the 
most dispositive.120   
 In The Social System (1951) and Toward a General Theory 
of Action (1951), Parsons developed the “functionalist” side 
of his methodology.  In addition to taking place against this 
structural backdrop, he now asserted, social action was 
directed by a set of four “functional imperatives,” or 
‘problems’ which must be met adequately if equilibrium 
and/or continuing existence of the system is to be 
maintained.”121 
 The four problems are those of Goal Attainment, or 
“keeping the action system moving steadily toward its 
goals”; Adaptation, or “properly perceiving and rationally 
manipulating the object world for the attainment of ends”; 
Integration, or “holding cooperating units in line, of creating 
and maintaining ‘solidarity,’ despite the  emotional strains 
involved in the process of goal attainment”; and Latency, or 
ensuring that “units have the time and the facilities, within a 
suitable conditioning environment, to constitute or 
reconstitute the capacities needed by the system.”122   
 These imperative problems at the societal level create 
social sub-systems, each to address the respective basic 
                                                                                                                                  
‘need dispositions’ and therefore of potential ‘motivational commitments’ to 
various types of goals and to various patterns of behavior.”  See Morse, supra, at 
105. 
118 “The social system, or structure of social organization, consisting of defined 
roles and their associated and institutionalized (=internalized and shared) role-
expectations (= ‘expected performances’ and ‘sanctions.’)” See Morse, supra, at 
105.   
119 “The culture system, consisting of the heritage of knowledge, beliefs, ideas, 
technologies, mores, customs, habits, laws, values, standards, norms, together 
with the symbols, both tangible (artifacts) and intangible (language, the arts) that 
represent them.” See Morse, supra, at 105.  
120 “No one of these systems is entirely independent of the others. The culture 
system is the major binding element.” See Morse, supra, at 105. 
121 See Morse, supra, at 113. 
122 See Morse, supra, at 113-114. 
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functional imperative: Goal Attainment manifests, for 
example, in the political system; Adaptation manifests in the 
economic system.123  Each sub-system can further be 
analyzed in terms of these functional imperatives: for 
example, the economy can be analyzed in terms of Goal 
Attainment (the “Production sub-system”); Adaptation (the 
“Investment capitalization sub-system”); Integration (the 
“Entrepreneurial sub-system”); and Latency (the “Economic 
commitments sub-system”).124 
 Social action was determined within the structural 
framework of personality-social role-culture; and driven by 
the functional imperatives of goal attainment-adaptation-
integration-latency.  Parsons’ last major theoretical 
contribution was to posit that social action was additionally 
mediated according to a set of five fundamental “pattern 
variables” for interpreting the social situation, mediating 
potentially conflicting concepts, and producing the ultimate 
social orientation in which action occurred.125 
  
 The functional imperatives are transhistorical and 
                                                          
123 See Morse, supra, at 121-122. 
124 See Morse, supra, at 140-141. 
125 See Devereux, supra, at 38-42. The framework for structural analysis are the 
pattern variables, guided by three principal criteria: “First, the variables should 
be completely general and permit comparisons between groups of any sort 
whatever and across cultures… Second, the variables should be relevant for the 
action frame of references… Finally, the variables should be relevant for the 
analysis of the functional problems about which system differentiation takes 
place… The outcome of Parsons’ thinking about these matters was the now-
famous set of pattern variables… These were a set of five dichotomous variables 
conceived as constituting universal and basic dilemmas confronting any actor in 
any social situation. Parsons argued that each variable represented a 
fundamental problem of orientation which the actor would somehow have to 
resolve either one way or the other; moreover, he would have to come to terms 
with all five before arriving at any determinate orientation…. 1. Affectivity [e.g. 
marital bond] -Affective neutrality [e.g. customer bond]…; 2.Specificity 
[customer] -diffuseness [marital]…; 3. Universalism [cognitive]-particularism 
[cathectic]…; 4. quality-performance…; 5. self-orientation-collectivity-
orientation….” 
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universal, and the social response to them is evolutionary in 
nature: societies evolve towards ever-higher levels of 
structural “differentiation” in the management of social 
roles.126 Although Parsons’ theory was universalist in 
that it posited that all societies would traverse roughly the 
same set of structural-functional changes, this progress was 
far from inevitable.  In fact, societies could fail to progress if 
their cultures did not adapt sufficiently to environmental 
conditions127: the term evolution implied a race for survival 
of the fittest among societies and cultures.  Hence Parsons’ 
theory of “evolutionary universals”: adaptations universally 
required in order for societies to progress to modernity.128 
This neo-Darwinian, (or more accurately, neo-
Spencerian),129 perspective also implied the urgency of policy 
intervention for those societies that had to date failed to 
produce the requisite cultural change for economic 
development.  As one Parsonian remarked, “There ought to 
be interest also in the application of evolutionary theory to 
the practical problem of modernization: without economic 
and social development some considerable proportion of the 
… persons on the planet have a bleak future.”130 
                                                          
126 See Morse, supra, at 143: “These four functional problems represent four 
distinct (yet interdependent) social `ends,’ and constitute the basis of four 
corresponding rationalities, the simultaneous application of which is responsible 
for the ways in which social systems function.  Within a rather undifferentiated 
social system, such as a primitive family or tribe, consistency among the four 
rationalities and their application is achieved by the institutionalization of role 
patterns together with the opportunity for adjustment by direct settlement of 
conflicts…. When a society becomes highly differentiated, the possibilities of 
inconsistency become far more numerous… The degree of consistency achieved 
is a determinant of the stability or instability of the system, any inconsistency 
among the four types of rationality or their application being a particularly 
important source of conflict and, potentially, of change.” 
127   
128  
129  For a discussion of Herbert Spencer and social Darwinism, see Chantal 
Thomas, Globalization and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, UC Davis Law 
Review. 
130  Jackson Toby, Parsons’ Theory of Societal Evolution, in TALCOTT PARSONS, THE 
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Parsons’ reading of Weber’s The Protestant Ethic 
through his own structural-functionalist lens helped him to 
conclude from this theory that “American society 
constituted an evolutionary breakthrough; it displayed a 
higher level of organized complexity than any other.”131  It 
was at this stage that Parsons’ methodology reached its 
zenith,132 disseminating through Parsons-trained academic 
appointees to the rapidly expanding field of sociology from 
the 1930s to the 1960s.133 
In one highly influential application of the pattern 
variable analysis, Parsons working with his frequent 
collaborator Edward Shils, further streamlined the “pattern 
variables” into a general division between “traditional” and 
“modern” society.134  The dualistic distinction between 
tradition, on the one hand, and modernity on the other, 
would be picked up by W.W. Rostow135 and employed 
generally in the development policy of the time.  Thus, 
Parsons’ work helped to establish the groundwork for 
modernization theory.  In his drive to develop a 
universalistic account of economic growth and its 
relationship to governance, however, Parsons explicitly 
elided those aspects of Weber that contradicted this 
objective.136  
                                                                                                                                  
EVOLUTION OF SOCIETIES 1, 20 (1977). 
131 Frank J. Lechner, “Talcott Parsons,” in WILLIAM H. SWATOS, JR. EDITOR, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION AND SOCIETY (1998). 
132 PETER HAMILTON, TALCOTT PARSONS 28 (1983).  (“The influence exerted by 
Parsons’s theoretical work over American sociology … cannot be overestimated.  
Within the general context of sociological orthodoxy at the time, normally 
referred to as structural-functionalism, Parsons reigned supreme.”) 
133 PETER HAMILTON, TALCOTT PARSONS 28 (1983). 
134 Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, eds., Toward a General Theory of 
Action 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951). 
135 Walt Whitman Rostow, Review of “Toward a General Theory of Action,” 5 
World 
Politics 540 (1953). 
136  Parsons describes these himself in The Structure of Social Action (1949, p.v-vi).   
In the introduction to Structure of Social Action, he notes that he is not interested 
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 Parsons believed that his general theory essentially 
extended and perfected the insights of Weber’s theory of 
ideal types.  Parsons asserts that “if Weber had developed 
such a systematized general theory, ‘he could hardly have 
failed’ to realize that functionalism represents the most viable 
approach.”137  Subsequently, however, New Weberians have 
demonstrated the ways in which Parsonian universalism not 
only misapplied Weber’s typology but, more seriously, 
misunderstood Weber’s overarching project.  In 
“Deparsonizing Weber,” for example, Cohen et al. strongly 
opposed Parson’s reading of Weber as a nascent 
functionalist, arguing that Weber himself “rejected 
functionalism.”138  They argued that Parsons dramatically 
simplified Weber’s analysis (criticizing Parsons for treating a 
factor as “decisive rather than … one of several important 
considerations.”139  This simplification would have formed 
the ground floor in the one size fits all edifice. 
 
A.2. Parsons and Theoretical Shortcut #2: The Determinism 
of “Values” in Modernization 
 
In The Structure of Social Action, Parsons argued that 
Weber and other prominent social theorists had converged 
on the centrality of “cultural norms and beliefs—in other 
                                                                                                                                  
in the “separate and discrete propositions to be found in the works of” the 
authors he considers (primarily Weber, Durkheim, Alfred Marshall and Vilfred 
Pareto), but in “a single body of systematic theoretical reasoning the 
development of which can be traced through a critical analysis of writings of this 
group and of their predecessors.”  The Structure of Social Action (1949, p.v)  This 
amounts to an admission that these writers are being read for the ways in which 
they support a theory that Parsons himself wishes to develop.   
137 COHEN p.230, citing Talcott Parsons, Introduction to Max Weber, The Theory 
of Social and Economic Organization 28-29 (1947) (A.M.Henderson and Talcott 
Parsons trans.) 
138 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 13-15, 17-18 (G. Roth & R. Wittich ed. 
1968). 
139 (COHEN p.230).   
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words, values” as an explanation for social action.140  While 
the “conditions of action” and other environmental factors 
played an important role in determining social evolution, 
culture was the ultimate cause.141 
Defenders of Parsons were careful to point out that 
Parsons’ structural-functionalist theory did not focus on 
beliefs to the exclusion of other factors.142  Yet Parsons 
himself described his work as “culturally determinist.”143  
Although the “institutionalization of values” was “a 
contingent process,” the “normative pattern” of those values 
provided “a society its identity” as the “single most 
important functional[ist] facet.” 144  As Parsons argued, the 
“concept of values provides the focal center for analyzing 
the organization of [social] systems, of societies and of 
personalities.”145 
It was Parsons’ theory that influenced writers such as 
David McLelland to focus on the “achievement motive” in 
culture as an explanation for effective social adaptation.146  
                                                          
140 NILS GILMAN, MANDARINS OF THE FUTURE 74 (2004). 
141  Jackson Toby, Parsons’ Theory of Societal Evolution, in TALCOTT PARSONS, THE 
EVOLUTION OF SOCIETIES, at 1, 8 (1977) (these other factors did “not give direction 
to change; direction is given by cultural values”) (emphasis in original).  Thus, 
for example, “Parsons explains the ultimate failure of the Roman Empire in 
terms of the inability ‘to develop a dynamic religious system which could 
legitimate and strengthen the enormously expanded societal community’.”  
Jackson Toby, Parsons’ Theory of Societal Evolution, in Talcott Parsons, The 
Evolution of Societies, at 1, 9 (1977) (citing Talcott Parsons, Societies: 
Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives, at 92 (1966)). 
142  Jackson Toby, Parsons’ Theory of Societal Evolution, in TALCOTT PARSONS, THE 
EVOLUTION OF SOCIETIES, at 1, 8 (1977) (asserting that Parsons’ version of cultural 
determinism “does not mean that cultural developments are the only or even the 
main source of social change.”  Toby specifically wanted to distinguish Parsons 
from the more exclusively cultural explanations of theorists such as Ruth 
Benedict.  See Toby, supra, at 9; see also RUTH BENEDICT, PATTERNS OF CULTURAL 
CHANGE (1934). 
143  TALCOTT PARSONS, SOCIETIES: EVOLUTIONARY AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, 
at 113 (1966). 
144 Lechner, supra. 
145 Quoted in NILS GILMAN, MANDARINS OF THE FUTURE 82 (2004). 
146 See DAVID MCLELLAND, THE ACHIEVEMENT MOTIVE (citing Parsons). 
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Parsons’ theory of culture and social change also posited a 
universalistic theory of societal evolution in a “sequence of 
stages”147 – a characteristic that would surface fully in one of 
Parsons’ most important intellectual heirs, W.W. Rostow. 
 
Certainly, Weber saw himself and his work as 
opposed to the economic determinism of what is sometimes 
termed “vulgar” Marxism.148 At the same time, however, 
New Weberian scholars have emphasized that Weber also 
accepted much of the fundamental wisdom of Marx’s 
approach.  That is to say, Weber’s theory both diverged and 
converged with Marxian analysis.149 
 The clearest example of Weber’s careful blending of 
historical materialist insights with his own analysis might be 
his well-known statement that “very frequently the ‘world 
images’ that have been created by ‘ideas’ have, like 
switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has 
been pushed by the dynamic of interest.”150 
 Rather than emphasizing the exclusive role of 
“values” as engendering capitalistic growth, Weber is 
proposing a much more specific role of “ideals.”  In 
analytical terms, the statement sees ideals as necessary but not 
sufficient to effect historical change.  The “dynamic of 
                                                          
147  Jackson Toby, Parsons’ Theory of Societal Evolution, in TALCOTT PARSONS, THE 
EVOLUTION OF SOCIETIES, at 1, 20 (1977). 
148 Guenther Roth, Global Capitalism and Multi-Ethnicity: Max Weber Then and Now, 
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO WEBER 117, 118 (2000) ( “… Weber disclaimed an 
‘inner sympathy’ with capitalism, as against the champions of older laissez-faire 
doctrines, he defended , as a ‘rather pure bourgeois,’ the imperatives of the 
capitalist market place against its many detractors from the right and left… Not a 
policy operating with anticapitalist slogans . . . but . . . the resolute insistence on 
promoting our bourgeois-industrial … development is the only economic policy 
feasible in the long run in the age of capitalism, whether you love it or hate it’ 
[MWG I/4:672f]” 
[cite for vulgar Marxism and for Weber’s opposition to it, see Allen and Parkin]   
149 cite Allen, Parkin 
150 (pp.277-278, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (1946) (H.H. Gerth & C. 
Wright Mills trans.) (note that Mills was a prominent leftist sociologist, see Allen.  
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interest” pushes social activity along one “ideals” track over 
another.  Without this dynamic of interest, therefore, ideals 
could not take hold and flourish.  At the same time, this 
statement tells us, ideals ultimately play the shaping role, 
the mold into which underling interests drive social action. 
 Thus, Weber’s statement that “not ideas, but material 
and ideal interests, directly govern men’s conduct.”151  Weber 
sought to explain the important role that norms play in 
shaping behavior, resisting an explanation of social action 
that looked solely to the structure of the economic “means of 
production.”  As will be further explored below, however, 
Weber’s understanding of norms seemed imbued by a 
distinctly dimmer mood than that of Parsons.  Weber 
explicitly recognized the subordinating role that norms 
could play in effectuating the domination of members of 
society to the ruling elite.  Indeed, in this conceptual 
interrelationship between dominant norms and material 
interests, Weber’s theory might be read against the work of 
subsequent critical theorists in a new light.  This will be 
explored further below,152 but for present purposes the main 
point is that Weber’s theory viewed material interests as a 
centrally important factor, interacting with “ideal interests” 
and driving social action along the “tracks” laid by those 
ideal interests to shape history. 
 By contrast, New Weberian scholars have pointed out 
that Parsons drained much of the influence of the non-
normative from Weber’s theory.  Cohen et al argue that “In 
attempting to assimilate Weber’s formulations of his own 
version of action theory, Parsons asserted that a “focus of 
interest on the normative aspects of the action systems” was 
basic to Weber’s scheme. … According to Parsons, … ‘there is 
                                                          
151 (pp.280, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (1946) (H.H. Gerth & C. 
Wright Mills trans.) (note that Mills was a prominent leftist sociologist, see Allen.  
See German original and consider stating it here with an opinion on whether 
faithfully translated or not.) 
152 See infra. 
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no such thing as action except as effort to conform with norms’ for 
Parsons (1949: 76-77, emphasis added).”153 
  Thus, while Parsons argued correctly that Weber 
had a focus of interest on the normative aspects of action, he 
exaggerated by asserting that norms are central to Weber’s 
conception of social action.  On issues where Weber made no 
mention of norms or explicitly denied their importance, 
Parsons claimed (to the contrary) that norms were important 
to Weber.  When Weber stated that norms were of varying 
importance, Parsons asserted their central importance.  
When nominated other factors as being primary, Parsons 
elevated norms to a position of centrality and deemphasized 
nonnormative factors.  The consequence is that Weber’s 
conception of action theory was distorted.154 
The New Weberians suggest, by contrast, that in Weber’s 
analysis self-conscious value-orientation is only one type of 
social action.  Moreover, Weber felt that value-rational action 
was both potentially antagonistic to, and constrained by, the 
instrumentalities of modern statehood.   
How does Weber’s analysis of the Protestant ethic in 
                                                          
153 P.233 
154 Cohen et al: 
“Action may be oriented on instrumentally rational, value-rational, effectual or 
traditional grounds.  That is, the actor’s orientation may be determined (Weber, 
1968: 24-25) principally by his ‘expectations as to the behavior of objects … and 
of other human beings,’ by his ‘conscious belief in [a] value for its own sake,’ by 
his ‘specific affects and feeling states,’ or by ‘ingrained habituation.’ Weber (1968: 
29) also noted three types of subjective meaning common in social action: usage, 
custom and complex of interests.  That is, an action may be performed 
repeatedly because of current use, because of long familiarity, or because of 
stable opportunities for realizing interests. 
 “Parsons perceived all three of these types of subjective meaning as 
essentially normative.  In addition, he viewed as essentially normative three of 
the four categories for orienting action: traditionalism, instrumentally rational 
action and value rational action… However, a category-by-category analysis 
shows that traditional behavior, usages and customs are primarily habitual, 
while instrumentally rational behavior and complexes of interests are largely 
oriented to expediency rather than to norms.  Only value-rational behavior is 
primarily normative in any of the senses intended by Parsons.” 
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driving capitalism, a striking example of value-rational 
conduct, mesh with this analysis of the types of social 
action?  The value-rational conduct that gave rise to effective 
capitalistic conduct would, like all other types of religiously 
motivated behavior, come to be constrained by the very state 
and society that arose initially out that behavior.155  This was 
one of the paradoxes that Weber underscored: the way in 
which the very religious values which initiated modern 
activity – industry in the economic sphere, scientific inquiry, 
and even the rule of law --- would ultimately create 
institutions that would destabilize the values that birthed 
them.  This destabilization of values was what Weber called 
the “disenchantment” of modern society, described above. 
 Given Weber’s attention to disenchantment from 
value-rational action, Parsons’ interpretation of this typology 
of social action as value-driven is curious.  This emphatic 
focus on ideals seems to be inspired more by the Protestant 
Ethic than by the source of the typology itself, in Economy and 
Society. 
The rather exclusive attention to ideals also 
manifested itself in Parsons’ analytical distance from 
material conditions as causes of social action and 
determinants of social relations.  Weber, by contrast, 
specifically warned that his intention was not “to substitute 
for a one-sided causal materialistic an equally one-sided 
spiritualistic causal interpretation of culture and of 
history.”156  Cohen et al argue: “While we cannot be certain 
whether Parsons misunderstood the target of Weber’s 
critique of ‘Marxian historical materialism,’ he clearly 
missed its substantive point.  Weber quite clearly retained the 
                                                          
155 see, e.g., JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, MAX WEBER: POLITICS AND THE SPIRIT OF 
TRAGEDY 26 (1996) (describing Weber’s theory of capitalism as a “sociological 
phenomenon springing up originally from religious convictions, which would 
eventually give way to secularization as the entrepreneur continued to 
demonstrate his qualifications as a Christian by his business integrity.”)].   
156 WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC , at 183. 
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interest category (including material interest) as a central 
motive for action and as an important social force; he 
rejected only sociological formulations that assigned an 
exclusive attention to self-interest (especially material 
interest).  In contrast, Parsons very nearly read the interest 
category out of Weber altogether, thereby denuding his 
work of its attention to the ‘dynamic of interest’ as a basic 
motive for action.”157 
The excision of nonnormative interests in Weber 
served to underscore and possibly to distort Weber’s 
discussion of the role of  Protestant “values” in producing 
capitalistic behavior.  Whereas Weber sought to describe 
Protestantism as one particular historical source of a more 
general phenomenon, the Parsonian approach tends to cut 
away and deemphasize this historical and analytical 
complexity.  Combined with Parsons’ attraction to 
universalistic and prescriptive analysis, this approach can 
end up simplifying Weber’s thesis into the proposition that 
Protestant values not only helped generate capitalistic 
behavior, but that they are actually “necessary” for 
capitalism to take root as a general matter.  “For Parsons, 
revolutions in consciousness, not the inexorable unfolding of 
technological power or the contradictions of class society, 
provided the critical turning points in history.”158 
An endorsement of capitalistic and scientific values 
from a normative perspective was part of Parsons’ self-
conscious understanding of the intention behind his work.  
In his introductory description of the objectives of setting 
out a systematic theory of social action, Parsons made clear 
that the focus of this theory: “the interpretation of 
‘capitalism,’ ‘free enterprise,’ ‘economic individualism,’ as it 
has been variously called.”159  Parsons was partially 
                                                          
157 COHEN P.236 argue 
158 Gilman, Nils. Mandarins of the Future., 2004. p 93. 
159  (The Structure of Social Action (1949, p.vi). 
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motivated by a special plea directly from Friedrich von 
Hayek, who saw160 Weber as an “ideological forerunner” for 
a theory of economic growth that eschewed “public 
regulation” suggested by Marxian and Keynesian policies.161  
Just as the argument for deregulatory politics served 
as an important and explicit counterpoint to advocates for 
socialist statist policy, the argument for the importance of 
beliefs served as an important and explicit counterpoint to 
proponents of the view that the primary deficit in the 
developing world was the absence of capital.  The latter 
formed an important part of dependency theory, which 
argued that colonizing countries had extracted capital from 
colonies in addition to establishing market patterns that 
created economic dependency of the peripheral colonies on 
the metropolitan center.162 
 
*  *  * 
 
 Weber was a self-described bourgeois163 who strongly 
supported the German state164 and one who may have 
believed that the developing world was ‘inherently’ 
disqualified to generate development.165  Yet he became one 
of the intellectual forefathers of the modernization 
movement.  This article suggests that, unfortunately, when it 
comes to the application of Weber’s theories to development, 
                                                          
160  [in Weber’s Protestant Ethic, but I don’t know if Hayek was relying only on 
that, have to look more at Hayek and also at this letter] 
161  (Kieran Allen, Max Weber, at 7 (citing T. Parsons, “The 
Circumstances of My Encounter with Max Weber,” in R. Merton and M.W. Riley 
eds., Sociological Traditions from Generation to Generation: Glimpses of the 
American Experience, 1980, at pp.38, 42). 
162  See Andre Gunder Frank, the Development of Underdevelopment. 
For an explicit denunciation of Parsonian methodology see Andre Gunder 
Frank,The Sociology of Development and the Underdevelopment of Sociology 
(London: Pluto Press 1971). 
163 (quote) 
164 (quote) 
165 (quote).   
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much in development policy has inherited too much from 
the Eurocentric sensibility of Weber’s work and not enough 
from the sophistication of his analyses.  The sophistication of 
this theory was not trivial.  Streamlined in the service of a 
particularly American version of free market capitalism, 
Weber’s analysis was stripped of insights that in fact might 
have predicted many of the lessons that were learned the 
hard way from the application of the “evolutionary 
universals” model that developed.  The desire to create a 
viable and clearly opposed alternative to socialism in the 
Cold War era likely inspired Parsons and others simply to 
elide and underplay the role that material interests, and 
Marxian analysis, had in shaping Weber’s own theory.  
Again, the solution threw the baby out with the bathwater: 
in gravitating towards an idealist explanation for capitalist 
development, the Parsonians set themselves up for policies 
that were not only misguided but ineffective. 
 
 
A.3. Parsons and Theoretical Shortcut #3: The Correlation 
Between Modernization and Democracy 
 
Parsons argued that the “necessary breakthroughs” 
for modernization were of a piece and included the 
contemporaneous rise of capitalism and democracy: “the 
institutionalization of the authority of office, the use of 
market mechanisms for mobilizing resources, a generalized 
legal order, and the democratic association.”166  Parsons did 
not devote much attention to exactly how democracy would 
arise or how it would operate.167 Rather, Parsons assumed a 
naturalistic relationship between modernization and 
democracy – as the former emerged, the latter would 
                                                          
166  Jackson Toby, Parsons’ Theory of Societal Evolution, in Talcott Parsons, The 
Evolution of Societies, at 1, 13 (1977). 
167 [cite]   
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naturally take root.  In his 1964 essay, Evolutionary Universals 
in Society, Parsons explicitly applied evolutionary theory to 
identify centralized political legitimacy, the emergence of 
political rationalization through bureaucracy, and “the 
democratic association with elective leadership and fully 
enfranchised membership” as naturally co-evolving hallmarks of 
modernity.168 
The casual assertion of the link between modern 
bureaucracy, capitalism and democracy may have stemmed 
from the fact that Parsons did not analyze the role of power 
in his list of functional imperatives.169  Rather, Parsons 
expressed a highly idealized version of the actual 
functioning and social role of “the institutions of political 
democracy” such as electoral franchise.170  This was 
consistent with this neoclassical orientation in terms of 
political and economic theory, and with his objective of 
counteracting oppositional theories then competing for 
allegiance in the realm of international economic policy.171  
Thus, “pessimism was the aspect of Weber’s thought that … 
Parsons had labored so hard to downplay in Toward a 
Theory of Social Action.”172  
 Although Parsons recognized coercion as a factor in 
Weber’s analysis,173 he nevertheless underplayed that aspect 
                                                          
168 Talcott Parsons, Evolutionary Universals in Society (1964). 
169 “Had he regarded power in this way, Parsons might have seen that effective 
social goals are of necessity those that are desirable from the standpoint of the 
powerful.  This might have led him to [investigate the] hierarchical definition and 
enforcement of social goals….” [p.151]  Chandler Morse, The Functional Imperatives, 
p.100 in The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons: A Critical Examination (1961). 
170 [pp.298-301] Andrew Hacker, Sociology and Ideology, p.289 in The Social Theories 
of Talcott Parsons: A Critical Examination (1961). 
171 Parsons’ “`conservative’ bias” had been oft remarked on – actually it is more 
of a classical liberalism: “it is the ideology of John Locke and John Stuart Mill, 
the ideology of political liberty and a free society.” [pp.290-291]  Andrew Hacker, 
Sociology and Ideology, p.289 in The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons: A Critical 
Examination (1961). 
172 NILS GILMAN, MANDARINS OF THE FUTURE 55 (2004). 
173 (Parsons The Structure of Social Action 1949, pp. 658,717; Talcott Parsons, 
Max Weber and the contemporary political crisis, Review of Politics vol 4 (1942), 
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of Weber’s analysis in multiple ways.  The first was through 
his own selective culling of Weber’s theoretical concepts.  As 
Cohen et al observed, Parsonian theory holds that “common 
values are the sine qua non of the social order.”174  Parson’s 
reading of Weber not only emphasized normative interests 
driving individual activity at the expense of internally 
identified non-normative factors such as material interest, as 
discussed above, but also emphasized those normative 
interests at the expense of externally determined non-
normative factors, such as coercion: “Parsons’ great stress on 
the alleged importance of the ‘common value’ in Weber’s 
work forced a fundamental reordering of Weberian 
perspectives on the significance of ideas and interests in 
social action, and eventually resulted in misinterpretation of 
Weber’s perspective on domination.”175 
 The Structure of Social Action accomplishes this re-
ordering partially through omission.  Most of Parson’s 
treatment of Weber focuses on his sociology of religion, 
lending force to the collective-value, normative analysis.  
Only a small portion of Structure of Social Action focuses on 
Weber’s treatment of power. 
 Yet power ultimately played a central role in Weber’s 
analysis of modern governance.  As noted above, Weber’s 
theory was inflected by a Nietzschean sensitivity to 
“structures of dominancy.”176  New Weberians Kieran Allen 
and Cohen et al have argued that a “correct understanding 
of Weber’s general sociology is impossible unless founded 
on a faithful reading of this theory of” power.177 
 
This bowdlerizing tendency in Parson’s reception of 
                                                                                                                                  
at p.62.), 
174 (COHEN p.236)   
175 (COHEN p.236) 
176 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 941 (G. Roth & R. Wittich ed. 1968); see 
supra section; Lansmann, supra, at 83.   
177 (COHEN p.237); see also Allen chapter 2. 
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Weberian was perhaps most famously displayed in his 
translation of Weber’s ideal types of governance, or 
Herrschaft. The term forms the basis for Weber’s classic and 
perhaps best known analysis, his formulation of the ideal 
types in social structures as deriving from forms of power or 
Herrschaft that are “traditional,” “charismatic” or “formal-
rational” in nature. 
  The plain, unvarnished definitions of Herrschaft 
in contemporary German-English dictionaries – as “rule” or  
“dominion” - seem to capture the term’s blending of 
coercion by the elite together with some basic level of 
acceptance, if not full consent, by the masses. 178  English 
translations of Weber’s Economy and Society, however, have 
tended to err on the side of either coercion or consent, 
construing Herrschaft as “authority,” highlighting consent, or 
“domination,” highlighting coercion. 
Guenther Roth, in his translation of Economy and 
Society, chose to translate Herrschaft as “domination.”  
Roth’s choice of “domination” mirrored that of Reinhard 
Bendix, who in his book of Max Weber explicitly discussed 
the difficulty of translating Herrschaft, preferred the term 
“legitimate domination.”179  Parsons, however, preferred the 
                                                          
178 Herrschaft: “power, rule, reign” – p.381 – 2002 Cambridge Klett 
Comprehensive German Dictionary; "rule, dominion (uber); mastery, power, 
control" p.927 Langenscheidts Taschenworterbuch Englisch (1956). 
179  In his section on Legal Domination, Bendix begins with a footnote 
describing the difficulties of translating Weber’s term Herrschaft:  
 
It is difficult to find an English equivalent for the German term 
Herrschaft, which emphasizes equally the ruler’s exercise of 
power and the follower’s acceptance of that exercise as 
legitimate, a meaning which goes back to the relations between 
lord and vassal under feudalism.  The English terms 
“domination” and “authority” are not equally apt, because the 
first emphasizes the power of command whether or not 
consent is present, while the second emphasizes the right of 
command and hence implies the follower’s acceptance almost 
to the exclusion of the ruler’s very real power.  Weber wished 
to emphasize that both power and consent are problematic, but 
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term “leadership.”  Parsons’ rendition of Herrschaft, 
therefore, plays up the “consent” side of the term even more 
than “authority.” 
In a review of Bendix’s “intellectual portrait” of 
Weber, Parsons explained: “The term [Herrschaft], which in 
its most general meaning I should now translate as 
“leadership,” implies that a leader has power over his 
followers.  But “domination” suggests that this fact, rather 
than the integration of the collectivity, in the interest of 
effective functioning … is the critical factor from Weber’s 
point of view … The former interpretation [does not 
represent] the main trend of Weber’s thought, though he 
was in certain respects a ‘realist’ in the analysis of power.  
The preferable interpretation … is represented especially by 
his tremendous emphasis on the importance of legitimation 
… legitime Herrschaft [was] for Weber … overwhelmingly the 
most significant case….”180 
The New Weberians have explored at length the 
difficulties of translating Weber’s Herrschaft into English.  In 
particular, Cohen et al. devoted extensive discussion to the 
Parsons’ misuse of the term.  Cohen et al. dispute that 
Weber’s “prime emphasis was on either (1) leadership in the 
interest of effective collectivity functioning or (2) 
                                                                                                                                  
as a realist in the analysis of power he would have been critical 
of any translation that tended to obscure the ‘threat of force’ 
present in all relations between superiors and subordinates.  
For these reasons, I prefer the term ‘domination.’ 
 
p.481.  Bendix puts his finger on a difficulty of translation in Weber’s concept 
subtly blending - and conceptually requiring – both the notion of coercion and 
the notion of consent.  When unpacked in this way, the seemingly intended 
meaning of the term Herrschaft remarkably comes within striking distance of 
Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony.  Indeed, some Frankfurt School would 
employ Weberian concepts their critique of modern society. 
180 Talcott Parsons, Review of Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait, 
25 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW 750 (1960). 
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legitimation.”181 Rather, Cohen et al. argue that “Weber did 
not suggest that dominant persons act to integrate 
collectivities in the interest of effective functioning.  Rather, 
he treated such individuals as acting in terms of their own 
ideal and material interests as they perceive them.”182  
Moreover, Cohen et al. found Parson’s emphasis on 
legitimating as “no more convincing than Parson’s related 
attempt [concerning] leadership.”183  Cohen et al. point to 
Weber’s statement that “although Herrschaft does not ‘in 
every case … utilize economic power for its foundation and 
maintenance,,,,in the vast majority of cases, and indeed in 
the most important ones, this is just what happens… and 
often to such an extent that the mode of applying economic 
means for the purpose of maintaining Herrschaft, in turn, 
exercises a determining influence on the structure of 
domination.” 
 Moreover, Cohen et al. argue that, whereas Parsons 
emphasized the importance of “belief in legitimacy” in 
explaining the basis of power in social structures, Weber 
allowed that Herrschaft could be based in “physical coercion; 
habituation to which at least under certain conditions Weber 
applied the label ‘discipline’; rational calculation of interests, 
a specific version of which is founded in relationships of 
expertise; and belief in the legitimacy of perceived order.”184  
Thus, Weber wrote:  
“It is by no means true that every case of submissiveness to 
persons in positions of power is primarily for (or even at all) 
oriented to this belief [in legitimacy].  Loyalty may be 
hypocritically simulated by individuals or by whole groups 
on purely opportunistic grounds, or carried out in practice 
for reasons of material interest.  Or people may submit from 
                                                          
181 (COHEN p.237) 
182 COHEN p.238.   
183 COHEN p.238.   
184 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 53-4, 212-214, 942-946 (G. Roth & R. 
Wittich ed. 1968). 
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individual weakness and helplessness because there is no 
acceptable alternative.”185  
 Cohen et al. conclude: “In short, contrary to Parsons, 
who attempted to equate Herrschaft with legitimate 
domination, Weber considered nonlegitimate domination at 
least equal in importance to legitimate domination…. 
Although Weber’s multiple-factor approach is a dominant 
motif in his discussions of Herrschaft, a second emphasis is 
… on power and not, as Parsons would have it, on 
leadership … or legitimacy.”186 
As subsequent New Weberians have pointed out, 
these difficulties in translation probably have had at least as 
much to do with the Anglo-American tradition of political 
thought as with linguistics.  While Cohen et al. critique the 
lack of attention to “nonlegitimate” rule in Weber’s thought, 
at least as problematic was the understanding of the term 
“legitimate” itself.  Weber’s understanding of the term 
appears to have been strictly positivist, referring to the 
actual willingness of subjects to obey authority rather than to 
any normatively valid basis for their obedience. “Weber’s 
uncanny ability to equate authority with power flew in the 
face of the more optimistic outlook of western political 
philosophy which assumed that the Enlightenment’s legacy 
had resolved the problem by defining all legitimate 
authority as deriving from voluntary consent.”187 
 Lansmann elaborates on the Weber’s understanding 
of legitimation, arguing that it was “not concerned with the 
normative question of whether or not that body of rules 
ought to be considered legitimate.”188  This approach was 
                                                          
185 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 214 (G. Roth & R. Wittich ed. 1968). 
186 (COHEN at p.239) 
187 JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, MAX WEBER: POLITICS AND THE SPIRIT OF TRAGEDY 62 
(1996). 
188 Lansmann, supra, at 87: “This is a point where many of Weber’s critics argue 
that he has unjustifiably altered the generally accepted meaning of the concept.  
Weber ignores the argument that a concept such as ‘legitimate’ has implicit 
normative implications and cannot, therefore, be used in a ‘neutral’ manner.  
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shaped by Weber’s methodological affinity both with “legal 
positivism and post-Nietzschean skepticism.”189  Eliason 
further explores the difference between Anglo-American 
political thought and Weber’s post-Nietzschean, anti-
Hegelian approach:  
 
“For an Anglo-American… [l]iberalism means 
‘freedoms,’ enshrined politically as rights and protected 
by various institutional methods which limit state 
authority… The core problem of liberalism is state 
power: limiting it, controlling, or alternatively of 
justifying its political role which is to be determined by 
constitutions and by democracy or more broadly by 
consent arising through discussion.  Weber, however, 
was far removed from all of this.  He had no sentimental 
attachment to either democracy or parliamentary forms.  
‘Rights’ barely exist as a concept in his texts, and when 
they appear they do so as a valuable residue of past 
fanaticism.  … Indeed, he showed little affinity even 
with German liberalism, which made its own distinctive 
contribution to the liberal tradition with the idea of 
Rechstaat, the ideal of a state of laws not of men… Weber 
hardly used the word Rechstaat.  The explanation for this 
is that the word itself has natural-law connotations.  
And natural law was alien to Weber, who was very 
pronounced in favor of what we might call legal 
positivism – or, maybe better, legal realism, since there 
were lingering elements of natural law in the legal 
positivism of his day…”190 
 
 
                                                                                                                                  
According to Weber’s critics to describe a regime as legitimate must be to refer to 
a valued achievement other than the contingent fact that its citizens appear to 
obey its laws or just happen to believe it to be legitimate.” 
 
189 Landesman continues: “Weber was, in many ways, influenced by both legal 
positivism and post-Nietzschean skepticism.  He was not concerned with the 
problem of which regimes are normatively legitimate, but with a different 
question: … ‘how can modern regimes legitimate themselves or be held to be 
legitimate?’” P.88. 
190 Eliaeson, supra, at 136-137. 
 
 
RE-READING WEBER IN LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
 
 
 61
A.4. Parsons and U.S. Foreign Policy 
 
The “confluence of U. S. foreign policy needs and the 
ambitions of Parsons and his collaborators would provide the 
foundation for a social scientific theory of social change,… 
Parsonian theory would provide a basis for uniting the 
particularistic studies being made in Area Studies programs into a 
single, coordinated research and policy agenda.”191  In formulating 
that agenda, Parsons was particularly motivated by the desire 
to provide an “American alternative to Marxism,” as his 
theory would subsequently come to be called. 192  In this 
Cold War context, Parsons sought to portray Weber - and his 
theories about capitalism as interpreted by Parsons - as 
“above political conflicts.”193 
Parsons explicitly situated his analytical framework of 
evolutionary universals in the policy divide between 
capitalism and socialism.  The notion that the major engine 
of growth and development lay in the “beliefs” of members 
of society found important support in Max Weber’s 
exposition of the role of Protestant ideals in spurring 
capitalist development in Western Europe.   
Parsons was motivated to establish the universality of 
his theory at least in part out of the same concerns that 
animated his endorsement of normative factors, namely a 
desire to exclude and delegitimate rival Marxian accounts of 
economic growth.  In fact, Parsons declared “special 
reasons” for downplaying the role of  nonnormative 
interests, and underplaying the problematic conceptual role 
of democracy, in his reading of Weber.194 These reasons 
                                                          
191 Gilman, Nils. Mandarins of the Future.  2004. p 73. 
192 (P.177, Gouldner, The Coming Crisis in Western Sociology, cited in Kieran Allen, 
Max Weber at 7.) 
193 “Weber thus entered the canon of American sociology as a ‘value free’ 
sociologist.” (Allen, Max Weber, at p.8.  Discuss the value free issue a bit more 
here - see Allen at p.73, Parkin.) 
194  See T. Parsons, “On ‘De-Parsonizing Weber,’ American Sociological Review 
October 1975 at p.668.   
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related to his desire to deprivilege and delegitimate rival 
accounts.195 In particular, excising Weber’s sociocultural 
“pessimism”  from his own theory allowed Parsons to “craft 
a Weberian theory that permitted [the] image of  American 
modernity as a wonderful thing.”196 
Parsons sought not only to emphasize the importance 
of capitalist beliefs, but also to situate this causal variable in 
a universalist analysis of economic growth and social 
change.  Central tenets of modernization theory were that (1) 
there is a universal path towards economic development 
which features the emergence of a highly differentiated 
social structure; (2) this path features the centrality of free 
market entrepreneurs; (3) states that wish to succeed in 
economic development should do as much as possible to 
free constraints on entrepreneurs and investors.197 
 The dependentista development theorist Andre Gunder 
Frank observed that, although Parsons himself was not 
primarily focused on the developing world, “[a]rguably 
"development" was the field in which Parsonianism became 
the most influential, even though it was rather far removed 
from his own immediate concerns. It was Parsons who 
translated Weber into American ..., and it was post-War but 
Cold War America that used Parsonized Weber to conquer 
the post-colonial Third World in apparent competition with 
the Soviet Union and China.”198  
According to Kieran Allen, Parsons worked with the 
                                                          
195  See T. Parsons, “On ‘De-Parsonizing Weber,’ American Sociological Review 
October 1975 at p.666, seeking to “clarify ... the relation between economic theory 
and sociological theory.” 
196 NILS GILMAN, MANDARINS OF THE FUTURE 55 (2004). 
197 This was the view, for example, represented by Hayek’s reading of Weber. 
198   Andre Gunder Frank post. Frank was a central proponent of dependency 
theory, and also was perfectly aware of the interconnections between Parsons, as 
an interlocutor of Weber, and modernization theorists such as W.W. Rostow.  
[Frank argues that Clifford Geertz, Robert Bellah, Marion Levy, Florence 
Kluckhon, Homans et al made direct inputs into development theory and policy.  
Investigate this.] 
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CIA-sponsored “Congress for Cultural Freedom.”  Allen 
describes the Congress of Cultural Freedom as an 
“organization that sought to wage an intellectual struggle for 
the hearts and minds of left leaning intellectuals.”199  While 
                                                          
199  (Allen at p.8 [Other scholars involved with the Congress for Cultural 
Freedom, such as Daniel Bell and Seymour Lipset, interpreted Weber as 
supporting a reading of market-oriented democracy as constituting the end-
point, for both pragmatic and ontological reasons, of human evolution.  Daniel 
Bell wrote The End of Ideology (1960), which viewed Weber as an important 
intellectual predecessor of the pragmatic argument  (see D. Bell, The End of 
Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties, 1960, at p.279).  
Seymour Lipset also relied on Weber’s theories for the ontological argument that 
liberal democracy decisively represented the “good society itself in operation.”  
See Lipset, ‘The End of Ideology’ in C. Waxman ed., The End of Ideology Debate 
(1969 at p.69).  Together, Edward Shils, Daniel Bell and Seymour Lipset, all 
finding intellectual support in Weber, formed the American center of the 
Congress for Cultural Freedom.  See Scott-Smith at p.443] [Gilles Scott-Smith 
provides a detailed history of the rise and plateau of the Congress for Cultural 
Freedom.  See Giles Scott-Smith, “The Congress for Cultural Freedom, the End of 
Ideology and the 1955 Milan Conference: 'Defining the Parameters of Discourse' 
in Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 37, No. 3, 437-455 (2002).  Rather than 
ideological neoliberals, both Bell and Lipset supported an approach that would 
view itself as “non-ideological” and as essentially espousing some version of an 
“Atlantic consensus” finding common ground between European social 
democracy and American New Deal-ism.  See Scott Smith at p.442.  In the early 
phase of the CCF, this brand of moderate welfare statist politics served as an 
alternative to the threat of “hard-line” Marxism and totalitarianism.  After the 
death of Stalin in 1953, and the perceived decline of the hard-line 
Marxist/totalitarian alternative, the members of the CCF began to view the 
differences between various brands of industrial democracy as essentially minor, 
and the “end of ideology” discourse was born.  See Scott-Smith at pp.438,440.  
Henceforth, the challenge for the modern Western state was a scientistic one 
related to managing productivity and engineering specific solutions to social 
problems within a broadly Fordist context.  See Scott-Smith at p.441.  The CCF 
soon faced challenges both from those espousing a more deregulatory approach - 
Hayek was a vocal “dissenter” within the CCF’s “Atlantic consensus” (See Scott-
Smith at p.451). It also began to face challenges from the global South, beginning 
with India but soon burgeoning into the state organizers of the Non-Aligned 
Movement.  See Scott-Smith at pp.454, 455.  The voices from these quarters 
seemed to be calling for a revival of socialist and authoritarian politics, a 
challenge that Scott-Smith describes as ultimately too foreign and too large for 
the short-lived statist “Atlantic consensus” of the CCF.  See Scott-Smith at p.455 
(“ the gap between West and South was much greater than that between the USA 
and Western Europe, and the CCF would have difficulties in exporting its ideas 
beyond the ‘Atlantic consensus’ of the Euro-American intelligentsia”).] 
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the CCF endorsed a moderate Fordism,200 the interpretation 
of Weber in Parsons emphasized Weber’s espousal of free-
market capitalism in the Protestant Ethic, combining that 
with Weber’s notion of ideal types to create a potent theory 
of modernization.   
Based at Harvard’s Department of Social Relations 
(DSR), Parsons was able to work with contemporaries to 
shape an agenda for social science that could be immediately 
transferred to U.S. foreign policy initiatives.201  The DSR, 
underwritten by the Carnegie Corporation, sponsored 
scholarly exchanges with Edward Shils and others at the 
University of Chicago for the purpose of establishing a 
single, general account of modernity in the social sciences. 202   
                                                          
200 The Congress for Cultural Freedom itself stopped short of free market 
economics, its function ultimately being instead to build support for a more 
moderate form of market-oriented government, compatible with American New 
Deal politics and European social democracy, that could serve as a viable 
alternative to leftists.  The CCF’s theoretical center seemed to rely on a reading of 
Weber that saw, in Weber’s discussions of bureacracy, support for a Fordist state. 
201 NILS GILMAN, MANDARINS OF THE FUTURE 73 (2004).  Gilman’s description of the 
influence of Parsons in the emergence of this scholarly agenda is worth quoting 
at length: 
 
…U. S. foreign policy needs and the ambitions of Parsons and his collaborators 
would provide the foundation for a social scientific theory of social change, 
which would eventually come to be known by the name modernization theory.  
[Parsons’ Department of Social Relations or DSR] would shape modernization 
theory…. First, Parsons articulated more fully than any other contemporary 
American scholar … the concept of modernity that would provide a 
fundamental, if usually implicit, template for both intellectuals and policy 
makers in their understanding of the desirable direction and ultimate goal of 
change in the postcolonial world. Second, [DSR] members helped redirect 
postwar social theory away from social critique and toward the creation of a 
descriptive … theory of human action…. This social theory would help justify 
the creation of technologies of social reform, mostly applied to non-Western 
countries. Third, the DSR was the institutional fountainhead for the promotion of 
Parsonian social theory, which provided the foundation for modernization 
theory. …[T]he DSR provided an institutional presence for the employment and 
training of students of modernization. Most of the sociologists associated with 
modernization theory had some affiliation with the DSR as either professors or 
collaborators. 
202 Id. 
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This account contained all of the qualities described 
above. The definition of modernity as occurring through 
evolution along a single, universal path, characterized and 
spurred primarily by social “values,” and leading to a highly 
“differentiated” social structure in which bureaucratic 
governance, modern capitalism, and democracy all naturally 
co-existed.  Parsons viewed the United States as occupying 
the apex of this evolutionary trajectory.   “Moreover, since 
historical change had to come from outside the system, Americans 
were obligated to go out and help other societies get moving 
toward greater differentiation.”203  Parsons’ prescriptions for 
“help” were “welcomed with especial warmth in development 
studies.”204  The application of Parsonian analysis to the objective 
of economic development would produce one of the leading policy 
frameworks of the mid-to-late twentieth century, Modernization 
Theory. 205 
 
 
B. W.W. Rostow:  Modernization Theory Meets 
Economic Development Policy 
 
The most well-known of modernization theorists, W.W. 
Rostow,  eagerly absorbed Parsons’ scholarship and had 
“align[ed his] pronouncements with the vision of modernity 
that Parsons painted.”206  Moreover, Rostow shared and 
extended Parsons’ enthusiasm for concretizing U.S. social 
science in the form of U.S. foreign policy.207   Because of 
                                                          
203 Gilman, Nils. Mandarins of the Future., 2004. p 88 
204 Gilman, Nils. Mandarins of the Future., 2004. p 79. 
205 Gilman, Nils. Mandarins of the Future.  2004. p 73. 
206 NILS GILMAN, MANDARINS OF THE FUTURE 73 (2004). 
207 “The infectious sense of excitement, of being on the verge of unlocking the 
mysteries of human sociability, appears throughout the writings of 
modernization 
theorists (and indeed most social scientists of this period). `A very big 
scientific development has been rapidly gathering force,’ Parsons explained 
to Dean Buck. `I will stake my whole professional reputation on the statement 
that it is one of the really great movements of modern scientific thought.’  
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Rostow’s enormous influence in economic development 
theory and U.S. foreign policy, this methodological 
alignment proved among the most significant channels for 
the transmission of Parsons’ understanding of Weberian 
theory – and of Parsons’ Theoretical Shortcuts. 
 
 
B.1. Rostow and Theoretical Shortcut #1 (“One-Size-Fits-
All”): From “Evolutionary Universals” to “Stages of 
Growth” 
 
 Parsons and Rostow shared a methodological 
ambition to conceptualize “modernization” as “a 
comprehensive and cohesive process that entailed what Max 
Weber had called ‘rationalization.’”208  As such, both 
theorists ignored Weber’s own cautions regarding an 
evolutionary understanding of his “ideal types.”209  Both 
theorists helped to divert Weberian historical analysis into a 
“one-size-fits-all” prescriptive approach. 
 Walt Whitman Rostow was among the most 
influential transmitter of this approach in economic 
development policy.210  In the Process of Development (1952) 
                                                                                                                                  
Walt Whitman Rostow agreed that synthetic social science was nothing less 
than revolutionary: `The revolution may be defined as an effort to achieve a 
more unified application of the social sciences. . . .,’ a project that he believed 
would “get much assistance from the current generation of political scientists 
who are increasingly 
committed to the study of comparative politics in non-Western societies.” 
Gilman, Nils. Mandarins of the Future. 2004. p 78. 
208 NILS GILMAN, MANDARINS OF THE FUTURE 5 (2004). 
209 See Wolfgang Schlucter, Psychophysics and Culture, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION 
TO WEBER 59, 70 (2000) (arguing that Weber “fundamentally rejected organic 
analogies in economics and sociology” and by extension social Darwinism). 
210  Michael Adamson, Social Scientists as Policymakers, 14 HUMANE STUDIES REVIEW 
(2000); David Steigerwald, The Paradoxes of Kennedy Liberalism, 28 REVIEWS IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY 636 (2000). (See Gunder Frank post, arguing that Parsons was 
“arguably with What Whitman Rostow one of the ... defining 
theoretical/ideological leaders with the widest influence on cold war rhetoric 
and policy....”).  
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and The Stages of Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto 
(1962),211  Rostow carried elements of Parsons’ analysis to 
the more streamlined world of development policy and 
practice. 212   
 The Stages of Economic Growth, in particular, stylized 
the analytical components of Parsons’ work, causing a 
deepening of Parsons’ key elisions of Weber.  Rostow 
dramatically simplified Parsons’ analysis of “evolutionary 
universals.”  Parsons had maintained a belief in the validity 
of the concept, but in his exposition generally sought to 
maintain complexity.213  Rostow, on the other hand, reduced 
social change throughout all of human history to five stages 
of economic growth: 214 
 
1. the “traditional society” stage (“whose structure is 
developed within limited production functions, based 
on pre-Newtonian science and technology, and on 
pre-Newtonian attitudes towards the physical 
world”)215; 
 
2. the “preconditions for takeoff” stage (the period in 
which society transitions from a traditional formation 
to one ready to “exploit the fruits of modern science, 
                                                          
211  Other works by Rostow include: The American Diplomatic Revolution; Essays on 
the British Economy of the Nineteenth Century; The Process of Economic Growth; The 
Growth and Fluctuation of the British Economy, 1790-1850; The Dynamics of Soviet 
Society; The Prospects for Communist China; An American Policy in Asia; A Proposal: 
Key to an Effective Foreign Policy; The United States in the World Arena; Politics and 
the Stages of Growth; and The Diffusion of Power. 
212  Michael Latham argues that Parsons and Edward Shils had developed the 
central tenets of modernization theory by the 1950s.  MICHAEL E. LATHAM, 
MODERNIZATION AS IDEOLOGY: AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE AND 'NATION-BUILDING' 
IN THE KENNEDY ERA (2000). 
213 [CHECK] 
214 Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (3rd ed., 1960), at 4 (“It is possible to 
identify all societies, in their economic dimensions, as lying within one of five 
categories.”). 
215 Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (3rd ed., 1960), at 4. 
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fend off diminishing returns, and thus to enjoy the 
blessings and choices opened up by the march of 
compound interest”);216 
 
3. “the take off” stage (the “interval when the old blocks 
and resistances to steady growth are finally 
overcome”);217 
 
4. the “drive to maturity” stage (“a long interval of 
sustained if fluctuating progress, as the now regularly 
growing economy drives to extend modern 
technology over the whole front of its economic 
activity”);218 and 
 
5. the “age of high mass consumption” (“where, in time, 
the leading sector shift towards durable consumers’ 
goods and services”).219 
 
Weber’s ideal types had morphed into Parsons’ evolutionary 
universals and now into Rostow’s “five stages.”220   
Indeed, Rostow’s confidence in the universality of this 
sequence was such that he felt confident even in estimating a 
universal time-frame for movement across the stages once 
the “take-off” triggered the process of sequential change: 
“Historically, it would appear that something like sixty years 
was required to move a society from the beginning of take-
                                                          
216 Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (3rd ed., 1960), at 6. 
217 Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (3rd ed., 1960), at 7. 
218 Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (3rd ed., 1960), at 9. 
219 Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (3rd ed., 1960), at 10. 
220  Rostow’s contemporary Alexander Gerschenkron adopted a more 
sophisticated theory of modernization, which ultimately eclipsed Rostow’s in 
terms of respectability in the academy.  Gerschenkron also advocated a “linear 
stages” version of economic development and famously developed “historical 
backwardness” as a descriptive ideal type.  See Alexander Gerschenkron,  
Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, 1962.  He also believed that 
countries could sometimes skip stages through the adoption of advanced 
technology and through managed state intervention. 
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off to maturity.”221   
The only qualification Rostow felt it necessary to add 
to this general theory arose in the cause of a society’s initial 
propulsion into this sequence.  Although the “preconditions 
for take-off were initially developed, in a clearly marked 
way, in Western Europe… [t]he more general case in 
modern history… saw the stage of preconditions arise not 
endogenously but from some external intrusion by more 
advanced societies.”222 
In his “Stages of Growth” theory, Rostow adopted the 
theoretical inclination of Parsons towards a universal 
structuralism.  In pursuing this inclination, Parsons and 
Rostow shared more, methodologically, with Marxian rather 
than Weberian theory.  For Rostow in particular, the 
construction of a methodologically similar alternative to 
Marxian structuralism appears to have been fully 
intentional.  As the subtitle of Stages of Economic Growth 
indicates – a “Non-Communist Manifesto” – an explicit goal 
of this account was to counter the historical materialist focus 
on economic dynamics of class conflict.223 
This simplistic universalism was not shared by all 
modernization theorists.  Rostow’s contemporary Alexander 
Gerschenkron, for example, produced a theory of historical 
transition to modernization that, although sharing its 
general orientation with Rostow, nevertheless introduced 
important complications in the form of acknowledging the 
contingent nature of the preconditions stage, and as well as 
the role of differences in initial material conditions in 
                                                          
221 Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (3rd ed., 1960), at 10. 
222 Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (3rd ed., 1960), at 6. 
223  Charles Kimber Pearce, Rostow, Kennedy, and the Rhetoric of Foreign Aid 
(2001); Michael Adamson, Social Scientists as Policymakers, Humane Studies 
Review Vol. 14, No. 3 (“During the 1940s and 1950s, Rostow developed his 
"stages" theory as a general model of social development to counter Karl Marx's 
framework for relating socioeconomic factors to social revolution. He presented 
his theory in public policy forums as practical knowledge for using foreign aid to 
conduct economic warfare.”) 
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influencing and differentiating trajectories of modernization 
among “latecomers.”224  Gerschenkron’s personally intimate 
acquaintance with the “historically backward” society of his 
native Odessa probably helped to enhance his taste for 
methodological complexity.  While Gerschenkron’s theories 
eventually have come to prevail favor over Rostow’s much 
more simplied version, in the immediate context of mid-
century U.S. foreign policy it was Rostow’s approach that 
prevailed.225 
 
 
B.2. Rostow and Theoretical Shortcut #2:  Modernity and 
“Values” 
 
Rostow also deepened the Parsonian emphasis on 
normative factors, and in particular of capitalistic values, as 
a causal explanation for societal “evolution.”  Indeed, the 
primary determinant of societal “takeoff” was the emergence 
of a capitalist class both willing and able to take risks and 
make investments of the kind necessary to jumpstart the 
process of rapid economic growth thought to be 
characteristic of the modernization process.    
While this component of Rostovian theory is often 
read for the proposition that capital formation is central to 
economic development, notable in Rostow’s own 
formulation is the emphasis on values.  The “external 
intrusion of advanced societies” is important primarily 
because it “set[s] in motion ideas and sentiments which 
initiated the process by which a modern alternative to the 
traditional society was constructed.”226  It is this shift in 
values which allows the capitalist class to emerge: “The idea 
                                                          
224 Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A 
Book of Essays. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962 
225 Charles Kimber Pearce, Rostow, Kennedy, and the Rhetoric of Foreign Aid 
(2001); 
226 Rostow, Stages of Economic Growth, at 6. 
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spreads … that economic progress is possible…. New types 
of enterprising men come forward… willing to mobilize 
savings and to take risks in pursuit of profit or 
modernization.”227 
Rostow’s treatment here recalls, of course, Weber’s 
account of the Protestant Ethic.  Weber’s account, however, 
explicitly identified itself as a corrective to, rather than a 
replacement for, a “one-sided materialistic” view of 
historical change.228  Rostow, by contrast, appears to view 
the ideas of progress and profit as uniquely independent 
variables.  Changes in “values,” rather than co-
determinative of historical change, appear to become their 
sole cause. 
 
B.3. Rostow and Theoretical Shortcut #3: Modernity and 
Democracy  
 
Like Parsons, Rostow also glossed over the 
relationship of democracy to economic growth and the 
market. Rostow asserted an easy, natural relationship 
between the emergence of economic growth and political 
democracy.229  The emphasis on democracy meshed with the 
goal of providing an attractive alternative to revolutionary 
socialism: “As Arthur Schlesinger Jr. put it, modernization 
theory “represented a very American effort to persuade the 
developing countries to base their revolutions on Locke 
rather than on Marx.”230 
 Rostow shared with modernization theorists 
generally the “belief that modernization would bring 
American-style health, wealth, and democracy to traditional 
nations.” 231  Even in the early 1960s, for example, Rostovian 
                                                          
227 Rostown, Stages of Economic Growth, at 6-7. 
228 See supra cite. 
229  See, e.g., W.W. Rostow, View from the Seventh Floor, (1964), at 25. 
230 NILS GILMAN, MANDARINS OF THE FUTURE 10 (2004). 
231 NILS GILMAN, MANDARINS OF THE FUTURE 9 (2004). 
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fellow traveler Lucian Pye criticized modernization theory 
for its “‘unreasoned expectation’ that democracy was 
‘inevitable’” once economic take-off had begun.232     
 Although both Parsons and Rostow oversimplified 
the relationship between modernity and democracy by 
assuming that the former would promote the latter 
automatically, the Rostovian version of this 
oversimplification parted ways importantly from that of 
Parsons.  Parsons assumed away the problem of democracy 
by neglecting to elaborate on the particular dynamics of its 
emergence; Rostow assumed away the problem by 
embracing the necessity of authoritarian rule as an 
important part of “setting the stage” for democracy.233  
Rostow and other “high modernists,” in James Scott’s 
terminology, endorsed the use of state force to create 
“administrative order” while the institutional elements 
required to support bureaucratization and economic growth 
were put into place.234  The “trade-off” between 
development and democracy seemed acceptable particularly 
“[i]n the context of an American cold war mentality that 
considered `developmental dictatorships’ preferable to 
‘vulnerable’ democracies.”235 
 
B.4. Rostovian Modernization Theory and U.S. Foreign 
Policy  
                                                          
232  Mark T. Berger, Decolonisation, Modernisation and Nation-Building: Political 
Development Theory and the Appeal of Communism in Southeast Asia, 1945–
1975, 34 Journal of Southeast Asian Studies  421, 434 (2003) (quoting Lucian W. Pye, 
Politics, personality and nation-building: Burma’s search for identity (1962), pp. xv–
xvi, 7, 38, 42.); see also Tae-Gyun Park, W. W. Rostow and Economic Discourse 
in South Korea in the 1960s, 8 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND AREA 
STUDIES 55 (2001), at 59. 
233 see also Tae-Gyun Park, W. W. Rostow and Economic Discourse in South 
Korea in the 1960s, 8 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND AREA STUDIES 
55 (2001), at 59.  
234 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the 
Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998). 
235 NILS GILMAN, MANDARINS OF THE FUTURE 11 (2004). 
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Rostow’s streamlined analytical framework came to 
characterize “modernization theory” generally: an account 
of economic growth and social change that focused on the 
importance of the expanding capitalist nucleus and the shift 
in beliefs.  Rostow’s career shows both how this strain of 
neo-Weberian theory and scholarship on economic growth 
and social change impacted U.S. policy in developing 
countries. 236   Rostow adopted a variety of rhetorical 
approaches in urging U.S. policymakers to adopt and 
implement modernization theory.  Rostow’s efforts under 
Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson included an 
extended involvement in the establishment of the Alliance 
for Progress in Latin America.237 
Contemporaneously with the publication of The Stages 
of Economic Growth, Rostow began to implement his analysis 
in service to the U.S. government, first with Office of 
Strategic Services (the precursor to the CIA) during World 
War II, then as chairman of the policy planning council of 
the State Department under Presidents Kennedy and 
Johnson, and finally as a special assistant for national 
security affairs to President  Johnson.  Rostow’s 
development advice quite often explicitly took into account 
anti-communist foreign policy objectives at the center of the 
Cold War.238  In this last position, Rostow served directly 
                                                          
236  Other influential modernization theorists included Lucian Pye, Max Milliken 
and Daniel Lerner.  See David Steigerwald, The Paradoxes of Kennedy 
Liberalism, 28 Reviews in American History 636 (2000). 
237  Charles Kimber Pearce, Rostow, Kennedy, and the Rhetoric of Foreign Aid 
(2001).  Rostow and others experienced most success under Kennedy’s 
administration, which actively sought guidance from the academy.  See David 
Steigerwald, The Paradoxes of Kennedy Liberalism, 28 Reviews of American 
History 636 (2000). 
238  See, e.g., Memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson, “Food Aid to 
Egypt” (June 18, 1966) (weighing the utility of aid to the Nasser regime in Egypt 
against the objective of reducing Soviet influence) (available from the Jewish 
Virtual Library, at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-
Israel/frus061866.html).  Also at Source: Schwar, Harriet Dashiell. (Ed.). Foreign 
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under Special Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy.239  In this capacity, 
Rostow served as a primary architect of U.S. involvement in 
Vietnam as part of U.S. anti-communist foreign policy.240 
One important initial effect of translating Rostow’s 
theory into U.S. policy was a focus on development aid in 
general.  Rostow succeeded in persuading the U.S. 
government to move towards longer-term aid to developing 
country governments,  although efforts in this regard never 
matched the Marshall Plan.241  Rostow believed that the U.S. 
government could help to support a capitalistic framework 
that would enable the preconditions for takeoff  - conditions 
conducive to entrepreneurship – to emerge. 242  
                                                                                                                                  
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, V. 18, Arab-Israeli Dispute 1964-1967. DC: 
GPO, 2001.  In the Middle East, Rostow’s preeminent objective appeared to be to 
promote stability so as to prevent the fracturing of the Arab states into Soviet 
alliances.  Hence Rostow also advocated pressuring Israel to make concessions to 
Palestinian negotiators so as to prevent a buildup of tension in the region.  See 
Memo to President Johnson, “Rostow Urges Johnson to Pressure Israel” (January 
5, 1968), at Source: "Memorandum from [Walt] Rostow to President Johnson," 
Smith, Louis J. (Ed.). Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, V. 20, Arab-
Israeli Dispute 1967-1968. DC: GPO, 2001. and also 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/Frus33.html. 
239  There is a White House file with Rostow’s correspondence while in this 
position.  Other files are held by the University of Texas. 
240  U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The U.S. Government 
and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part II, 1961-
1964 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985).  (Describing W. W. 
Rostow as among the “foremost leaders in the development of U.S. 
counterinsurgency doctrine and programs” and as a leading and persistent 
advocate for concerted military action in Vietnam.)  Chapter 1, titled “The 1961 
Decision To Stand Firm In Vietnam,” recounts in detail Rostow’s consistent 
advocacy for military action in Vietnam - and in ensuring that such planning 
occurred without Congressional participation – from the early stages of U.S. 
involvement following the 1961 decline of the rightist Laotian government. 
241  See, e.g, Tae-Gyun Park, W. W. Rostow and Economic Discourse in South Korea 
in the 1960s, 8 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND AREA STUDIES 55 (2001), at 57-61.  
In fact, at the takeoff stage Rostow advocated the support of broader welfare 
state support.  See Rostow, Stages of Economic Growth, pp.62-63. 
242  Charles Kimber Pearce, Rostow, Kennedy, and the Rhetoric of Foreign Aid 
(2001); Michael Adamson, Social Scientists as Policymakers, Humane Studies 
Review Vol. 14, No. 3  (“Based on his reading of British and American economic 
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With other development economists of the time,243 
Rostow also endorsed “unbalanced growth”244 – that is, a 
focus on supporting key industries rather than attempting to 
address more broadly the infrastructural and societal 
conditions of economic production.  The unbalanced growth 
model operated on the assumption that accelerating growth 
in these key industries would create “spillover gains” that 
would bring the rest of the economy along – a theory that 
later became known as “trickle-down” economics. 
Unbalanced growth policy implemented Rostow’s 
focus on the expanding capitalist nucleus because it 
envisioned a core of entrepreneurs taking a leadership role 
in these key industries.  The conception of developing societies 
as “dual” economies split between traditional and modern 
segments characterized much of the development economics of 
this period.  This conception could be reinterpreted as yet another 
“example of the utility of binary thinking within a Parsonian 
model.”245   
Additionally, because it emphasized the importance 
of investors, this model could support the country’s 
continued receptivity to foreign capital, and continued 
openness to the international marketplace.246  Moreover, U.S. 
                                                                                                                                  
history, Rostow identified a lack of capital formation as the primary obstacle 
preventing poor countries from rapidly modernizing during the critical period as 
they emerged from colonial rule. Rostow recommended that Washington 
provide the requisite funds that would serve as a catalyst for the achievement of 
"takeoff," or rapid economic growth. "Takeoff" would lead to a period of "self-
sustained growth," which would make the world's poor less inclined to foment 
political unrest and agitation.”) 
243  E.g. Albert Hirschman is among the best known of the advocates for 
“unbalanced growth.”  See Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic 
Development (1958). 
244  See, e.g, Tae-Gyun Park, W. W. Rostow and Economic Discourse in South Korea 
in the 1960s, 8 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND AREA STUDIES 55, 61 (2001). 
245 Gilman, Nils. Mandarins of the Future, 2004. p 83. 
 
246  See, e.g, Tae-Gyun Park, W. W. Rostow and Economic Discourse in South Korea 
in the 1960s, 8 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND AREA STUDIES 55, 60 (2001). 
(“Within this approach, what kind of economic structure should be 
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economic surplus could be channeled into trade, aid and 
investment projects in developing countries.247  Indeed, an 
important dynamic of the model was its role in boosting U.S. 
economic interests. 248 
An examination of Rostovian modernization theory 
also reveals that U.S. policy in turn affected and altered the 
analytical framework of modernization theory.  In particular, 
the military and geopolitical objectives of the U.S. in this 
time frame led to increasingly greater emphasis on the 
importance of “nation-building.”249  Nation-building not 
only served the goal of modernization within a developing 
country, however, but also served the goals of regional order 
and stability – crucial to Cold War era U.S. policy. 
 In early modernization theory, nation-building and 
democracy-building were intertwined.250  Because nation-
building furthered development, and under modernization 
theory the development of capitalistic economic growth 
naturally facilitated the development of democracy, it 
followed that nation-building would promote democracy.251  
                                                                                                                                  
recommended?  It was not to be an independent economy, but one which had a 
place within the international capitalist economy. On the one hand this was 
related to the speeded up economic development, because the Third World 
should continue to accept a great amount of foreign capital and various kinds of 
developed skills and technology.”)  Rostow, Milliken and Pye were particularly 
influential in shaping U.S. policy in Southeast Asia.  See id.   
247  See Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, at pp.93-100. 
248  See Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth at pp.6-8: The economic 
development program outlined in the balance of this book is conceived as one of 
the instruments for carrying out the task of helping create an environment within 
which American society can thrive.”) “ 
249  Michael E. Latham, Modernization As Ideology: American Social Science and 
'Nation-Building' in the Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2000). 
250  Mark T. Berger, Decolonisation, Modernisation and Nation-Building: Political 
Development Theory and the Appeal of Communism in Southeast Asia, 1945–
1975, 34 Journal of Southeast Asian Studies  421, 425 (2003) (“The idea of 
nationhood carried withit a commitment, at least in the abstract, to democracy, 
human rights and universalsuffrage”) 
251  See, e.g., James S. Coleman, ‘The political systems of the developing areas’, in 
The politics of the developing areas, ed. Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 537–9; see alsoMark T. Berger, 
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A 1960 Presidential Task Force report on which Rostow 
collaborated outlined the intended mutual reinforcement of 
nation-building and democracy-building objectives:  “The 
new aid program must recognize these motivations and 
provide the resource incentive for local leaders to direct 
nationalistic forces into constructive channels of building 
democratic nations. It should give support especially to the 
leaders who are eager to modernize society...” 252   
In practice, and in keeping with the gist of “high 
modernism,” nation-building concerns increasingly took 
priority often took priority over the promotion either of 
economic development or democracy.253The Cold War 
environment meant that “order and stability were always 
more important than democracy as far as most 
modernization theorists were concerned.”254  Nils Gilman 
writes, 
 
Conceptualizing the passage to modernity as a brief 
transitional period, with political instability and the 
concomitant threat of Communist takeover as the main 
risks, many modernization theorists began to suggest 
that the United States should promote the most rapid 
possible passage through this dangerous “stage of 
growth”— by whatever means necessary. Ultimately, 
this theory would justify U. S. intervention in Vietnam 
                                                                                                                                  
Decolonisation, Modernisation and Nation-Building: Political Development 
Theory and the Appeal of Communism in Southeast Asia, 1945–1975, 34 Journal 
of Southeast Asian Studies  421 at 429 (2003) (“Early theorists were at least 
rhetorically committed to democracy,often seeing it as the direct result of 
economic development and the key to political stability.…At the same time, this  
conception of political development was elitist and technocratic, and even in the 
1950s stability was regarded as more important than democracy – an emphasis 
that would become more pronounced in the 1960s.”) 
252  Task Force Report, Dec. 31, 1960, National Security File(NSF): Subjects: 
Foreign EconomicPolicy, Box 297, John F. Kennedy Library(JFKL). 
253  Stephen G. Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy 
Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America (1999). 
254  Mark T. Berger, Decolonisation, Modernisation and Nation-Building: Political 
Development Theory and the Appeal of Communism in Southeast Asia, 1945–
1975, 34 Journal of Southeast Asian Studies  421, at 426 (2003). 
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on the grounds that such action promoted 
modernization. 255 
 
The dynamics of this “reverse” influence from U.S. policy 
concerns back to practice became even more pronounced in 
subsequent strains of modernization theory.  In the emphasis 
on modernization “by any means necessary,” and the 
acceptability of sacrificing democratic governance towards 
this end, Rostovian “modernization theory would in 
Gilman’s words “represent liberalism’s entry into this hall of 
twentieth-century ideological horrors.”256 
 
C. Another Path: Moderate Parsonianism in Development 
Studies 
 
 While modernization theory came to dominate much 
of U.S. development policy in the early postwar era, another 
Parsonian trajectory gained significant ground in the 
academy although ultimately enjoying less salient influence 
in the field.  This strain of Parsonian analysis generally took 
care to retained greater analytical complexity.  Although the 
Parsonian focus on social patterns and structures still 
characterized this work, these “Moderate Parsonians” 
                                                          
255 NILS GILMAN, MANDARINS OF THE FUTURE 12 (2004).  
256 NILS GILMAN, MANDARINS OF THE FUTURE 11 (2004). Eventually, later 
modernization theorists like Samuel Huntington would focus on the “strong 
state” as the pre-eminent concern, downplaying the role of the shift in values 
towards the “expanding capitalist nucleus” or the supposed symbiotic 
emergence of political democracy.  See, e.g., Samuel Huntington, Political order in 
changing societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968);Huntington, The 
soldier and the state: The theory and politics of civil-military relations (Cambridge: 
HarvardUniversity Press, 1957); Changing patterns of military politics, ed. Samuel 
Huntington (New York: FreePress, 1962  “Samuel Huntington is generally seen 
as one of the most prominent exponents ofthe shift from classical modernisation 
theory, with its psychological orientation and its apparent emphasis on 
democracy, to the politics-of-order and military modernization theory.”  Mark T. 
Berger, Decolonisation, Modernisation and Nation-Building: Political 
Development Theory and the Appeal of Communism in Southeast Asia, 1945–
1975, 34 Journal of Southeast Asian Studies  421 at 442 (2003).   
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tended to eschew the sweeping cross-historical and cross-
geographical conclusions of modernization theory.  Perhaps 
not surprisingly, the political valence of this strain of 
development studies tended to track a more moderate 
liberalism, as opposed to the concertedly classical-liberal 
starting point of modernization theory. 
 A somewhat more self-critical and other-regarding 
sensibility seemed to characterize this more moderate 
Parsonianism.  The focus on cultural variables arose, in part, 
out of the realization by these development experts while 
working in the field that “`even though "we knew all of the 
answers," very few of them worked. Initially we were simply 
insensitive to the (1) cultural differences, (2) indigenous 
motivating forces, and (3) different value systems. Often one 
of the greatest mistakes Americans make . . . is the 
assumption that the response of foreigners can be predicted 
upon the basis of our own value system.”’257  Thus, for 
example, an early Parsonian moderate Albert Hirschman 
concluded that “I set out to learn about others, and in the 
end learned about ourselves.”258 
 Certainly, Hirschman sought to establish general 
conclusions regarding strategies for development.  In 
particular, Hirschman became known for the “unbalanced 
growth” approach to spurring industrialization,259 and its 
accompanying concepts of “forward” and “backward” 
                                                          
257  Bruce E. Seely, Historical Patterns in the Scholarship of Technology Transfer, 
Comparative Technology Transfer and Society 1.1 (2003) 7, at 13 (citing p. xxii of 
Strassor, G. (1974). Keynote address: Technology transfer revisited. In Manning, 
G. K. Technology Transfer: Successes and Failures (pp. xv-xxii). San Francisco: San 
Francisco Press; citing also Hirschman, A. O. (1967). Development Projects 
Observed. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. ).  
258  Albert Hirschman, A Dissenter’s Confession: The Strategy of Economic 
Development Revisited, in G.M. Meier and D. Seers ed., Pioneers in 
Development (1984). 
259  Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development, at 63-70 (defining 
development as a “chain of disequilibria” manifesting in a “see-saw” effect 
whereby concentrated growth in one sector would be followed by “catching-up” 
effects in other sectors.  
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linkage.260  Hirschman’s theories, however, moderated both 
the universalism and the market orientation of the 
modernization theorists. 
 Hirschman disavowed the “laissez-faire” tendencies 
of theorists like McLelland and Hagen.261  And, regarding 
integration of developing-country economies into the 
international marketplace, he evinced caution, warning 
against the dangers of “polarization effects” that might arise 
if developing-country economic activity became displaced 
by developed-country competition.262 
 Although less dogmatically neoliberal than Rostow, 
with “unbalanced growth” Hirschman distanced himself 
from more emphatically Keynsian policies of demand-side 
development policy.263  Hirschman’s approach emphasized 
supply-side concepts such as savings, investment and 
“trickling-down” effects.264  Hirschman shared the general 
liberal orientation and attraction to universalism of Rostow, 
                                                          
260  Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development, at 100 (defining 
backward linkage effects as those arising when industrial economic activity 
induces “attempts to supply through domestic production the inputs needed in 
that activity”; and defining forward linkage effects as those arising when 
industrial economic actors “attempt to utilize [their] outputs as inputs in some 
new activities.”) 
261  Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development, at 2 n.3; see also 
Albert Hirschman, Journeys Towards Progress at 5 (1963). 
262  Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development, at 188. 
263  Hirschman criticized the “balanced growth” model because it was “derived 
from the demand side…. It is argued [that] to make development possible it is 
necessary to start, at one and the same time, a large number of new industries 
which will be each others’ clients through the purchases of their workers, 
employees and owners.”  Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development, at 
51.  Hirschman criticized this model in part because he felt it was unrealistic: “if 
a country were ready to apply the doctrine of balanced growth, then it would not 
be underdeveloped in the first place.”  Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic 
Development, at 54.  The balanced growth model was associated with Paul 
Rosenstein-Rodan’s “theory of the big push,” and accordingly a somewhat more 
statist view of development policy and planning. 
264  See Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development, at 35-44 
(focusing on the “ability to invest” and the “complementarity of investment”) 
and 187-190 (focusing on “trickling-down” effects) 
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but in more moderate form. 
 In fact, Hirschman rebelled against the stronger 
universalizing tendencies of modernization theory, seeking 
instead to “underline the multiplicity and creative disorder” 
of dynamics of growth and development.265  The overall 
message of The Strategy of Economic Development appeared to 
endorse careful case-by-case analysis over one-size-fits-all 
policy.266  Perhaps because of this sensibility, Hirschman’s 
field experience included much more direct consultation for 
developing-country governments than that of the U.S. 
government-centered Rostow.267 
 Hirschman’s understanding of Weber caused him to 
acknowledge the possibility of the “hiding hand”; that is the 
possibility of unintended consequences of development 
policy resulting in part from inadequate knowledge of or 
sensitivity to the particular interests and motives regarding 
economic production in a given locale.268  The “hiding hand” 
analysis demonstrates how the “one-size-fits-all” critique of 
Weber extends far beyond the normative problem of 
“ethnocentricity”:269 “one-size-fits-all” policies are 
problematic from a pragmatic perspective simply because 
                                                          
265  Albert Hirschman, A Dissenter’s Confession: The Strategy of Economic 
Development Revisited, in G.M. Meier and D. Seers ed., Pioneers in 
Development (1984). 
266  Hence Hirschman’s critique of the “visiting economist’s syndrome,” often 
provoked by institutional donors’ demands for speedy diagnosis of and 
prescription for economic growth in developing countries.  Albert Hirschman, A 
Dissenter’s Confession: The Strategy of Economic Development Revisited, in 
G.M. Meier and D. Seers ed., Pioneers in Development (1984). 
267  For a short general introduction to Hirschman’s role in Latin America, and 
the relationship with his theories of economic development, see Ana Maria 
Bianchi, Albert Hirschman in Latin America: Notes on Hirschman’s Trilogy on 
Economic Development, presented at the 9th annual European Conference on 
the History of Economic Thought (Conferencia Europeia de Historia do 
Pensamento Economico (ECHE)) (on file with author). 
268  See Albert Hirschman, Development Projects Observed (1967). 
269 See, e.g., David Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 
WISCONSIN L. REV. 720, 737 n.31; David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-
Estrangement, 1974 WISCONSIN L. REV. 1062, 1080. 
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they tend not to work well.  It suggests that the 
transplantation of universals will fail not only because of 
differences in normative ideals, but also because of 
differences in interests and in practices.   
 Ultimately, Hirschman himself maintained the 
emphasis on the normative.  One of his unique contributions 
to development analysis was to identify a major shortcoming 
in development policy as psychological: “Our diagnosis is 
simply that countries fail to take advantage of their 
development potential because, for reasons largely related to 
their image of change, they find it difficult to take the 
decisions needed for development in the required number 
and at the required speed.”270    Later, Hirschman would 
supplement this psychological analysis with a description of 
a “failure complex” that could plague development 
policymakers, rooted in part by a rage de vouloir conclure.271 
 Hirschman’s solution to this problem, however, 
retains something of Weber’s sophisticated integration of 
material and ideal, normative and nonnormative.  Rather 
than wait for psychological change to arise independently, 
Hirschman advised the establishment of “inducement 
mechanisms.” Systems for engineering the interests of 
decisionmakers would ensure that “decisions … will be 
taken because there is some extra pressure behind them as a 
result of pacing, routine responses, threatened penalties, 
certain and high profitability, or other forces.”272 
 While Hirschman’s “social engineering” approach to 
development policy ultimately fell prey to criticism as well, 
                                                          
270  See Albert Hirschman, The Stategy of Economic Development at 25.  At 
times, hesitation could yield to ambivalence: “While overtly considerable effort 
is made in a country to introduce modern methods and techniques, a vague 
resentment may yet exist at the same time against the new ways, a secret hope 
that the equipment or the methods will not work out….”  Hirschman, The 
Strategy of Economic Development, at 138. 
271  A rage of wanting to be done with it.  See Hirschman, Journeys Toward 
Progress (1963). 
272  Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development, at 27. 
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its understanding of the importance of environmental 
incentives to adopt economic growth strategies evinces a 
deeper understanding of Weber’s theory of social change.  
Moreover, it is this understanding which ultimately served 
as the basis for the later critique of Hirschman and others.  
Former World Bank economist David Ellerman, for example, 
has concluded that the “social engineering” approach must 
fail because, in the end, “both the motivation and the 
knowledge are external to the doers.”273 
 
 If Rostow’s “extreme” Parsonianism informed U.S. 
policy, the more subdued and open-ended approach of 
Hirschman and others, such as Gunnar Myrdal274 and Bert 
Hoselitz,275 found reflection elsewhere in the U.S. academy, 
and also tended to gravitated more towards internationalist 
projects.  Thus, university centers emerging out of this 
period included not only W.W. Rostow’s Center for 
International Studies at MIT, but also the more moderate 
University of Chicago's Research Center in Economic 
Development and Cultural Change and its accompanying 
journal Economic Development and Cultural Change.276  The 
“Chicago School” of sociology focused on detailing the 
complex socioeconomics of development.277  In particular, 
these institutions sought to correct “the early mistakes” by 
recognizing the “interactive nature of transfer and 
development activities.”278   
                                                          
273  David Ellerman, Rethinking Development Assistance: An Approach Based on 
Autonomy-Respecting Assistance, at 2 (on file with author).  Indeed, Hirschman 
himself has endorsed Ellerman’s work. [cite] 
274  
275  
276  Bruce E. Seely, Historical Patterns in the Scholarship of Technology Transfer, 
Comparative Technology Transfer and Society 1.1 (2003) 7, at 13-14   
277  The Chicago School of sociology features more moderate politics than its 
counterpart, the Chicago School of economics, which is known for adopting a 
more definitely neoliberal perspective. 
278  Bruce E. Seely, Historical Patterns in the Scholarship of Technology Transfer, 
Comparative Technology Transfer and Society 1.1 (2003) 7, at 13-14  (citing to 
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 Despite the academic prestige and relative influence 
of the Moderate Parsonians, their scholarly efforts appear to 
have proven relatively less influential than those of the 
modernization theorists.  According to Paul Krugman, “high 
development theory” of this sort failed to gain influence 
precisely because it embraced multidisciplinary complexity.  
Krugman writes,  
 
Like it or not, the influence of ideas that have not been 
embalmed in models soon decays. And this was the fate 
of high development theory. . . . By the early 1970s 
(when I was a student of economics) [Hirschman and 
Myrdal] had come to seem not so much wrong as 
meaningless. What were these guys talking about? 
Where were the models? And so development theory 
was not so much rejected as simply bypassed.279 
 
Despite Krugman’s explanation, Rostow’s equally 
unmodeled approach gained influence even while the 
Moderate Parsonians waned in theirs: “The most influential 
book on economic development to emerge from economic 
circles, however, was W. W. Rostow's The Stages of Economic 
Growth. 280  This is ironic, in light of Krugman's analysis, for 
…[Rostow's] was not an economistic theory . . . [Rostow's] 
economic development required not only appropriate 
economic, technological, and demographic conditions, but 
also appropriate social institutions and value systems.” 281  
                                                                                                                                  
Cleveland, H. (1960). The Overseas Americans. New York: McGraw-Hill; Sufrin, S. 
C. (1966). Technical Assistance—Theory and Guidelines.; especially Rosen, G. (1985). 
Western Economists and Eastern Societies: Agents of Change in South Asia, 1950-1970. 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Rosenberg, N. (1970). Economic 
development and the transfer of technology: Some historical perspectives. 
Technology and Culture, 11(3), 550-75. ).  
279 Quoted in Bruce E. Seely, Historical Patterns in the Scholarship of Technology 
Transfer, Comparative Technology Transfer and Society 1.1 (2003) 7, at 14. 
280 Seely, at 15-16. 
281 Seely, at 15-16. 
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Perhaps the theoretical simplicity of Rostow’s “unilinear”282 
conception of analysis recommended it to development 
economists in ways that the theoretical complexity of the 
Moderate Parsonians did not. 
 
 
D. Modernization and Legal Reform: Theory, Policy and 
Praxis 
 
D.1. The Law and Development Movement 
 
  This same dynamic, whereby the more thoughtful 
strains withdrew from the fulcrum of power, characterizes 
in part the wax and wane of the “law and development” 
movement of the 1970s.  This movement originally shared 
many of the tenets of modernization theory. 
 Modernization theory incorporates the notion of a 
stable legal order.  With respect to economic development, 
such a legal system is necessary particularly because it 
enables the predictable and effective enforcement of 
‘background’ rules necessary for capitalist economic growth, 
especially contract and property rights.283 
 The emphasis within modernization theory of a stable 
legal order and the rule of law reflects Weber’s own analysis 
of “logically formal rationality” in modern legal systems, as 
filtered through Parsonian evolutionary theory. 
 In his essay “Evolutionary universals in society,” 
Parsons argued - Parsons applied Weber’s notion of the 
“generalized legal order as the special hallmark of 
modernity”284 to recommend legalization as a prescriptive 
                                                          
282 Seely, at 16. 
283 For a concise exposition of modernization theory, see Kevin Davis & Michael 
Trebilcock, What Role Do Legal Institutions Play in Development?, IMF Paper 
Series (1999), at p.13. 
284  Jackson Toby, Parsons’ Theory of Societal Evolution, in Talcott Parsons, The 
Evolution of Societies, at 1, 13 (1977). 
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requirement for modernizing societies :  
 
Law furthers the independence of the normative 
components of the societal structure from the exigencies 
of political and economic interests …. It is the kind of 
law, the institutionalization of which marks the 
transition from intermediate to modern societies, that 
poses the theoretical problem.  Its organization must be 
generalized according to universalistic principles.  This 
requirement precludes such imposing systems as the 
Talmudic law or that of traditional Islam from being 
classed as modern law.  They lack the generality which 
Weber called formal rationality.285 
 
Parsons argued that “legalism” is “the major criterion 
marking the evolution of societies from ‘intermediate’ to 
‘modern’”:286 “[L]aw, when developed to the requisite level, 
furthers the independence of the normative components of 
the societal structure from the exigencies of political and 
economic interests and from the personal, organic, and 
physical-environmental factors operating through 
them…”287  Thus, law must be “highly generalized 
according to universalistic principles.”288 
 This phrasing, Trubek observed, is “Weberian in 
                                                          
285  Talcott Parsons, Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives 27 
(1966).  See also Talcott Parsons, Evolutionary Universals in Society, 29 American 
Sociological Review 339 (1964).  In Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative 
Perspectives, Parsons also emphasized the importance of procedure:  “Modern 
legal systems must also emphasize the factor of procedure, as distinguished from 
substantive precepts and standards.  Only on the basis of procedural primacy 
can the system cope with a variety of changing circumstances and cases without 
prior commitment to specific solutions.” 
286 David Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 WISCONSIN L. 
REV. 720, 737 n.31. 
287 p.27, Talcott Parsons, Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives 
(1966) (cited in David Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 
WISCONSIN L. REV. 720, 737 n.31). 
288 p.27, Talcott Parsons, Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives 
(1966) (cited in David Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 
WISCONSIN L. REV. 720, 737 n.31). 
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inspiration and characteristically Parsonian in its 
abstractness.”289  In his analysis of legal reform, as elsewhere 
in his work, Parsons transposes Weber’s historical, heuristic 
analysis onto the prescriptive frame of modernization 
theory.290  By “link[ing] the concept of modernity to societies 
that develop autonomous legal orders,” Parsons appears to 
“den[y] the possibility of ‘modernization’ without 
‘legalism.’” 291 
 
 The role of legalization within Parsonian theory 
helped to generate the impetus for legal reforms as a part of 
U.S. foreign policy in the mid-twentieth century.  The “rule 
of law”  became an important part of the framework 
adopted by the U.S. “foreign policy establishment” early in 
the post-World War II emergence of the U.S. as a leader in 
the international community.292  The question of “legal 
development” attracted significant support from the U.S. 
government and U.S. foundations from the 1950s onward.293  
Legal scholars joined into the already-ongoing efforts of the 
                                                          
289 David Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 WISCONSIN L. 
REV. 720, 737 n.31. 
290 David Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 WISCONSIN L. 
REV. 720, 737 n.31: “Parsons has taken over, at a very superficial level, the 
Weberian analysis, but has generalized it to all societies, making the 
development of logically formal rationality a criterion of modernity.” 
291 David Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 WISCONSIN L. 
REV. 720, 737 n.31. 
292 David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 1974 WISCONSIN 
L. REV. 1062, 1087.  See id., p.1067: “Given the political and intellectual climate of 
the time, it is no wonder that… ‘[d]evelopment’ was in the air: liberal America 
was excited by the prospect of harnessing American knowledge and resources to 
the developmental task.”  See also Robert A. Packenham, Approaches to the 
Study of Political Development, 17 World Politics 108, 109 & n.6 (1964) 
(describing the “legal-formal” approach to development to be the “dominant 
preoccupation of American political scientists at least until 1950.”) 
293 See David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 1974 
WISCONSIN L. REV. 1062, 1066 & n.13 (describing the emergence of this support 
and leading programs supported by the U.S. Agency for International 
Development and non-governmental bodies such as the Ford Foundation).   
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social science departments in the field.294  These “lawyers 
and academics adopted Max Weber’s legalism as the 
appropriate model for developing societies.”295 
 Legal reform efforts tended to focus on two primary 
areas.  The first was legal education.  Training local legal 
professionals seemed to go to the heart of the matter, since 
such professionals could then go on to design and operate 
formal-rational legal systems.296  The legal-education effort 
involved academics from elite American law schools 
working with governmental and private funding sources to 
design programs for the reform of legal training in 
developing countries toward the instrumentalist (or realist) 
sensibility of American-style “legal liberalism.”297  
 A second emphasis fell upon judicial reform 
specifically.  The American model of legalism “celebrated 
courts as the core of the legal order.”298  The International 
Commission of Jurists, for example, issued a report in 1959 
entitled “The Rule of Law in a Free Society,” declaring the 
centrality of “individual rights and the administration of 
justice in national societies.”299  This body continued to 
                                                          
294 David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 1974 WISCONSIN 
L. REV. 1062, 1065 (“The lawyers were latecomers to the development research 
game, responding more slowly than social scientists to the demand for 
theoretical insights into the processes of development.”) 
295 p.199, Robert B. Seidman, The State, Law and Development (1978). 
296 See Davis & Trebilcock, at p.14 (“the [law and development] movement 
adopted a top-down approach” and “emphasized the reform of legal 
education… The assumption was that lawyers trained to use the rule of law as an 
instrument for change would promote the development goals of the state.”)  See 
also David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 1974 
WISCONSIN L. REV. 1062, 1075-1076 (“by training lawyers to think more 
instrumentally, [law] schools could intiate change that would narrow the gap 
between … specific legal rules, doctrines and procedures on the one hand, and 
national developmental goals on the other.”) 
297 Cf. David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 1974 
WISCONSIN L. REV. 1062, 1075-1076. 
298 ROBERT B. SEIDMAN, THE STATE, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 199 (1978). 
299 International Commission of Jurists, The Rule of Law in a Free Society, at 
p.326 (1959) (cited in John H. Spencer, Review, Executive Action and the Rule of 
Law: A Report on the Proceedings of the International Congress of Jurists, Rio de 
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study the challenges posed to developing formal systems of 
adjudication in developing countries throughout the 
1960s.300 
 The law and development movement translated 
modernization theory’s basic approach into the particular 
language of the “liberal legalism” of the United States legal 
elite.  The liberal legalism paradigm adopted the following 
general assumptions: 
 
- It “focused on higher agencies of the legal system” as 
opposed to “nonstate forms of legal or other social 
ordering”; 
 
- It “manifested a pervasive belief in the ultimate 
efficacy of legal rules as instruments of social 
change,” emphasizing the “instrumental relationship 
between development goals and specific legal rules”; 
 
- It “assumed that legal professions were, or could be, 
representative of the public interest”; and 
 
- It “took for granted the existence of some natural 
tendency for legal systems in the Third World to 
evolve in the direction of [this] ideal model of liberal 
legalism.” 301 
 
These assumptions led the assistance effort to “focus on 
reform of formal rules, to work with the established 
professions, to believe that changes in the educatin of the 
                                                                                                                                  
Janeiro, 1962, in 61 Am. J. Int’l L. 839, 840 (1967). 
300 See, e.g., Executive Action and the Rule of Law: A Report on the Proceedings 
of the International Congress of Jurists, Rio de Janeiro, 1962; The Dynamic 
Aspects of Rule of Law in the Modern Age: Report o the Proceedings of the 
South-East Asian and Pacific Conferences of Jurists, Bangkok, Thailand, 1965. 
301 David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 1974 WISCONSIN 
L. REV. 1062, 1079. 
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professional legal class would ultimately produce desired 
social change and, above all, to assume almost automatically 
that any activity that was designed to change legal 
institutions of Third World countries to make them more 
like those of the United States would be an effective and 
extremely worthy pursuit.” 302 
 
 Law and development reform soon atrophied as a 
basis for U.S. intervention, however.  One factor was the 
theoretical ascendancy of “big push” economic development 
theory, which viewed law as purely instrumental to 
implement industrialization policies, rather than as an end in 
itself.303  Big-push and other economic development theories 
of this era found popularity and embrace amongst 
developing-country governments.304  
 Another factor was undoubtedly the waning official 
support within the U.S. foreign policy establishment.  With 
the rise of the Non-Alignment Movement of developing 
countries in the 1970s, however, the ability of U.S. foreign 
policy to effectuate this kind of law reform waned.  In the 
Cold War context, with the Soviet Union competing for 
alliances, and with the adoption of much of the developing 
world of nationalist/socialist government, the attention to 
implementing liberal reforms in the domestic legal systems 
of developing countries fell away.305   
                                                          
302 David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 1974 WISCONSIN 
L. REV. 1062, 1079-1080. 
303 Cf. Robert Packenham, Approaches to the Study of Political Development, 17 
World Politics 108, 110 (1964) (“one of the most notable characteristics of studies 
of the politics of developing areas is how far the pendulum has swung away 
from legal-formal to economic, administrative, sociological, and psychological 
factors as explanatory variables.”) 
304  
305 Eric Neumayer, “The infamous Cold War saying, ‘We know they are bastards, 
but at least they are our bastards, not theirs,’ which justified much support to 
Cold War allies in spite of a bad governance record, fell out of fashion with the 
Berlin wall.”  Neumayer, at p.1, The Pattern of Aid Giving (2003). [CITE – U.S. 
foreign policy during this era was a hodge podge of  strategies designed to 
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D.2. Another Path: Scholars in Self-Estrangement from Law 
and Development’s Theoretical Shortcuts 
  
A final cause in the decline of the law and 
development movement was a loss of confidence by the 
movement’s intellectual authors.  This experiential 
transformation is memorably recounted in the essay by 
David Trubek & Marc Galanter entitled, “Scholars in Self-
Estrangement.”306  Widely read among legal scholars 
interested in development, this article described the 
misgivings about the law and development movement that 
caused its proponents within the legal academy to withdraw 
from efforts at programmatic implementation of legal 
reforms in developing countries. 
Though not described in terms of the “Three 
Theoretical Shortcuts” formulation employed here, “Scholars 
in Self-Estrangement” nevertheless identified the same set of 
conceptual shortcomings in the law and development 
framework.   
 
 “Theoretical Shortcut #1 (“One-Size-Fits-All”).  
 
Trubek and Galanter explained at length the 
problems arising from the universalizing assumptions in 
“liberal legalism’s model of law in society.”307   
Where “liberal legalism” assumed “social and 
                                                                                                                                  
contain the Soviet Union: seeking explicitly or clandestinely to overturn socialist 
governments such as those in Chile and Guatemala, tolerating nationalist, statist 
and totalitarian regimes where they were open to alliance with the U.S., such as 
that in Egypt.  U.S. advocacy of liberal legal values tended to limit itself to 
disputes arising in an explicitly transnational context, such as nationalizations of 
property owned by foreign investors.]   
306  
307 David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 1974 WISCONSIN 
L. REV. 1062, 1080. 
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political pluralism,” Trubek & Galanter found instead 
“social stratification and class cleavage” in “most of the 
Third World.”308  Where liberal legalism assumed that “rules 
reflect the interests of the vast majority of citizens and are 
normally internalized by them,” the authors found instead 
that “rules are imposed on the many by the few and are 
frequently honored much more in the breach than in the 
observance.” 309  Where liberal legalism assumed that “courts 
are central actors in social control, and that they are 
relatively autonomous,” instead “in many nations courts are 
neither very independent nor very important.” 310   
Trubek and Galanter’s continued engagement with 
the model of liberal legalism caused them to “doubt that the 
model accurately describes legal life even in the United 
States.” 311 Rather than “general” rules, “many of the rules” 
                                                          
308 David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 1974 WISCONSIN 
L. REV. 1062, 1080. 
309 David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 1974 WISCONSIN 
L. REV. 1062, 1081. 
310 David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 1974 WISCONSIN 
L. REV. 1062, 1081.  An related critique from the authors’ colleague Bob Seidman 
came from the perception that courts had become marginal in the process of 
instrumentalizing and implementing development measures.  Robert Seidman 
observed in the context of African judicial reform, for example, that even those 
courts that had taken on characteristics of the rule of law “barely involved 
themselves in development,” instead focusing on the settlement of private 
disputes.310  Though this role would probably suffice in today’s understanding of 
the relationship of the judiciary to law and development, the view of that time of 
law-in-action appeared to contemplate a more active judicial role in the 
ambitious industrialization policies of the era.  “Institutions that can impose only 
punishments with rigid, complex, and slow procedures, that can only institute 
incremental change, subject to rules in legalese, always at overload, and lacking 
expertise to deal with technical matters, will not implement many development 
rules.  Those characterize at best, rule-applying institutions not problem-solving 
ones.  Development, however, required change-oriented, problem-solving 
institutions to induce new behavior in a wide range of clients.  The efforts of 
lawyers to ensure that the courts systems of Africa matched the ideal-type 
demanded by the Rule of Law missed the mark of development.”  Seidman, 
State Law and Development, at 218. 
311 David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 1974 WISCONSIN 
L. REV. 1062, 1081. 
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in U.S. law “originate from, and primarily serve, specific 
groups”; and moreover “those who apply rules have 
substantial discretion… to favor certain groups and 
viewpoints.” 312  Similarly, the “centrality of the courts is also 
largely mythical” in light of the fact that “regulatory activity 
and the promulgation of rules take place mostly in other 
settings.”313 
In adopting this universalistic paradigm, liberal 
legalism employed a “one-size-fits-all” approach assumed 
the desirability of a single set of reform goals.  In addition to 
being “ethnocentric,”314 such an approach was also 
“naïve”315 in that perilously ignored important differences 
across societies that could jeopardize particular reform 
efforts.316 
 
 Theoretical Shortcut #2: The Determinism of Values.  
On its face, the model of liberal legalism focused on 
implementing specific institutional reforms through the 
courts and legal education.  Although it  did not explicitly 
prioritize a shift in values, it certainly envisioned that a 
general shift towards rationally instrumental thinking and 
behavior would flow from its reforms.317  Moreover, such 
                                                          
312 Id. at 1081. 
313 Id. at 1081. 
314 Id. at 1080.  The charge of ethnocentricity was also implied in Unger’s critique 
of the conception of logically formal rationality in law as essential to modernity 
as a particularistic result of specific history of Europe. ROBERTO M. UNGER, LAW 
IN MODERN SOCIETY, Chapter 3 (1977).  
315 David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 1974 WISCONSIN 
L. REV. 1062, 1080. 
316 Based on this account, the assumptions of the law and development 
movement may also have misapprehended the logic internal to their own 
theoretical precursors in modernization theory, in that it appeared to assume 
that the very social phenomena that it was trying to create – courts, highly skilled 
and publicly-interested legal professionals – were already sufficiently in place as 
to be able to aid in the application of reform efforts. 
317 David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 1974 WISCONSIN 
L. REV. 1062, 1075 (“by training lawyers to think more instrumentally, the schools 
could initiate change that would narrow the gap between the present 
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reforms would further the “ultimate values” (in Parsonian 
terms) of “liberty, equality, participation and rationality.”318   
 Trubek and Galanter noticed and objected to a more 
subtle normative dynamic within this framework: the 
identification of practices that constituted 
“counterinstances” to the “paradigm” to be “labell[ed] as 
deviant and therefore ‘bad.’”319  Trubek and Galanter stop 
short of the charge that the prioritization of instrumental and 
ultimate values reflective of the liberal legal paradigm as 
“good” and marginalization of others as “bad” amounted to 
a judgment that Third World societies were underdeveloped 
because of “bad values.”  In making the charge of 
“ethnocentrism,” however, Trubek and Galanter go some 
ways towards implying this very dynamic.  The “bad 
values” upshot of “value determinism” would resurface 
more explicitly in the much later writings of Good 
Governance Scholars.320 
 
 Theoretical Shortcut #3: Correlation between 
modernity and democracy.  The “most serious” defect of 
liberal legalism in the law and development movement, 
according to Trubek and Galanter, was its failure to 
recognize that “the formal neutrality of the legal system is 
not incompatible with the use of law as a tool to further 
domination by elite groups.”321  The law and development 
movement began by believing that its reform efforts would 
necessarily promote democratic goals.322  “While the 
                                                                                                                                  
performance of the legal profession and its developmental possibilities”). 
318 Id. at 1076. 
319 Id. at 1082. 
320  
321 David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 1974 WISCONSIN 
L. REV. 1062, 1083. 
322 Id. at 1064: “Legal development assistance was originally justified as a 
rational and effective method to protect individual freedom, expand citizen 
participation in decisionmaking, enhance social equality, and increase the 
capacity of all citizens rationally to control events and shape social life.” 
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assistance agencies consistently maintained that the legal 
development projects they supported were achieving these 
goals, many scholars began to wonder….” 323  The 
disproportionate access of the wealthy to the legal system, 
and the “natural” conservatism of the legal professions, 
often seemed to undermine rather than to further the 
processes of democratic change.324 
 This realization reflects the Theoretical Shortcut of 
simplifying the relationship between modernization and 
democracy.  As Trubek and Galanter found, the process is 
far from straightforward.  Rather, and bearing out Weber’s 
initial analyses, it may require concerted effort against the 
process of legal rationalization and its accompanying 
entrenchment of bureaucratic hierarchy. 
 
 
E. The Revival of “Law and Development”: The Good 
Governance Era 
 
 During the 1970s, legal reform as a focus of 
development discourse entered into a phase of dormancy.  
The withdrawal of law and development scholars from legal 
reform efforts, coupled with the geopolitical and economic 
dynamics of international relations during that era,325 chilled 
efforts by the U.S. foreign policy establishment to achieve 
the “rule of law” as part of modernization in developing 
countries. 
 With the deep economic contractions that wracked 
                                                          
323 David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 1974 WISCONSIN 
L. REV. 1062, 1064. 
324 David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 1974 WISCONSIN 
L. REV. 1062, 1084. 
325 Among these dynamics were the relative ascendancy of the developing world 
signaled by the Non-Aligned Movement and the OPEC oil strikes, and the 
accompanying bid by many developing-country governments to reorder 
international law to accommodate nationalist-socialist economic and legal 
systems. 
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many leading developing country governments in the early 
1980s, the era of reconciliation of the developing world to 
the liberal vision began.  The 1980s saw the emergence of the 
“Washington consensus:” endorsement of economic 
liberalization shared by the U.S. government and by such 
international financial institutions as the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank.  The IMF, the World 
Bank, and the GATT were during this period able to procure 
agreement from developing country governments to 
fundamental policy shifts in the direction of traditional 
liberalism.  The IMF and World Bank policies of 
“conditionality” of funds on “structural adjustment,” such as 
liberalizing trade and investment policy, privatizing state-
owned economic actors, and reducing social spending, were 
joined by the commencement of negotiations that would 
result ultimately in the reinforcement of trade liberalization 
through the establishment of the World Trade 
Organization.326 
 It was during this period of reconciliation of the 
developing world to the liberal vision327 that the focus of the 
“foreign policy establishment” began to shift back to law 
reform.  “Good governance” policy articulated the legal and 
administrative dimensions of this larger set of liberalization 
reforms. 328 
 In its “first generation” of reforms, good governance 
policy focused primarily on the reform of the legal and 
regulatory systems for the administration of private law and 
public fiscal and financial law.329  This reform would be 
achieved, first, by bringing such systems into compliance 
                                                          
326 [cite AM U ILR article] 
327 [Haggard calls this Deep Integration] 
328 James Gathii, Retelling Good Governance Narratives on Africa's Economic 
And Political Predicaments: Continuities and Discontinuities In Legal Outcomes 
Between Markets And States, 45 Vill. L. Rev. 971, 1000-1001 (2000). 
329 I employ the terminology of Kerry Rittich’s The Future of Law and 
Development, 26 Mich. J. Int’l L. 199, 206 (2004). 
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with an internationally established code of “best practices,” 
creating regularization both domestically and internationally 
through the transnational harmonization  according to such 
practices.330  Second, such reforms would be achieved by 
emphasizing accountability and transparency within these 
harmonized systems.  In particular, “anti-corruption” 
reforms would ensure systemic allegiance to the principle of 
the rule of law.331 
 In this initial iteration, “good governance” policy 
explicitly avoided the realm of democratic politics, on the 
grounds that the expertise of the advising institutions was 
merely “economic”’ and not “political.”332  The “second 
generation” of good governance reforms, however, has 
recognized this distinction as a false one: good governance 
policy now explicitly recognizes the importance of 
democratic participation in governance reform, particularly 
through the incorporation of “civil society” into the decision-
making and reform process.333 
 
 
 
 
The Connection Between Weberian Thought and Good 
Governance Policy 
 
One of the leading architects of contemporary good 
governance theory, Ibrahim Shihata, explicitly articulated its 
Weberian intellectual heritage in essays such as The World 
Bank and “Governance” Issues in Its Borrowing Members.334  
                                                          
330  
331  
332  
333  
334 See Ibrahim Shihata, The World Bank and “Governance” Issues in its Borrowing 
Members, in 1 The World in a Changing World 53 (1991); see also Ibrahim 
Shihata, Issues of “Governance” in Borrowing Members – The Extent of Their 
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Alvaro Santos has observed that in arguing that “good 
governance” primarily meant the “rule of law,” Shihata 
“referred to Weber’s ideal type of ‘logically formal 
rationality’… in a modern state as conducive to economic 
growth.”335 
This application of Weberian theory also revealed the 
indebtedness of Shihata and others to a particular 
understanding of it, that of the modernization theorists as 
inherited from Talcott Parsons.  The conversion of Weber’s 
historical discussion to a prescriptive formula, and the focus 
of that formula on a single, universal solution to the 
challenge of economic development, bore the distinctive 
imprint of modernization theorists.336  Indeed, the focus on 
abstracting governance “functions” from political and 
societal contexts is part of the Parsonian inheritance of 
“global governance” scholarship more generally.337 
 It is the objective of this paper to argue that these 
concerns stem not just from ad hoc formulations of the actors 
and agencies involved.  Rather, the specific kinds of 
shortcomings identified by the Good Governance are 
intrinsically linked to the theoretical and analytical 
framework bequeathed by Parsonian Structural-
Functionalism and of Modernization Theory.  The remainder 
of this section shows how the concerns raised by the Good 
Governance Scholars track the Three Theoretical Shortcuts 
                                                                                                                                  
Relevance under the Bank’s Articles of Agreement, in The World Bank Legal Papers 
245, 268 (2000).  I am indebted to Alvaro Santos for his investigation of these 
sources and their link to Weberian theory.  See Alvaro Santos, The World Bank’s 
Uses of the ‘Rule of Law’ Promise in Economic Development, in Kennedy & Trubek 
eds., at 216, 229-234. 
335 See Santos, supra, at 230. 
336 Cf. James Gathii, James Gathii, Retelling Good Governance Narratives on 
Africa's Economic And Political Predicaments: Continuities and Discontinuities 
In Legal Outcomes Between Markets And States, 45 Vill. L. Rev. 971, 1000-1002 
(2000). 
337 Robert Latham, Politics in a Floating World: Toward a Critique of Global 
Governance, in Martin Hewson & Timothy Sinclair eds., APPROACHES TO GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE THEORY 23, 31-35 (1999). 
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traced in the foregoing genaeology. 
 
Theoretical Shortcut #1: One-Size-Fits-All 
 
 The tendency of good governance policy to produce a 
single set of recommended reforms, regardless of political or 
social context, has generated wide-ranging concerns 
amongst Good Governance Scholars.  In a discussion of the 
IMF-sponsored drive towards “building a legal architecture 
for global markets” through the “harmonization of law 
around the globe by way of developing legal standards,” for 
example, Katerina Pistor “questions the assumption that 
legal harmonization will result in the improvement of legal 
institutions.”338 Addressing standardization initiatives across 
several areas of law including “accounting, auditing, 
bankruptcy, corporate governance, insurance regulation and 
securities market regulation,”339 Pistor notes that the desire 
standardization effort arises out of the desire to achieve 
efficiency through increased certainty and uniformity.340  
Pistor notes the crucial downside of such efforts, however: 
“Even if it were possible to design the perfect law or to 
develop the best standards for a particular area of the law, 
the incorporation of this law into a domestic legal system is 
per se not a guarantee for it to become effective.”341   
Noting the “interdependence of legal rules and the 
                                                          
338 p.1, Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on 
Developing Economies, G-24 Discussion Paper Series, Research Paper for the 
Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs, 
No.4, June 2000, United Nations.  
339 P.3, Pistor Paper.  Examples were guidelines developed by the International 
Federation of Accountants (IFAC), the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors (IAIS), the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO), the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) including its Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, and the 
OECD including its Principles of Corporate Governance.  See id. 
340 Pistor paper at 4. 
341 Pistor paper at 5. 
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characteristic of law as a ‘cognitive institution,’”342 Pistor 
concludes that “the process of law-making, the compatibility 
of the new rules with pre-existing ones as well as with given 
economic and political conditions, and the existence of 
constituencies with a demand for these rules is more 
important than the contents of the supplied rules.”343 The 
general quality of harmonized legal standards leaves open 
many questions that must then be resolved 
particularistically.  For example, the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance do not specify the appropriate means 
for resolving conflicts between shareholders and other 
“stakeholders.”344  Proposals for securities harmonization 
assume a political system and governance framework 
compatible with such liquid capital markets.345  In these and 
numerous other ways, the harmonization effort only 
prompts, rather than resolves, the political and institutional 
challenges associated with governance in a particular 
context.  Since standardized provisions can only acquire 
meaning “by relating them to pre-existing legal concepts, or 
interpreting them from scratch… the process of 
standardization defeats its very purpose.”346  Ultimately, 
Pistor “warns against viewing legal standards as a panacea 
for building effective legal systems around the world.”347 
 The importance of contextually specific analysis and 
application emerges as one of the conclusions of Kevin Davis 
and Michael Trebilcock in their sweeping review of 
empirical studies of the relationship between legal reform 
and economic development.  Davis and Trebilcock note that 
the empirical data, though far from conclusive and 
                                                          
342 Pistor paper at 8. 
343 Pistor paper at 5. 
344 Pistor paper at 14 (considering employee codetermination and affiliated 
owners). 
345 Pistor paper at 12. 
346 Pistor paper at 17. 
347 Pistor paper at 17. 
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methodologically potentially questionable,348 do suggest a 
“weak” correlation between some of the major tenets of 
“good governance” reform such as establishing a formal 
system for contract enforcement.349 The authors caution, 
however, that the application of this tenet, as with many 
others in legal reform projects, through exclusive emphasis 
on judicial and court reform runs the risk of ignoring other 
modalities of governance that may be equally important in a 
given context.350   
Equally importantly, legal reform projects too often, 
in the opinion of the authors, ignore the far more challenging 
step of translating such broad policies into concrete 
administrative support.351  The focus of legal reforms on 
establishing particular content, such as contract enforcement, 
and obtaining general qualities, such as transparency, too 
often somehow overlooks the extensive and fine-grained 
overhaul of local administrative technologies required to 
achieve such objectives.352 
                                                          
348 See infra, referring to the subjective assessments that form the basis of many 
of these studies. 
349 See Kevin Davis & Michael Trebilcock, What Role Do Legal Institutions Play 
in Development?, IMF Paper Series 52 (1999)  (“There is no conclusive evidence 
one way or another on the relative efficiency of informal and formal methods of 
contract enforcement. However, at the aggregate level the available evidence 
weakly supports some broad generalizations.”) 
350 See id. At 9 (concluding generally that “an exclusive or predominant 
preoccupation with the court system inappropriately discounts the important 
role played by government departments and agencies and specialized 
administrative or regulatory bodies in the administration and enforcement of 
laws”). 
 
351 See id. (“the much more daunting challenge has proven to be that of 
enhancing the quality of institutions charged with the responsibility for enacting 
laws and regulations and institutions charged with the subsequent 
administration and/or enforcement of those laws or regulations.”). 
352 Cf. Chantal Thomas, Transfer of Technology in the Contemporary 
International Order, 22 Fordham International Law Journal 2096 (1999) 
(discussing contemporary reforms in international intellectual property and 
environmental law and concluding that “broad areas persist in which the Bretton 
Woods model for technology transfer falls short, and in which greater oversight 
 
 
RE-READING WEBER IN LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
 
 
 102
 
Theoretical Shortcut #2: The Determinism of “Values” 
 
 Good Governance Scholars have also questioned the 
degree to which contemporary legal reform projects may 
unwittingly be assuming that poor countries remain so 
because of inappropriate values.  Such questions have been 
raised in particular about the “anti-corruption” wing of good 
governance reform efforts.   
Through a Weberian lens, the anti-corruption focus 
can be understood as a desire to bring the state more into 
conformity with the goal of formal rationalism.  Corruption 
distorts the rational decision-making processes of the state 
by serving individual interests at the expense of efficient and 
transparent administration.  As such, the beneficial impact of 
reducing corruption in government is self-evident. 
  Critics of anti-corruption reforms have charged, 
however, that in effect they are expressions of a belief that 
people in poor countries have irrational values or corrupt 
values.  James Gathii, for example, has detailed extensively 
the way in which “[g]ood governance accounts demonstrate a 
significant distrust of African leadership.”353  Gathii provides an 
historical genaeology of conceptions by modern Western 
theorists of Africa as irrational and immoral.354  Such 
simplistic assumptions about the “inherent” values of 
Western versus non-Western cultures can, in turn, lead to an 
inability to perceive corruption in the West.355 
                                                                                                                                  
of technology transfer is needed even in a liberalized regime. Paradoxically, 
some of these areas arise out of the very changes in the international economic 
order that eliminated the old technology transfer model. These changes have 
created implementation costs and a general need for technology necessary to 
administer increased international trade, finance, information, and intellectual 
property flows.”) 
353 Gathii, supra, at 1008. 
354 Gathii, supra, at 975-985. 
355 David Kennedy, The International Anti-Corruption Campaign, 14 Conn. J. Int’l L. 
455 (1999) (summarizing concerns about anti-corruption, inter alia, as follows: 
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 This value determinism leads to a self-reinforcing 
perception amongst development analysts.  Poor countries 
are assumed to have irrational values and informal 
governance, and their irrational values and informal 
governance are then assumed to cause their poverty.  This 
circularity is a serious flaw in the methodology of much 
good governance reform analysis.  This work produces 
“quantitative” or “empirical” studies of the relationship 
between the rule of law or corruption, on the one hand, and 
economic growth, on the other; but the assessments of rule 
of law or corruption in the measured countries are often 
based on subjective judgments. 356 In particular, the World 
Bank’s Governance Indicators, which are widely read and 
widely applied in the Bank’s own policy work,357 are drawn 
from surveys of individual persons’ perceptions.358  While 
recent studies have endeavored to broaden the geographical 
sourcing for such surveys, the majority of the perceptions 
                                                                                                                                  
First, the claim that the anti-corruption campaign is the product of a double 
standard by the West against the rest - the normal lobbying and campaign 
financing practices of Washington law firms are seen as corruption when 
undertaken by members of leading families of Pakistan or Indonesia. Second, the 
anti-corruption campaign puts pressure on public practices in the Third World 
which are no different from the private practices of individuals and corporations 
in the First World. Imelda Marcos's shoes are a scandal, but Bill Gates' house is 
simply part of the idiosyncratic lifestyle of the rich and famous.”) 
356 See, e.g., Davis & Trebilcock, supra, at 53 (“The difficulty with those studies 
[on formal contract enforcement and economic growth] is that they all rely upon 
subjective assessments of the likelihood of government repudiation of contracts 
and the overall level of law and order….”). 
measures of the effectiveness with which contracts are enforced.”). 
357 See Alvaro Santos, supra. 
358 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, & Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters 
IV: 
Governance Indicators for 1996-2004 (World Bank, May 2005) (presenting 
“aggregate governance indicators” measuring “i) Voice and Accountability; ii) 
Political Instability and Violence; iii) 
Government Effectiveness; iv) Regulatory Quality; v) Rule of Law, and, vi) 
Control of 
Corruption” for “209 countries and territories,” and based “individual variables 
measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 37 separate data sources 
constructed by 31 different organizations”). 
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measured still originate from Western countries.359 
 Related to the idea that people in poor countries have 
irrational or corrupt values is the idea that Western systems 
have become successful due to superior values, an 
imperialist overtone in some anti-corruption efforts.360  This 
leads to a lack of respect for local ways of doing things and 
local values, on the assumption that such ways are 
inherently flawed.361  One result can be reforms and 
processes that ignore local considerations and therefore are 
perceived as illegitimate.  When combined with an 
insufficient attention to power dynamics, the result can be 
disastrous as discussed below.362  Also related to the idea 
that people in poor countries have irrational or corrupt 
values is the idea that development can only after such 
values have changed.363 As the Rostovian and culture and 
development perspectives described above suggest, the 
single biggest requirement for development in poor societies 
is that the culture embraces the “Protestant” values required 
for capitalistic economic growth.   
 This critique picks up on the relationship between 
normative and non-normative interests discussed above.  To 
be sure, Weber in the Protestant Ethic described value-
rational behavior associated with Calvinism as critical in 
producing the phenomenon of American capitalism.  The 
idea that the West succeeded economically because it had 
superior values is probably most commonly associated with 
Weber’s work in Protestant Ethic.  As the discussion above 
indicates, however, Weber’s understanding of social action 
and governance, including their manifestations in the 
                                                          
359 Id. 
360 See, e.g., Lawrence Harrison, Underdevelopment is a State of Mind: The Latin 
American Case (1985).   
361 See for example the literature relating to “informal” contract enforcement 
mechanisms, e.g., in Trebilcock & Davis at 50-53. 
362 Infra discussion of privatization cases. 
363 See Harrison, supra. 
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modern West, was ultimately more complex.  To begin with, 
according to one of his biographers, Weber himself explicitly 
rejected the idea of cultural inferiority, and criticized the 
Social Darwinists of his day who sought to explain 
differences in levels of development across societies in such 
terms.364 
 Defenders of good governance policy would 
undoubtedly argue that the charges of cultural imperialism 
misunderstand the project, and align themselves with 
Weber’s egalitarianism on this point.  Just as Weber pointed 
out that certain values were more amenable to capitalism 
from a descriptive rather than normative point of view, any 
endorsement of values in good governance policy would 
presumably be understood as purely instrumentalist: 
adopted for their productive effects rather than for their 
normative superiority.  
  The critique of cultural imperialism is not only that it 
focuses on so-called Western values above others, but also 
that it focuses on values at the expense of other dynamics 
that play a role in development.  Social action is 
characterized by material interests as well as ideals, and 
value-rational behavior is only one kind of social action.  
Consequently, development – including the development of 
law and administration through “good governance” – 
requires much more than a shift in values. 
 This critique reflects the elision of material interests in 
                                                          
364 JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, MAX WEBER: POLITICS AND THE SPIRIT OF TRAGEDY 35 
(1996): “[Weber] assumed that there could be no transcendant standard by which 
cultures could be judged superior and inferior.”  As an example of this view 
Diggins cites Weber’s statement in his essay on “Churches and Sects” regarding 
Mormons and Indians in Utah: “[O]ne person may assert that the… material and 
other accomplishments and characteristics which the Mormons brought there 
and developed are a proof of the superiority of the Mormons over the Indians, 
while another person … may prefer the desert and the romantic existence of the 
Indians.  No science of any kind can purport to be able to dissuade these persons 
from their respective views.”  Aside from its romanticism of the Indians, this 
statement appears to be a fairly strong version of cultural relativism rather than 
cultural imperialism. 
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the streamlined version of Weberian and post-Weberian 
thought.  Would Weber himself support an idea that values 
have to shift in order for development to be attained?  Weber 
did not approach his study of non-Western societies with a 
reformer’s eye.  His objective was to provide accurate and 
analytical description, rather than prescription.  Weber did, 
however, concern himself with the economic development of 
his native Germany.  Indeed, after writing the Protestant 
Ethic Weber expressed strong misgivings about the ability of 
Germany to compete with the industrious Americans.365 
 In proposing a course of action for Germany, 
however, Weber never suggested that Calvinist values be 
transposed.  Rather, he sought to identify concrete 
institutional reforms that might have the effect of spurring 
German society into more effective growth through the 
strengthening of the bourgeoisie.  The proposed reforms did 
not seek to replicate the institutional and legal characteristics 
of American society, but rather were designed to address 
what Weber saw as the specific weaknesses of German 
society – the overweening power of the executive and the 
relative influence of the quasi-feudal agrarian elite.366 
 In this vein, good governance reforms might be said 
to do the same: propose institutional reforms that can help to 
create an “entrepreneurial class.”  Weber was an avowed 
supporter of the bourgeoisie, and certainly the focus within 
modernization theory and good governance policy on the 
“capitalist” nucleus rightfully claims a Weberian pedigree.  
Yet Weber’s own thoughts about how to generate such 
activity in his home country showed that he rejected both (1) 
the idea that a shift in values was necessary, and that (2) the 
system of the model country could be unproblematically 
transplanted.  In this sense Weber rejected some of the 
tendencies of the discourses discussed above.  Although he 
                                                          
365 [CITE] 
366 [CITE] 
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was frustrated by the “values” of the Junkers, for example, 
Weber did not prescribe a shift in values but rather 
institutional mechanisms designed to counterbalance the 
influence of the Junkers – such as, direct election of the 
President by the people instead of the legislature. 
 This is, in fact, the objective of good governance 
reform.  Where good governance can continue to improve in 
achieving its stated objectives, therefore, would be to avoid 
sliding into a simplistic one-size-fits-all approach on the one 
hand, or to slip into simplistic value-deterministic approach, 
on the other. 
 
 A final upshot of “value determinism” lies in the 
centrality of the entrepreneurial class to governance models 
of development.  While a focus on the entrepreneurial class 
characterizes both Weber’s thought and the 
modernization/good governance approach, one speculates 
whether Weber’s awareness of the role of material 
conditions might have caused him to doubt whether legal 
reform should be the focus of development policy.  Weber 
simply did not address the question of how materially 
underdeveloped societies might achieve industrialization 
however (his sole reform project being Germany). 
Contemporary good governance reform picks up the 
emphasis of  modernization theory on creating a “capitalist 
nucleus,” in particular through multinational corporations 
and foreign direct investment.367   The critiques of this focus 
are multilayered.  Some empirical data show support for the 
hypothesized positive relationship between capital inflows 
and foreign direct investment, on the one hand, and growth, 
on the other.368  The associated dynamics and distributional 
consequences of this dynamic, nevertheless, have led to 
                                                          
367 See Brett L. Billet, Modernization Theory and Economic Development: 
Discontent in the Developing World (1993), at pp.4-5. 
368 P.115-117, Brett L. Billet, Modernization Theory and Economic Development: 
Discontent in the Developing World (1993). 
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widespread “discontent” with modernization theory in the 
developing world.369  Inflows of foreign direct investment 
correlate with higher levels of external debt, official aid and 
military assistance, suggesting that a “client-state” 
relationship of sorts may be necessary to attract and support 
these inflows.370  
In the context of “Washington-consensus” structural 
adjustments such as privatization, for example, private 
foreign direct investment in privatized state assets often 
floats on a wide range of support from interested 
governments (e.g., the political risk insurance provided by 
the U.S. to its nationals through OPIC) and international 
organizations (e.g., the loan guarantees provided by the IMF 
to such investors through MIGA).  Such supports enable 
foreign direct investment to occur but are also accompanied 
by formal371 and informal372 conditionalities shaping the 
policies and terms structuring such investment.  are [support 
with dissection of privatization relationship and IMF 
guarantees] This clustering effect of ties to foreign 
economies may produce the experience of impaired 
sovereignty that Rittich, for example, has observed as a 
critique of good governance reforms.373   
The “capitalist nucleus” dynamic appears to operate 
on an even more fundamental bias, that of the size of the 
host economy: such capital inflows tends to favor economies 
that already have some minimal level of capital formation.  
                                                          
369 Pp.117-122, Brett L. Billet, Modernization Theory and Economic Development: 
Discontent in the Developing World (1993). 
370 Pp.117-122, Brett L. Billet, Modernization Theory and Economic Development: 
Discontent in the Developing World (1993). 
371 The policy of conditionality. 
372 Technical assistance and advice.  See, e.g., Rittich, The Future of Law and 
Development, 26 Mich. J. Int’l L. 199, 206 (2004) (describing both conditionality 
and a “variety of other soft mechanisms to promote the reforms that they 
regarded as optimal… from technical advice…; thematic reports and policy 
prescriptions…; and empirical research.”). 
373 Pp.210-211 & 231-232, Rittich, The Future of Law and Development, 26 Mich. 
J. Int’l L. 199 (2004). 
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Consequently, those countries “that have the greatest need 
for external capital sources due to their relatively lesser 
ability to generate capital domestically are the most unlikely 
to obtain” it.374  According to one analyst, Bret Billet in a 
1993 study, the beneficiaries from this “circle of prosperity” 
are relatively few.375  Consequently, modernization-theory-
based measures such as structural adjustment and 
associated good governance reforms may serve to “enlarge 
the gap between the richest and the poorest” of countries.376 
If only a relative difference in economic growth, an 
enlarging gap need not undermine the case for Washington-
consensus reform.  Where the gap reflects an absolute 
decline, as apparently characterizes some countries, the 
cause for concern becomes much greater.377 
There are a number of flaws in good governance 
lending.  The first is the methodology of how “good 
governance” is computed.  For example, the World Bank 
relies too much on opinion surveys, allowing for the 
possibility that subjective impressions – and biases -- are 
reproduced in assessment criteria.  [cite Kaufman study]  
More disturbing from the perspective of good governance 
advocates is the suggestion of recent empirical data 
compiled by Eric Neumayer that funding appears to track 
“donor interest” – as measured, for example, by the export 
interest of donor-country nationals and by political ties,378 at 
                                                          
374 Pp.121, Brett L. Billet, Modernization Theory and Economic Development: 
Discontent in the Developing World (1993). 
375 Pp.121, Brett L. Billet, Modernization Theory and Economic Development: 
Discontent in the Developing World (1993). 
376 Pp.122, Brett L. Billet, Modernization Theory and Economic Development: 
Discontent in the Developing World (1993). 
377 See Chantal Thomas, Am U ILR discussion of relative versus absolute 
inequality amongst countries, noting that some Eastern European countries and 
sub-Saharan African countries have experienced an absolute decline in some 
income and quality of life indicators. 
378 Neumayer, at pp.97 (concluding that although “recipient need” as measured 
by poverty levels proved significant in determining “aid eligibility,” donor 
interests such as “colonial experience” and “economic interests in the form of 
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least as much as “good governance” criteria such as 
adherence to the rule of law or low levels of corruption.379  
The same study found that, of all the potential criteria for 
measuring good governance, “low regulatory burden” 
proved to be the only consistently significant correlative to 
aid levels.380   
Despite the nominal value assigned to democracy and 
respect for human rights, these factors were, by contrast, 
indeterminate or insignificant in determining aid levels.381  
These empirical findings seem to support similar 
conclusions from Billet’s study of a decade earlier that 
political and economic interests “cluster” around and 
ultimately drive such programs.  They also support the 
intuition voiced by critics of good governance that market-
oriented reforms continue to trump democratic reforms, 
notwithstanding the formal inclusion of the latter in 
contemporary good governance assessments.382  Finally, 
such findings underscore the general concern that recipient 
countries continue to be rewarded for implementing “one 
size fits all” economic policies, rather than for adopting more 
specific institutional reforms related to participatory and 
non-corrupt decision-making.383 
 
                                                                                                                                  
exports and military-strategic interests” proved more significant in determining 
the level of “good governance” aid).   
379 Neumayer found that “[l]ow corruption and respect for the rule of law are 
basically irrelevant” in determining good governance aid flows.  Neumayer at 
p.82. 
380 p.97 Neumayer. 
381 P.97 Neumayer (finding that such criteria determined initial aid eligibility but 
not aid levels). 
382 See Thomas, Does Good Governance Privilege Markets at the Expense of 
Democracy?; Rittich, The Future of Law and Development at 224-225. 
383 Rittich, The Future of Law and Development, at 224-225 (“Although one of 
the touchstones of second generation reforms is the rejection of a one-size-fits-all 
template for development and the importance of wider participation in the 
formulation of development goals, there is surprisingly little diversity in either 
the discourse or the prescriptions about the legal reforms needed for 
development.”) 
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Theoretical Shortcut #3: The Correlation Between 
Modern Capitalism and Democracy. 
 
 Although good governance reforms have recently 
begun to emphasize the importance of participation by civil 
society, some Good Governance Scholars have observed that 
much remains in the way of implementation.384  Good 
governance programs too often maintain a dual and self-
reinforcing narrowness of focus: substantively on promoting 
the interests of the investors as opposed to other 
stakeholders in economic growth; and institutionally in 
maintaining a top-down, “one-size-fits-all” approach.  The 
preceding two sections suggested that these two 
shortcomings flow from the Theoretical Shortcuts intrinsic to 
the analytical framework supporting good governance 
policy.   This section argues that the dangers that flow 
from this self-reinforcing narrowness are insufficiently 
perceived due to an overly casual assumption about the 
natural correlation between modern bureaucracy, capitalism, 
and democracy.385 
 A striking example of this would be the World Bank’s 
recent experiences with privatization of water utilities in 
Latin America, and especially in Cochabamba, Bolivia.  The  
strategy implemented a “one-size-fits-all” program of 
privatization rooted in the Washington consensus.386  The 
focus of such programs has ostensibly been to improve 
water delivery in poor countries, reducing the inefficiency of 
existing government utilities and advancing progress 
towards the Millennium Development Goal of improved 
access to potable water. 
 In practice, however, the privatizations often focused 
                                                          
384 See, e.g., Rittich, supra. 
385 Amy Chua has made this point with respect to the rights of ethnic minorities 
in developing economies, in her book World on Fire. 
386 See, e.g., World Bank, Strategic Directions for World Bank Engagement 
(2003); World Bank, Water Resources Management (1993). 
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on protecting the interests of investors, to the (perhaps 
unintended) exclusion of other stakeholders and especially 
of consumers.  Thus, the World Bank was able to employ its 
formidable resources to offer political risk guarantees and 
below-market loans to make such privatizations attractive 
for investors.   
 From the modernization-cum-good-governance 
perspective, such a program may not have raised red flags 
because of the policy shortcomings that arise from the 
Theoretical Shortcuts.  First, privatization was accepted as a 
universally desirable and effective legal reform.  Second, an 
emphasis may have been placed on the interests of investors 
over other stakeholders on the theory that this emphasis 
would unleash the “capitalistic spirit” necessary to trigger 
economic growth.  Finally, no deliberate assessment of the 
role of democratic participation was made, perhaps because 
of an insufficient sensitivity to the role of power and 
coercion in modern bureaucratic governance. 
 Had local consumers been consulted in advance, an 
awareness of the implausibility of the Bolivia privatization 
might have surfaced.  Proponents might have realized that 
the projected prices for privatized water services far 
exceeded the price points at which consumers were willing 
to pay, particularly those for whom the new water service 
would require a third or more of their monthly salaries.387  
Moreover, proponents might have realized that land claims 
to local water sources were contested.  Because none of these 
assessments were made, the Bolivia water privatization 
proceeded as planned but soon encountered radical 
resistance on the part of the local population, leading to the 
cancellation of the privatization contract and embroiling the 
Bank in controversy.  Unfortunately, the experience with 
Bolivia resembles those of other recent water privatizations 
                                                          
387 Public Citizen, Water Privatization Fiascoes: Broken Promises and Social 
Turmoil (2003). 
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throughout the developing world.388 
 The disastrous experience with water privatizations 
indicates the danger of insufficiently incorporating local 
participation and local information into the development 
policymaking process.  Recently, good governance policy 
has sought to correct this imbalance by explicitly 
incorporating “civil society.”  Good Governance Scholars 
such as Kerry Rittich, have argued that such recent reforms 
have taken place more on the surface than in practice.389 
 
 
PART III. Conclusions and Prospects For Reform 
 
David Ellerman, a former World Bank economist, has 
sought to incorporate many of these insights into a new 
approach to development policy, which he entitles 
“Autonomy Respecting Development.”  Ellerman has 
argued that “social engineering” approaches to development 
are destined to fail:  “problems in the social engineering 
approach are endemic. Sustainable transformation towards 
developmental ends needs to be based on motives that come 
out of the doers' own internal values—and knowledge needs 
to be grounded on the doers' own learning experiences.”390 
 
Following the observations related to the three 
Theoretical Shortcuts, such “autonomy-respecting 
development” should: (1) avoid the “one-size-fits-all” 
approach by carefully considering local context; (2) avoid the 
“determinism of values” by eschewing implicit cultural 
imperialism, understanding the role of material conditions  
and “nonnormative interest” in affecting outcomes, and 
balancing the interests of investors with those of other 
                                                          
388 Id. 
389 Rittich, The Future of Law and Development, 26 Mich. J. Int’l L. 199 (2004). 
390 Ellerman, Autonomy-Respecting Development. 
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stakeholders; and (3) incorporate an awareness of the role of 
coercion in modern governance, and the non-automaticity of 
democracy therein, by specifically seeking out local 
participation. 
 Good governance reforms are already moving in this 
direction.  Policy documents by the World Bank increasingly 
emphasize the importance of context and local capacity-
building.  They also recognize the importance of engaging 
economic groups beyond investors.  Finally, they have 
moved towards institutionalizing more participatory 
decision-making.   
The World Bank Inspection Panel exemplifies all three 
kinds of insights.   The Inspection Panel allows local groups 
to identify specific grievances relating to World Bank 
sponsored development projects.  The Panel could be better 
institutionalized, however; currently it is ad hoc, dependent 
on a petition rather than an automatic part of the process; it 
frequently occurs after the development project has already 
been completed; and it often serves only an advisory 
function.  Improvements would come from including this 
kind of information-gathering as an automatic and central 
part of the formulation of local development projects. 
 The solutions offered by Ellerman, the Inspection 
Panel, and the Good Governance Scholars will be noticeably 
more redistributive (or at least multi-distributive) than the 
policies offered by the Rostovians and Parsonians.   
 Ultimately, the proposed differences in distributional 
consequences cannot escape an underlying debate on 
political economy.  There simply is a difference of opinion 
about the relative value of participatory, redistributive 
development policy, and therefore about the relative values 
of legal reforms designed towards that end.   
 Moreover, all of these approaches disregard 
sovereignty, in the traditional sense of the term to mean the 
recognition of a unitary, unconstrained state.  In different 
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ways, all of these approaches situate themselves within a 
contemporary “global governance” framework, in which 
law and policy arises out of the interaction between multiple 
institutional and social planes. 
 Finally, these suggested reforms do not necessarily 
reflect what Weber himself might have recommended, if he 
were writing on international political economy today.   
Rather, they represent an attempt to put “Weberian wheels” 
back on the right track in law and development.391 
  
                                                          
391 See Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantement of Logically Formal Rationality, or 
Max Weber’s Sociology of Law in the Geneaology of the Contemporary Mode of Western 
Legal Thought, supra, at 1076. 
